P (PLP)

ABDUL RASHID, C. J.‑This is an appeal, by special leave, from a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, dismissing an application in the nature of habeas cor5us, preferred by Chiragh Din against the detention of his brother, Miraj Din, under the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949. The principle point urged by Khawaja Feroze‑ud‑Din on behalf of the detenu was that as .the Senior Superintendent of Police had assigned no reasons for the arrest of the detenu and as even the nature of the prejudicial act that Miraj Din was suspected of committing had not been indicated, it should be held that the order of arrest was mala fide and amounted to a fraud on the statute. I cannot accept this contention. The Senior Superintendent of Police was examined as a witness in the case. When questioned about the reasons which had satisfied him that the detention of Miraj Din was necessary in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety, the witness claimed privilege under sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. It was for the Court to determine whether the privilege had been rightly claimed. If the Court came to the conclusion that the witness was entitled to claim privilege for the reasons which led to his satisfaction, no hostile inference could be drawn against the witness. If, on the other hand, the privilege was not rightly claimed, it was open to the Court to compel the witness to answer the questions put to him. If there were any suspicious circumstances which led the Court to suspect the bona fides of the witness, it was open to the Court not to raise the presumption in favour of the regularity of official acts under Illustration (e) of section 114 of the Evidence Act, but to call upon the Crown to prove that the order of arrest was bona fide and was based on some reasons. In the present case, no order was passed by the Court at any time asking the Crown to establish the reasons that had led to the satisfaction of the officer ordering the arrest In these circumstances, the mere failure of the Senior Superin tendent of Police to assign any reasons for the arrest of the detenu cannot be made the basis of a finding that the order of arrest was mala fide. The counsel for the detenu next contended that the High Court was entitled under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to determining whether a person had been illegally or improperly detained, and that the High Court could not determine whether a person was illegally or improperly detained unless the detaining authority assigns some reasons for the detention. This contention, in my opinion, is wholly devoid of force. The burden of proving that the order of arrest was mala fide rests on the detenu, and in the absence of any material on the record showing that the officer ordering the arrest acted in bad faith, the Crown cannot be called upon to prove that the order was not illegal or, improper. The other points urged on behalf of the detenu have all been dealt with in my judgment in Abdul Wahid's case (Muhammad Hayat v. the Crown‑Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1950). For the reasons given above, I would dismiss this appeal. ABDUR RAHMAN, J.‑I agree that the appeal should be dis missed. No other course is open to us when we find that a subjec tive interpretation has to be placed on the word `satisfied' used in section 3 (1) of the Public Safety Act and that the petitioner has failed to establish that the Senior Superintendent of Police had not, in fact, been satisfied as to the necessity of placing the peti tioner under arrest with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. It is baseless to contend that by his failure to disclose the reasons or the type or category under which they fell, the officer concerned had prevented the High Court from exercising its lawful jurisdiction. To prevent the High Court from exercising its jurisdic tion is one thing and to prevent it by legitimate methods, from passing an order in favour of the petitioner in the exercise of its juris diction another. With the dismissal of the petition on the merits or on account of an interpretation placed by this Court on section 3 (1) of the Public Safety Act in Maulana Maudoodi's Appeal which the High Court was bound to follow, that jurisdiction was duly exercised. It was unfortunate for the petitioner, however, that it was not exercised in his favour. But that was because the Senior Superintendent of Police was found, on an interpretation of the Public Safety Act, not bound to disclose the reasons for the petitioner's arrest, and having regard to the order under section 3(1) of the Act passed in due form, the onus of establishing that he had not been satisfied or that the order was passed mala fide or for a collateral purpose, was found to be lying on him. AKRAM J .‑I agree with my Lord the Chief justice: A. H. Appeal dismissed. Attorney for appellant :‑Ch. Muhammad Siddiq.