P L D 1966 Azad J (PLP)

MUHAMMAD SHARIF, A. C. J.‑This is an appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 30‑11‑1964, by which the respondent was ordered to be released on bail. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the Sessions Judge, Mirpur, acting as the Tribunal under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, ordered the arrest of the respondent on 26th November 1964; under section 23 (A) of the said Act. The respondent was arrested and produced before the Tribunal who by its order dated 27th November 1964, in spite of the fact that a bail application had been presented on behalf of the accused, ordered his detention in police custody for 10 days. The accused respondent then approached the High Court for bail and the learned Single Judge by order dated 30‑11‑1964, accepted the bail application and ordered his release on furnishing bail in the sum of Rs. 10,000 with two sureties in the like amount. The Government has now come up in appeal against the said order. The learned Government Advocate has argued that only judgments passed by the Tribunal are appealable before the High Court; and that all orders passed by the Tribunal are final. His contention is that the order of bail made by the learned Single Judge was made without jurisdiction since the order passed by the Tribunal for the detention of the respondent in police custody was a final order. The learned Government Advocate has referred to subsections (6) and (7) of section 23‑A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, Subsection (6) provides that:‑

"The State Bank of Pakistan or any other person aggrieved by a judgment of a Tribunal may, within three months from the date of the judgment, appeal to the High Court." Subsection (7) provides that:‑

"Save as provided in the preceding subsection, all judgments and orders passed by a Tribunal shall be final." The Azad Kashmir Legislative Authority while adopting the Pakistan Foreign Exchange Regulation Act made certain amendments in the said Act and in subsection (6) we are to read the `District Magistrate' in place of the "State Bank of Pakistan." "Section 23‑A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which is pertinent to this appeal is reproduced below.‑ Section 23‑A.‑(1) Every Sessions Judge shall, for the areas within the territorial limits of his jurisdiction, be a Tribunal for trial of an offence punishable under section 23. (2) A Tribunal may, transfer any case for trial to an Additional Sessions Judge within its jurisdiction who shall, for trying a case so transferred, be deemed to be a Tribunal constituted for the purpose. (3) A Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Magistrate of the First Class in relation to criminal trials, and shall follow as nearly as may be the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for trials before such Magistrate, and shall also have powers as provided in the said Code in respect of the following matters, namely:‑ (a) directing the arrest of the accused; (b) issuing search warrants; (c) ordering the police to investigate any offence and report; (d) authorising detention of a person during police investi gation; (e) ordering the release of the accused on bail. (4) All proceedings before a Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 293 and 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and for the purposes of section 196 thereof, and the provisions relating to the execution of orders and sentences in the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall so far as may be, apply to orders and sentences passed by a Tribunal. (5) As regards sentences of fine, the powers of a Tribunal shall be as extensive as those of a Court of Session. (6) The State Bank of Pakistan or any other person aggrieved by a judgment of a Tribunal may, within three months from the date of the judgment appeal to the High Court. (7) Save as provided in the preceding subsection, all judgments and orders passed by a Tribunal shall be final." Clause (d) of subsection (3) invests the Tribunal with the powers of authorising detention of a person during the police investigation but such powers are to be exercised as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act has not been classified in the Act itself as bailable or non‑bailable or as cognizable or non‑cognizable and under Schedule II of the Code of Criminal Procedure offences against laws other than the Penal Code are to be treated as non‑cognizable and bailable if punishable with imprisonment for one year and upwards but less than 3 years. Under section 23 the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. The offence is, therefore, non‑cognizable and bailable. Subsection (2) of section 23, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, any offence punishable under this section shall be cognizable for such period as the Central Government may from time to time by notification in official Gazette, declare. The Government has been invested with the authority to declare any offence punishable under section 23 to be cognizable and even that for such period as the Government may think fit. Here an exception has been made to the provisions of the Code of Criminal 'Procedure but no such exception has been made in the matter of bail. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act never meant to treat the offence under the Act as a non‑bailable offence. It is not understandable how a Magistrate, and the Tribunal which has been invested with the powers of a Magistrate, can order the detention of person in police custody in, the matter of an offence which is bailable one. It is a well‑known rule of interpretation that penal statutes are to be strictly construed and words that are not there should not be imported into the same while interpreting the provisions of the penal statutes. At the same time it is also a well known rule of interpretation that an interpretation which leads to ridiculous and ludicrous results is to be discarded. Clause (d) of subsection (3) of section 23‑A would come into conflict with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if it were interpreted to mean that in case of bailable offence, the Tribunal could order the detention of a person in police custody. We think this clause has been enacted to meet a case where a person has been ordered to furnish bail and he fails to furnish bail, in such a case he may be ordered to be detained in police custody; otherwise this clause would come into conflict with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and shall have to be discarded. There is .a Full Bench judgment of our own High Court reported as Dil Mir v. Azad J. 8c K. Government (PLD1959AzadJ&K61) in which it was laid down that "it is a well recognized rule of interpretation that all Penal Statutes are to be construed strictly and the Court should not import into statutes words that are not there. Where the question of jurisdiction of Courts is involved, the Courts are very reluctant to throw away their jurisdiction unless specifically taken away by the use of clear and unambiguous language used in the statutes. Interpreting section. 16 of the Emergency Powers Act the Full Bench held that section 16 does not mean anything beyond this that certain offences which were either non‑cognizable or bailable or compoundable have been made cognizable, non bailable and non‑compoundable. It was further laid down in this authority that if it was intended that persons accused of offences under the Emergency Powers Act shall not be released on bail, the Legislative Authority could very well have expressed that intention by the use of clear and an unambiguous words. Following the Full Bench authority it shall be said in the present case also that if the Legislative Authority meant to treat the offence under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act as a non‑bailable offence, it could have said so in clear and unambiguous terms and at the same time it shall be said that if it was intended to take away the powers of the High Court of releasing persons accused of offence under section 23 of the said Act on bail under section 498,, Cr. P. C., that power should have been taken off by the use of clear and unambiguous language. There is nothing in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to say that the powers of the High Court to admit a person accused of an offence under the said Act to bail have been restricted or taken away. The order of the learned Single Judge admitting the respondent to bail, therefore, could not be said to be an order passed without jurisdiction. The appeal fails and is dismissed. S. Q. Appeal dismissed.