1993 PLP 505 (CLC)

4. The rent cases were resisted by the appellant and the mala file intention of the respondents/landladies were pointed out. It was pleaded that the conduct of the respondents in continuously demanding increase in rent more than the agreed rent was a strong factor, which militated against their bona fides in respect of personal requirement. The defence of the appellant in main is that the plea of personal requirement raised by the respondents is nothing but a smoke‑screen designed purposely as a sort of intimidation with a view to compel her to accede to the unreasonable demands in the matter of increase of rent.

5. The parties went to trial on the following issues:‑‑ (i) Whether the applicant requires the shop in question for her persona bona fide use? (ii) What should the order be?

6. The parties tendered evidence through their respective affidavits‑in evidence. They have also placed on record the relevant documents. On the assessment of evidence, both oral as well as documentary, the learned V Senior Civil .fudge and Rent Controller (South), Karachi (Miss Soofia Latif) decided both the applications against the appellant, giving rise to both these appeals. 7. 1 had the benefit of a full and able arguments from both Mr. Mohsin Tayebaly, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. H.A. Rahmani, learned counsel for the respondents, who have given a commendable labour and time to the study of the brief. I have also gone through the record of these cases carefully.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to several points but eventually confined his arguments to the following contentions:‑‑ (i) That there is no evidence available on record to prove that the respondents have got necessary funds to start with the proposed business of garments. (ii) No satisfactory evidence to prove the capability of the respondents to run the proposed business is adduced by the respondents. (iii) The respondents have failed to produce the evidence to the effect. that the income generated from business would be more than the rental amount presently received by the respondents. (iv) That there is no evidence on record to satisfy the Court that one of the two shops would not cater the needs of the respondents. (v) No evidence is brought on record to prove the partnership between two sisters, viz., the respondents in F.R.A. No.134 of 1988, and F.R.A. No. 135 of 1988, who have given different names of the proposed business concern. (vi) That since the respondents belong to a highly respectable and rich family, it was obligatory on their part to have examined their male members of family to prove that the ladies of their family are permitted to associate themselves in a business of this kind. (vii) That the respondents did not examine both of them in these cases separately although the need is joint, which should have been proved by both of them. (viii) That the demand in increase of rent continuously is a strong factor which militates against the bona fides of the respondents.

9. In short it is contended on behalf of the appellant that while considering the evidence as a whole and arriving at a conclusion on the basis thereof, the above factors may be kept in view.

10. The contentions at S. No (i), (ii), (iii), (v) and (vi) in my view are wholly misconceived. Para 3 of the written statement filed by the appellant makes it clear that the respondents belong to a rich family. There will therefore be no problem for them to arrange finances for proposed business.

11. The contention at S. No. (ii) was considered by this Court in the case of Sher Ahmad Jan v. Mst. Zubeda Nasreen, reported in 1989 CLC 1113, and was answered in the following words:‑‑ "The word `business' applies to an occupation of a mercantile or commercial nature. The physical involvement for carrying on business or trade is not necessary. The impression that the respondent should have skill or capability to do the business of tailoring herself is wholly misplaced. The word `business' by itself is very comprehensive and it may at some time include carrying on of a business through employees."

12. In the case of Mst. Ghulam Fatima and 3 others v. Noor Hussain, reported in 1991 SCMR 1939, the following observations were made:‑‑ "As regards the second ground, it is not the requirement of law that the landlord/landlady must establish on record that he/she is badly in need of earning livelihood for getting his/her own property vacated for his/her personal use. With the galloping inflation in the country and when every one is free to embark on a profession of his/her own liking, a chance cannot be denied even to those who have not worked so far, from starting a business or participating in an enterprise for the purpose of augmenting their income and fulfilment of their aspirations".

13. As regards the contention at S. Nos. (iii), (v) and (vi) the learned counsel for appellant has very little to say. The crux of the whole matter is whether the respondents required the disputed premises in `good faith' viz., honestly and once it is established then the Rent Controller is left with no p other option but to order the eviction of their tenant. It may be noted that the respondents/landladies were not obliged to make out a case of absolute necessity. They had simply to prove that they required the premises honestly and nothing beyond that. It will not be out of place to mention here that none of these pleas was raised in the written statement filed by the appellant.

14. Coming now to contention at S. No. (iv), whether one shop could cater I the needs of respondents, it may be observed that sufficiency or insufficiency of accommodation is the prerogative of landlord/landlady and they are not expected to make sacrifice to facilitate their tenant who has been able to establish her business after spending huge amount and putting up hard labour. This contention has, therefore, no force.

15. There is no rule of law that bona fides of the respondents could be proved by examining both the sisters in both the ejectment applications. This fact could be proved in an ordinary way like any other fact in issue. The. evidence of both the sisters was recorded separately in cases filed by each of them which was found sufficient to establish the fact that they needed the respective premises for a joint venture. I can see no reason for not accepting the evidence of the respondents. There is, therefore, no force in the contention at S. No. (vii) raised o n behalf of the appellant.

16. As regards the last contention about the demands made by the respondents for the increase of rent, it may be observed that these demands were made in pursuance of tenancy agreements. Even otherwise demand of higher rent does not per se cast any doubt about personal bona fide requirement, if proved independently. The respondents as their own witnesses have testified the facts leading to the ejectment proceedings, out of which these appeals have arisen both of theme are educated ladies and out of them one, namely, Mst. Rashida Bukhari is serving as teacher. They want to utilise their money, abilities. energies and time in better manner with better results to further improve their financial position and they cannot be denied to use their own properties only because none of the ladies from their family had earlier I entered into this field. After all some body has to take lead.

17. During the pendency of F.RA. No. 135 of 1988, an application under Order 41, rule 27 read with section 151, C.P.C. (C.MA. No. 51 of 1989) was moved on behalf of appellant to produce additional evidence to show that the respondent in the above appeal was in the habit of filing ejectment applications against her tenants. The orders which the appellant wanted to place on record relate to residential accommodation, the possession of which the respondent obtained through Court, which has got hardly any relevancy to the point in issue. Accordingly C.MA. No. 51 of 1989 is dismissed. The learned counsel for appellant in both the appeals did not address about C.MA. No. 292 of 1989 (F.RA. No. 134 of 1988), and C.MA. No. 293 of 1989 (F.RA. No. 135 of 1988), and consequently the same are dismissed as not pressed.

18. In the result both the appeals fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. The appellant is, however, allowed six months' time to vacate the demised premises. H.B.T./M‑1766/K Appeals dismissed.