2001 PLP 642 (PLC)

Date of hearing: 7th May, 2001. This appeal has been filed by Muhammad Ibrahim who claims that he was appointed as Jigger Operator on 4‑5‑1999 in the respondent's Establishment but he was not given necessary documents such as Social Security Card etc. consequent upon his appointment despite his reposted demands. He, therefore, complained to Joint Director Labour but without any result. On 7‑2‑2000 he requested his Manager to issue 'S' form for treatment of his wife but that too was refused. Instead he was told to get his wife treated in some private Hospital and then submit the Medical Bills. On ‑ 15‑2‑2000 as soon as he submitted Medical Bills the respondents Management got annoyed and terminated his services verbally on 16‑2‑2000. Thereupon, ‑he sent a mandatory grievance notice on 23‑2‑2000 which was never replied. He ultimately filed grievance petition in the Sindh Labour Court No.III, Karachi with prayer of his reinstatement and payment of‑full back benefits. His petition was, however, dismissed by Order, dated 31st July, 2000 and hence this appeal.

2. The respondents Management on receipt of notice about the grievance petition filed their written reply denying the appellant's allegations. According to their reply his appointment as Jigger Operator was made on 4‑8‑1999 purely on temporary basis, adding further that the appellant was neither regular nor punctual in his duties nor he complied with the requirements of Social Security. He also failed to produce his two photographs. Their plea was that availing of medical facility of a Private Hospital was not admissible and the documents filed by the appellant were not genuine. It was alleged by respondent have great that appellant always tried to black‑mail them. Apart from above he was a habitual absentee and got a devoted worker. Hence his services were terminated and the termination order was sent to him but he refused to receive it. On 4‑3‑2000 the appellant made a fresh application for his reappointment as Jigger Operator, undertaking to work devotedly to the satisfaction of the management. The respondents Management has denied having received the appellant's grievance notice adding further that it was due to his own default of being irregular and non‑punctual in his duties that his services were terminated. Their plea is that Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 was not applicable to the appellant's case as his employment was made purely as temporary basis.

3. I have heard the learned counsel of the parties and have perused the relevant record in the case file.

4. From the Issues that the learned Labour Court framed for decision in the case the only important Issue was whether termination of appellant's services was legal. It is stated in the grievance petition that services of the appellant were terminated verbally on 16‑2‑2000 (vide para. 5) and no letter of termination was given to him. He has repeated this statement in his affidavit‑in‑evidence vide para.

11. Neither the appellant himself nor the respondent's Management has produced his termination order in writing. Even the learned counsel for the appellant in course of his argument made a frank admission that since the appellant himself left service no letter of termination was issued. However, clause (3) of Standing` Order 12 of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 reads as under:‑- "The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take notice in accordance with provisions of section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969 and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as to they applied the redress of an individual grievance." It is, thus clear from the above provision of law that it would be mandatory to issue written order of termination of services of any workman. It was rather surprising to note in the Reply Statement filed on behalf of the respondents Management that termination order was actually issued and sent to the appellant but he refused to receive it. But as stated above such order has not been produced on record. If the respondents Management had really issued the termination order as stated by them in the Written Reply there was no reason why they withheld it and did not produce it alongwith their reply or through their witnesses alongwith his affidavit‑in‑evidence. Therefore, their statement that termination order was sent to the appellant but he refused to receive it cannot be believed. I am, therefore, convinced that no termination order was issued in writing. The learned Labour Court has obviously overlooked this important aspect of the case.

5. So far appointment of the appellant is concerned not only the appellant himself has claimed that he was appointed as Jigger Operator in the respondents Establishment but the respondents themselves have admitted that his appointment was made is that capacity but on purely temporary basis. As disclosed in the, Reply Statement the appellant's services were terminated mainly on the round that he was coming late or remained absent from duties. But there is nothing to show that disciplinary action was ever taken against the appellant on any occasion. Therefore, mere statement to the effect that he was late comer or habitual absentee was not enough unless it was supported by positive evidence. The assertion made in the reply statement that termination order was issued and even sent to the appellant was manifestly inconsistent with the disclosure made by the respondents counsel that no written termination order was issued.

6. For the above reasons neither written order of termination was issued nor any such order contained explicit reason for appellant's termination of services. As such the mandatory provision of law referred to above was not complied with. Hence the verbal order of termination of appellant's services was illegal and cannot be supported. Having arrived at this conclusion the judgment of the learned Lower Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. H.B.T.60/K (L. Trib.) ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal allowed.