P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.--‑The material questions that fall for‑deter mination in this writ petition and Writ Petitions Nos. 909 of 1958, 944 of 1958, 1011 of 1958, 1012 of 1958, 1027 of 1958 and 1028 of 1958 are the same and, therefore, all these petitions will be dis posed of by this order. The petitioner in each of these cases prays for a writ restraining the Sales‑tax authorities from realising sales tax from him. Each of the petitioner is a timber merchant whose business is to take forests on lease, fell down the trees, cut the trees into pieces that will sell in the market and take the timber thus obtained to Jhelum or Rawalpindi, where it is sold. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that their activities do not fall within the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and, therefore, the Sales tax authorities have no justification to assess their sales of timber to sales tax under the Sales Tax Act of 1951.

2. The defence put forward on behalf of the Sales Tax autho rities in each of the above petitions is that each of the petitioners is liable to sales‑tax because he is a manufacturer or producer of the timber which he sells at Jhelum or Rawalpindi as the case may be. Another point raised on behalf of the respondent was that as each petitioner could obtain the relief, sought by him in his writ petition, by an appeal to the Sales Tax authorities and to the dales Tax Tribunal, if necessary, and by a reference to this Court under section 17 of the Sales‑tax Act, the discretionary power vested in this Court to issue writs should not be exercised to his favour, and the petition should be rejected on the ground that another remedy is available.

3. Before dealing with the petitions on merits, I will dispose of the second of the above‑mentioned contentions raised on behalf of the respondent. It is correct that ordinarily the discretionary power of this Court to issue a writ should not be exercised if the relief sought by the petition for issue of the writ can be obtained by resorting to other proceedings under the law, but this is not an inflexible rule. If in a certain case it appears to this Court that the issue of a writ would enure to the benefit and the con venience of the parties, and will save time, this Court will not hesitate to issue a writ in spite of the fact that the person who prayed for the writ could obtain the relief he seeks by resorting to some other proceedings. Whether or not the Court will exercise writ jurisdiction where another remedy is open will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. In the present cases, it appears to me that the mere fact that the relief sought by the petitions can be obtained by the petitioners by resorting to appeals and references under the Sales Tax Act should not stand in the way of issuing writs if the petitioners can show that they should issue in their favour. My reason for this view is that if a decision is given by this Court at this stage, it will shorten the proceedings which would have to be followed if resort is had to the provisions contained in the Sales -tax Act. I would, therefore, proceed to consider whether or not the petitioners or any of them is entitled to the grant of the writ prayed for.

4. It is clear that if, as asserted by the respondents, the peti tioners are the manufacturers or producers within the meaning of section 2 (11) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, their case will fall within the Sales Tax Act and the levy of the sales tax from them would be entirely legal. The definition of the expression "manufacturer or producer" is given in section 2 (11) of the Sales Tax Act, the relevant part of which without the amendments recently introduc ed with regard to cotton ginners, reads as follows :‑ " manufacturer or producer' means a person who engages, whether exclusively or not, in the manufacture of goods and includes a printer, publisher, lithographer or engraver, and also any person (not being an employee) who manufactures goods, whether or not the materials of which the goods are manufac tured are owned by him: Provided that where one person manufactures goods for another, wholly or in part out of materials supplied by that other, and the goods are not for the use of, but are for sale by, that other, the person supplying the materials shall be deemed to be the manufacturer, and the person who so manufactures the goods shall be deemed not to be the manufacturer." No definition of the word "manufacture" is given in the Sales‑tax Act and one has, therefore, to resort to its dictionary meaning. One of the dictionary meanings of "manufacture" is the action or process of making of article or material by application of physical labour or mechanical power. One other dictionary meaning of the expression is to work up material into a form suitable for use. Another dictionary meaning of the expression is to produce by labour, while yet another is to bring into being something in a form in which it will be capable of being sold or supplied in the course of business. What the petitioners do is to take a forest on lease, fell down trees, cut off the branches, remove the leaves and cut the wood thus obtained into pieces and to sell those pieces in the markets at Jhelum or Rawalpindi, and this, in my view, is covered by more than one dictionary meaning of the word "manufacture" given above. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the petitioners that if the trees were brought to the market, they will not be sold as timber but only as firewood and it is, therefore, obvious that the process to which the petitioners resort to make the trees marketable by turning it into what is called timber is a process of manufacture for the purpose of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. I would, therefore, hold that the petitioners were rightly held to be assessable to sales‑tax. I might add that the view I have taken with regard to the activities of the petitioners being "manufacture" receives support from two decisions of High Courts in India. One of these decisions is Kulkarni v. State (A I R 1957 Madh. Prad. 45) wherein it was held that breaking of big boulders into stone is a process of manufacture. The second of these decisions is State of Bihar v. Chrestain Mica Industries (A I R 1957 Pat. 184), in which it was held that breaking up of big pieces of Mica into smaller pieces amounted to manufacture.

5. In view of what I have said above, I would hold that the petitioners are manufacturers of timber for the purpose of Sales tax Act, 1951, and the relief sought by them by these writ peti tions cannot be granted to them. All the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. MASUD AHMAD, J.

‑I agree.