1979CLC361 (PLP)

Dyeing, calendering, finishing and printing. Rs. 100 Rs.5,000

2. Dyeing and finishing. Rs. 100 Rs. 2,000

3. Dry cleaning. Rs. 100 Rs. 1,000 The petitioners submitted their objections through 'the Chamber of Commerce, as well as the Lyallpur Industrialists Society.

4. It is alleged that the respondent No. 1 did not consider those objections and accepted the proposals as made. A notification was, therefore, issued on 28th June, 1977 under sections 138 and 139 of the Punjab Local Government Act accordingly. The petitioners filed the present petition to challenge the abovesaid levy.

5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as the objections were not considered and disposed of in accordance with the Rules, the levy is unlawful. The learned counsel for the respondents produced the entire record and stated that the objections were duly considered. According to him the proposals were modified in certain cases, including W. P. No. 3607/77, but were accepted as such in the case of the present petitioners. I have also seen the record and I am clear that the respondents were conscious of the objections and did take the same into consideration while giving a decision. It is to be noted that though the proposed licence fee in the case 'dry cleaning machine' was Its. 1,000 it was fixed at Rs. 5,000 after considering objections.

6. The other objection taken by the learned counsels that as under section 145 of the Local Government Act, levy had to be made in accordance with the Rules, the respondents ought to have taken previous permission of the Government. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to section 4 of the Local Government Act to say that as the provision of previous permission of the Government was inconsistent with sections 138 and 139 of the same Act, the provision in the rules to that extent became inoperative and, therefore, could not be relied upon.

7. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, is quit valid. An independent power has now been given to the Local Council to levy a tax under section 138 of the Local Government Act. An additional power has been given to the Government to give directions in respect of the same matters under section

140. The power of the Administrator in the present case is, therefore, not subject to any previous permission of the. Government though he shall have to act according to the directions of the Government. The contention of the learned counsel is, therefore, mis conceived.

8. The learned counsel then submitted that sections 138 and 139 about a distinction between the existing taxes and a new levy. A bring to him, though new levy could be imposed by the Administrator, in could increase the taxes only under the directions of the Government proved for under section

140. Further the modification in an existing tax has reasonable and cannot' be made to the extent of 50 times and 20 t tm respectively, as in the present case.

9. This Court is not concerned with the unreasonableness of a ,tax. The duty of the Court is only to ascertain that there exists a valid p~ for such a tax and that the tax has been levied in accordance with ewe power and the law. Admittedly, that power is provided under section 38 and the manner is given in the West Pakistan Municipal Committee (Imposition of Taxes) Rules 1960. Section 138 reads as under :- "A Local Council subject to the provision of any other law may, and directed by the Government, shall levy all or any of the taxes enumerated in the second Schedule." Thus the power given is subject to the provisions of other laws. restriction, that a tax should not exceed a particular limit, has been referred to. There is no direction of the Government with regard to any extent o re particular tax. There is thus no violation of sections 138 and 140 of the local Government Act.

10. The learned counsel had also relied on section 139(2) of the Log Government Act, which is as follows ;__ "Where a tax is levied or modified the Local Council shall specify date for the enforcement thereof, and such tax or the modification h he come into force on such date." Emphasis was placed on words 'levied or modified'. It will be seen that sections 138 and 140 are the taxing provisions and not section 139 latter section only provides a manner of publication and date of enforcement. This section is, therefore, referable only after the tax has been levied Then is no provision for modification of a tax. The words `modified' or `modification' are therefore, only descriptive of the action already taken. Under section 138 there could be an absolutely fresh levy or there could be a chance in the existing levy. As for the Local council tax in both the cases goes it will be a levying As for description of the action of the Local Council it could be said that the new levy is by modification of the old levy or is fresh levy. However, the descriptive language in section 139 does in no way affect the power to levy a tax. The objection raised thus has no merit.

11. The learned counsel referred to the dictionary meaning of to word 'modify' to say that it meant to make, minor changes in the form oh structure of-alter without transforming etc.--The meaning referable to law as given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary are (Scots law) to award a decree as something to be done or paid, and generally, to make a basic or important change in--

12. The learned counsel for the petitioners then referred to the Notification itself to submit that the first two disputed items amounted to a double taxation. This objection is, however, premature. The applicants shag have to disclose their trades while applying for a licence of a particular trade and the respondents shall have to see as to under which particular item his trade falls. The petitioners will be able to object only then if they are asked to take out two licences under two different items with regard to one trade. That stage has not reached and there is such no objection at the present time.

13. The last point raised was that the power under section 138 ha been given to the Local Council and not to the Administrator who has imposed the impugned taxes. A reference to section 224 of the Local Government Act would dispel any doubts as regards the power of the Administrators for the transitional period. The Administrator is empowered at this stage as no legal Local Council has so far been elected. For the reasons given above, I do not find any merit in this petition, which is dismissed without any order as to costs. S. G. D Petition dismissed.