2001 PLP 1785 (CLC)

(2) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? OPP (3) Whether the suit is collusive? OPD (4) Whether the suit has been incorrectly valued for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction? If so what is correct valuation for both the purposes? OPD (5) Whether the disputed property has been correctly described in the plaint? If not then what is correct description of the property? O. P. Parties. (6) Whether the plaintiffs have locus standi to institute this suit? OPP (7) Whether the suit land is ancestral qua the plaintiffs? OPD (8) Whether Mst. Resham Bibi was a limited owner of the suit‑land to the extent of 1/4th share? OPP (9) Whether the parties are governed by custom in the matter of alienation of the disputed land? If so, what is that, custom? OP Patties. (10) Whether the sale of land through registered sale‑deed, dated 12‑7‑1967 by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No. 1, is illegal, void unjust, without authority and ineffective upon the rights of the plaintiffs? OPP (11) If Issue No. 10, is proved, then what is its effect on subsequent Mutation Nos.49 and 50? OPP (12) Whether the sale in dispute was for consideration legal necessity and was made after obtaining permission from the Collector? OPD (13) Relief. Evidence of the parties was recorded. The learned trial Court proceeded to decree the suit. He found the sale to be in violation of the customary law. He further directed respondent No.4 to return the consideration amount of Rs.10,000 to the petitioners and further that the petitioners shall retain the possession till the death of respondent No.4 where after the land would revert to the respondents Nos. 1 to

3. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners filed a first appeal which was heard by a learned Additional District Judge‑IV, Okara. The learned Additional District Judge opined that under the Christian Law of Succession as applicable in Pakistan since Inayat Masih died without any lineal decedents half of the land would gg to the widow and consequently to the petitioners and half would go to respondents Nos. 1 to

3. He accordingly modified the decree of the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree, dated 14‑5‑1986. Both the parties remained unsatisfied. The petitioner has filed Civil Revision No. 1655 of 1986 while respondents Nos. 1 to 3 have filed Civil Revision No. 1734 of 1986.

3. Mr. Noman Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the tenure was governed by the provisions of the said Act of 1912 and as such the only hurdle being the permission required by section 19 thereof and the same having been granted, the sale in its entirety by the widow in favour of the petitioner is valid. Mr. Masood Akhtar Sheikh, representing respondents Nos. 1 to 3 argues with equal vehemence that the matter was governed by what he describes as "Christian Customary Law" and as such the entire sale would be invalid and that the learned trial Court has correctly decided the lis.

4. I have gone through the record copies whereof are appended with both these civil revisions. Some facts of these cases are admitted i.e. the land was allotted to Magar. On his death it devolved upon his four sons in equal shares. Respondent No.4 is the widow of Inayat Masih, the fourth son and the land in dispute i.e. the 1/4th share of the estate of Magar comprising of the said rights stood transferred to her under the provisions of the said Act. It is also admitted that alienation was made in favour of the petitioner by the said widow with the approval of the Collector as envisaged in section 19 of the said Act. S. So far as the question of "Christian Customary Law" is concerned, learned counsel has not been able to point out any original, existence or instance of the said custom. In this state of affairs I find myself in agreement with the learned Additional District Judge when he expressed inability to comprehend the argument based on the said customary law. On the other hand, the matter of Christian succession in the sub‑continent including our country is governed by the provisions of Part V, Chapter II of the Succession Act, 1925. In the case in hand, to my mind, these provisions will be subject to and will have to be read alongwith the provisions of the said Act of 1912. As admittedly the suit‑land is State land and vests in Provincial Government. For all purposes it is a grant governed by the provisions of the said Act. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 taking qua argues that under section 20 of the said Act of 1912, a widow of the tenant gets the land until she dies or remarries or loses her rights under the provisions of the Act. According to the learned counsel this for all purposes is a limited estate. G. The said argument of the learned counsel, however, loses sight of the fact that section 20 of the said Act applies to succession to tenants who are original tenants, that is to say that the rules laid down in the said section would apply only to Magar who was admittedly the original tenant. However, it is section 21 which governs the case of a tenant who acquires by succession the tenancy. Now Inayat Masih had acquired the tenancy by succession to his father and not as an original tenant. His case would be governed by section 21(b) of the said Act of 1912. For the purposes of this succession it will be deemed that the tenancy in question (vesting in Inayat Masih) was agricultural land acquired by the original tenant. Thus, by fiction it shall be deemed that the land vested in Magar as an owner and devolved upon his sons as such. It is an admitted position that Inayat Masih as well as his widow were Christians. In this background and the legal fiction contained in the said section 21(b) of the Act of 1912 the succession to the estate of Inayat Masih, who will be deemed to be an owner of the agricultural land constituting the tenancy will be governed by the said Chapter II, Part V of Succession Act, 1925. Admittedly, respondent No.4 is his widow while respondents Nos. 1 to 3 are his kindred being his brothers. Thus, under section 33(b) of the Succession Act, 1925 half the property shall devolve to his widow and the other half shall go to his kins, i.e. his brother respondents Nos. 1 ‑

3. The learned Additional District Judge has, therefore, correctly expressed the legal position in the factual background of the case, in his impugned judgment and decree. The result is that the said judgment and decree need not be interfered with in these civil revisions as no ground stated in section 115, C.P.C. for the purpose exists. Resultantly both the civil revisions are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Q.M.H./M.A.K./C‑84/L Revisions dismissed.