1984 PLP (C (PLC)

(2) P L D 1958 Pesh. 157 (3) P L D 1967 Lah. 42 (4) P L D 1967 Lah. 408(c) (5) P L D 1959 Dacca 48(j) (6) 1979 C L C 217(a). However, on the other hand learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following rulings :‑ (1) 1982 P L C (C. S.) 102 (2) 1982 P L C (C. S.) 431 (3) 1981 P L C (C. S.) 256 (4) 1981 P L C (C. S.) 263 in support of his contention that where there was a charge of corruption, show‑cause notice under rule 6(3) was uncalled for and regular inquiry was a must. He has also further relied on (1) 1980 S C M R 850 . (2) 1981 P L C (C. S.) 263 (3) 1983 P L C (C. S.) 243 He has submitted that the statement of allegations and show‑cause notice was in flagrant violation of rule 6(3)(a) as it did not give the grounds and substance of evidence on which such allegations were based. Similarly he has relied on P L D 1970 Lah. 416 and P L D 1977 Lah. 117, in support of the claim of the appellant that reasonable opportunity of hearing as required by rule 6(3)(b) was not given and appellant was not confronted with the evidence as well as not given chance to cross‑examine the witnesses. With regard to the action so taken on the secret report of the Anti‑Corruption Establishment and Special Branch Police, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following rulings :‑ (1) 1980 S C M R 850 (2) P L D 1959 S C 25 at 30 (3) P L D 1967 Lah. 1204 at 12 1 2 (4) 1984 P L C (C. S.) 176 (5) P L D 1957 Kar. 576 (6) 1970 S C M R 475 to show that no action should have been taken against the appellant on such reports.

8. We have given our anxious throght td the arguments so advanced by the parties and first of all will deal with the most crucial and important legal point involved in this case i.e. whether a civil servant can be condemned on the basis of secret reports (with which he was not associated) so secured by the authority against him or not, particularly when he has not been con fronted with the same and given a chance to defend himself.

9. We have taken pains to go through the entire law on the subject as pronounced from time to time and particularly. we have thoroughly read the law so cited by the learned counsel for the appellant on which he has relied, in support of his contention vis‑a‑vis this issue. The consensus of opinion of all the rulings so mentioned above is that nobody can be condemned unheard as the same would be against the principle of natural justice. However, we will take up the case so cited as 1980 S C M R 850 which is a ruling of Full Bench of Supreme Court of Pakistan in which this issue has been discussed in detail and ultimately settled. It was observed in the said case by their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, when their attention was drawn to the fact that civil servants were condemned on the basis of report submitted by an inquiry committee of which they had no knowledge and no opportunity had been given to them to defend their case. Their lordships were appalled to come across this sort of treatment so met out to the civil servants. It was after expressing this dismay and horrification on the treatment so met out to the civil servants by the authority, it was ultimately held in the said case that the conduct of the Government in issuing a vague show‑cause notice was most un fortunate on its part and similarly it condemned the procedure adopted is other cases, when it was found that the Inquiry Committee report, which was a part of the material on the basis of which the said civil servant had been dismissed, was neither shown to them, nor they were allowed to participate in such inquiry. Similarly in 1984 P L C (C. S.) 176 (Service Tribunal Azad Jammu & Kashmir) in Muhammad Rafique v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the learned Tribunal came to a positive conclusion that disciplinary proceedings made secretly on the back of a civil servant. has no intrinsic value of evidence against him. In this judgment the learned Tribunal has relied on A I R 1953 S C 404 and A I R 1958 S C

538. In view of the law laid down we have no hesitation to hold this issue in favour of the appellant as it is apparent from record without any dispute, that he has been removed from service on the basis of secret reports provided to the authority by the Special Branch of Police as well as by the Anti‑Corruption Establishment. We are further strengthened in our findings when we go through the record of this case and find that at one time after receiving the said secret reports, the Authorised Officer viz: Additional Chief Secretary was pleased' to refer this matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad under whom the appellant was working at that time, to make inquiries, of course secret in nature against him and inform the said authority accordingly. We have gone through the reports of this officer and find that the matter was entrusted by the Deputy Commissioner to the A. D. C. (G), Faisalabad, who after making enquiries into all these allegations so levelled against him by the Police Agency, found hits absolutely innocent. The Deputy Commissioner, under whom the appellant worked for 3 years also positively observed that he never received any complaint of any sort against the appellant during the said period of his service and rather picked up him out of Magistracy for sensitive post of City Magistrate, Faisalabad. The Deputy Commissioner has further observed that all what has been happened was due to strict action taken by the appellant at his behest against the encroachers of the city, which involved big people and as well as anti‑social elements. In this way the Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that the appellant had created a large number of enemies on account of his straightforward attitude against them. The views of the Deputy Commissioner were endorsed by the Commissioner, Faisalabad. We have also taken notice of document so placed on the record by the appellant which is a letter from the S. M. L. A., Sector. 2, Faisalabad who while lauding the services of the appellant has declared him clean and honest officer. Accepted by both these inquiries, one made by the Police and other made by the Head of the administration of the District, were available with the authority when it chose to take action against the appellant. In view of the above circumstances, it was all the more incumbent upon the authority to give full chance to the appellant to defend himself, particularly when he has asked for this right, in his explanation so submitted by him after the show‑cause notice. In this manner we have no hesitation to hold that the authority has acted both against the principle of natural justice which is enshrined not only in the codified law of this country but emanates from the Holy Qur'an itself. Reference of the same is drawn from Surah Bani Israil of our Holy Qur'an, Reliance is placed on P L D 1977 Lah. 117 at page 129, wherein Justice Mushtaq Hussain and Justice Gul Muhammad Khan, have discussed in detail the verses in Surah Bani Israil and Surah Namal, to show that no body can be condemned unheard, a basic right of every human being.

10. However, a number of other legal issues have been raised in this matter such like not affording of personal hearing to the appellant and giving no reason for dispensation of inquiry against him. All these matters need not to be discussed at length as the significance of these issues pale into insignificance when the major issue in this case has been decided in favour of the appellant. However, it will be necessary to deal with another important legal issue, whether enquiry could be dispensed with in this case or not. In this matter learned :Advocate‑General has placed reliance on the case of Miss Sadaqat Hameed v. Secretary Education (1981 S C M R 1034) In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan were of the view that when there was involvement of certain scandalous affairs which where going to hurt the reputation of young girls it was not necessary to give the entire detail of the allegations, as the nature of allegations being sensitive in nature, were likely to affect the reputation and good name of the College/Institution. The learned Advocate‑General has argued that as there were a number of ladies involved in this case with whom the appellant was alleged to have illicit relation belonging to good as well as bad repute, therefore, the Authorised Officer/Authority were within their discretion to couch the charges in general manner and without bringing the details of the same in public by holding regular inquiry into such like scandalous affairs.

11. We have carefully perused the above rulings with respect, and find that the facts of the said case were absolutely different from the present case so before us. In that case a lady lecturer was involved in certain scandalous affairs and good name of the students of the Girls College was to be protected but in the present case the reading of the public report clearly reveals that most of the women with whom the appellant was alleged to have illicit relations, were women of ill‑repute and thus no such sensitivity was involved in his case. Furthermore the appellant has not been dismissed /removed from service on the sole charge of womanising but he has been condemned of being corrupt. We have repeatedly held in our various judgments that in matter of corruption, procedure under rule 6(3) was uncalled for and regular enquiry was must. We have only allowed dispensation of inquiry under rule 6(3) in corruption cases also but where we have found that charge could be proved simply by documentary evidence. In the present case the situation is quite different and the charges of corruption though levelled are vague in nature but nevertheless related to corruption of the appellant, therefore, the appellant was fully entitled to regular enquiry before holding him guilty of this charge. Reliance has been rightly placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the law so cited above in the earlier part of our judgment in support of the said contention.

12. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has been condemned on secret reports of the Anti‑Corruption Establishment and Special Branch of Police, which have based their reports without recording any evidence but only by probe at their own end, without associating the appellant at any stage of these enquiries and submitting at the same time that the appellant was reportedly or allegedly or stated to be corrupt.

13. We have also no hesitation to hold that on the charge of corruption the appellant was entitled to full‑fledged inquiry and Authorised Officer was not justified to dispense with the said procedure and also without giving any cogent reasons for the same.

14. When we asked the learned Advocate‑General to assist this Tribunal by producing any ruling to the contrary to show that conclusion drawn by us on the strength of law so cited above by the learned counsel for the appellant were not correct, he was unable to cite any such authority.

15. The result is that we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order dated, 3rd February, 1983 and direct that the appellant be reinstated in service with all back benefits. However, the competent authority in the case of the appellant, can proceed against him if it so deem fit, but in accordance with law so laid. There will be no order as to costs. M.I Appeal accepted.