P L D 1956 Supreme Court (Ind (PLP)

In advancing the first two of the above contentions learned counsel for the appellants assumes and asserts that the Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury was unequivocally of the opinion that there was no reliable evidence on which the conviction could be based and that the appellants should be, acquitted. On this assumption, he urges that, when in the circumstances the jury gave a ‑ unanimous verdict of guilty, his obvious duty was either to express his disagreement with the verdict of the jury and refer the whole case for the considera tion of the High Court under section 307, Criminal P. C., or, at the least, to have placed on record his reasons why in spite of his clear opinion against the prosecution case, he did not consider it necessary to disagree from the verdict of the jury. In order to substantiate this point of view, learned counsel took us through various portions of the charge to the jury and we have ourselves perused carefully the entirety of it. As already stated, the learned Judge undoubtedly pointed out m his charge all the weaknesses of the prosecution evidence in great detail. It is also likely that he was inclined for an ac quittal. But we are riot satisfied that he came to a definite 4 and positive conclusion that there should be acquittal. While pointing out the weakness of the prosecution evidence with leaning against its reliability he has not specifically rejected every important item of the prosecution evidence. It was only in some places that he stated categorically that he would not accept a particular item of evidence and would advise the jurors to reject it. In other places, while pointing out the infirmities of the evidence, he was not so categorical and positive, as to what his own opinion on that item of evidence was. For instance; out of the two eye‑witnesses, P. Ws. 1 and 2, the learned Judge said, so far as P. W. 2 is concerned, as follows: "Personally speaking I am not satisfied with the evidence of recognition of the accused persons as the assailants of ,Sourindra Gopal furnished by P. W. 2, Satyapada. You will be advised, gentlemen, not to rely upon the evidence of P. W. 2." As regards the evidence of the other eye‑witness, P. W. 1, however he summed it up as follows: "You should take a comprehensive view of all matters and then decide whether you should act upon the evidence of recognition of the accused persons as the assailants of Sourin dra furnished by P. W. 1, Bhupati." There was similar difference in the expression of his opinions with reference to the evidence of the dying declarations of the deceased. It ‑may be recalled that the evidence of the oral dying declarations is of statements to P. W. 7, Phani, and P. W. 3 Radhashyam. The evidence of statement to P. W. 7 was given by a number of witnesses viz. P. Ws. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and

13. Out of these so far as the evidence of P. W. 9 is concerned, the learned Judge specifically stated as follows: "I should tell you that you should not believe P. W. 9 when he stated on being questioned by Phani, Sourindra men tioned Moseb and Sattar as his assailants." But he did not rule out the evidence of the others on this item in the same manner. Then again, when he dealt with the question whether the slip of paper, Ex. 4, is genuine the learned Judge noticed that the said paper was shown 'to have been taken from the medical officer P. W. 17 into the posses sion of the Investigating Officer, P. W. 35, about a month later and commented on it as follows: "Personally speaking I see no reasonable explanation as to why the I. O. should not have seized Ex. 4 from P. W. 17 immediately after it was recorded, if it was recorded on 3rd November 1951, and sent it to the Magistrate forthwith." All the same, the learned Judge also remarked thus: "You will consider very seriously whether you have any reason to disbelieve the evidence of P. RNs. 17, 32 and 33." P. Ws. 32 and 33 are witnesses who spoke to the statement of the deceased said to have been taken by the Doctor, P. W.

17. Taking the charge to the jury, therefore, comprehensively we are unable to find that the learned Judge rejected the pro secution evidence and arrived at a clear and categorical conclusion in his own mind that the appellants were not guilty. We are, therefore, unable to accept the " assumption of learned counsel for the appellants that the Judge agreed with the unanimous verdict of the jury against his own personal conviction, as to the guilt of the accused. It appears to us, therefore, that there is no foundation, as a fact, for the argu ment that the learned Judge should have made a re ference to the High Court under section 307, Criminal P. C. or that, in any case, he should‑ have placed on record his reasons for agreeing with the verdict of the jury notwithstanding his‑own personal opinion to the contrary. Assuming however that the charge to the jury in this case can be read at being indicative of a definite opinion reached by the Sessions Judge, in favour of the appellants, it does not follow that merely on that account he is obliged to make a reference under section 307; Criminal P. C. What is required under that section is not merely disagreement with the verdict of the jury but the additional factor that the learned Sessions Judge "is clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court". It is now well‑settled, since the decision of the Privy Council in‑Ramnugrah Singh v. Emperor, (AIR 1946 P C 151) that under section 307, Criminal P. C. a. Sessions Judge, even if he dis agrees with the verdict of the jury must normally give effect to that verdict unless he is prepared to hold the further and clear opinion "that no reasonable body of men could have given the verdict which the jury .did". We are certainly not prepared to say that the present case satisfies that test or that the charge to the jury indicated any such clear conclusion. Indeed it is to be noticed that on intimation by the jury of its unanimous verdict, the learned Judge has recorded that he "agreed with and accepted the verdict". We have no doubt that it was perfectly competent for him to do so. Learned counsel urges that this acceptance is a judicial act and that having regard to the whole tenor of the Judge's charge to the jury, he was at least under a duty to himself and to the appellate Court to record his reasons for acceptance of the verdict of the jury. We are unable to agree with this contention. It may be that in a case where a Judge in his charge to the jury has clearly and definitely expressed himself for acquittal it would be very desirable, though not imperative, that he should give his reasons why he changed his view and accepted the verdict' of the jury. But we can find no basis for any such contention in this case. The two further contentions that remain which are enumerated above as 3 and 4 were not raised before the High Court. We are reluctant to allow any such contentions to be raised on special leave. The point relating to the possibility of the verdict having been the result of bias has no serious basis. It appears to us that the learned Sessions Judge had no justi fication in this case for imagining the possibility of such bias and giving a warning to the jury in this behalf. This is not a case which arose out of any incident involving communal tension. The likelihood of any such bias is not to be assumed merely from the fact of the appellants being Muhammadans and the jurors being Hindus. Nor is it right to take it for granted merely from the fact of proximity of the place of trial to the border between West and East Bengal. On the other hand, it is not without some relevance that when the jury was empanelled at the commencement of the trial, there was absolutely no such objection taken. Nor was the right of challenge to the jurors exercised. Learned counsel for the appellants has very stren uously argued before us, the point relating to the inadequacy of the examination of the appellants under section 342, Criminal P. C. Now, it is true that the examination in this case was absolutely perfunctory. The only questions put to each of the accused in the Sessions Court, and the answers thereto were the following. "Q. You have heard the charges made and the evidence adduced against you. Now say, what is your defence? What have got to say? A. I am innocent. Q. Will you say anything move? A. No. Q. Will you adduce any evidence in defence? A. No. There can be no doubt that this is very, inadequate compliance with the salutary provisions of section 342, Criminal P. C. It is regrettable that there has occurred in this case such a serious lacuna in procedure notwithstanding repeated in sistence of this Court, in various decisions commencing "Taro Singh v. The State" (A I R 1951 S C 441) on a due and fair compliance with the terms of section 342, Criminal P. C. But it is also well recognised that a judgment is not to be set aside merely by E reason of inadequate compliance with section 342, Criminal P. C. It is settled that clear prejudice must be shown. This Court has clarified the position, in relation to cases where accused is represented by counsel at the trial and in appeal. It is up to the accused or his counsel in such cases to satisfy the Court that such inadequate ex amination has resulted in miscarriage of justice. This Court in its judgment in the latest case on this matter viz. `K. C. Mathew v. The State of Travancore‑Cochin' (A I R 1956 S C 241), (delivered on 15th December 1955) has laid down that "if the counsel was unable to say that his client had in fact been prejudiced and if all that he could urge was that there was a possibility of pre judice, that was not enough". Learned counsel could not, before us, make out any clear prejudice,. All that learned counsel for the appel lants urges is, that this might be so in a case where the trial was with the assessors and the Judge's view on the evidence was the main determining factor. But he contends that the same would not be the case where the trial is with the aid of a jury. Learned counsel urges that a full and clear questioning in a jury trial does not serve the mere purpose of enabling the accused to put forward his defence or offer his explanation, which may be considered along with the entire evidence in the case. The jury would, he suggests also, have the opportunity of being impressed one way or the other by the method and the manner of the accused when giving the explanation and answering the questions and that the same might turn the scale. Learned counsel urges, therefore, that the non‑examination or inadequate examination under section 342, Criminal P. C. in a jury trial must be presumed to cause prejudice and that a conviction in a jury trial should be set aside and retrial ordered, if there is no adequate examination under section 342, Criminal P. C. We are not prepared to accept this contention, as a matter of law. The question of prejudice is ultimately one of inference from all the facts and circumstances of each case. The fact of the trial being with the jury may possibly also be an additional circumstance for consideration in an appropriate case. But we see no reason to think that in the present case this would have made any difference. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants in this behalf. In any case, an argument of this kind which would, if accepted, necessitate a retrial, is one that ought to be put forward at the earliest stage and at any rate at the time of the regular appeal in the High Court. This cannot be entertained for the first time in an appeal on special leave. For all the above reasons this appeal is dismissed. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.