CLC 1999

1999 PLP 1972 (CLC)

Messrs INDUS MOTOR COMPANY LTD. ‑‑‑Plaintiff Versus GOVERNMENT OF SINDH through

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
Suit No.331 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1863 of 1997, decided on 3rd May, 1997.
Honorable Judges
S. Deedar Hussain Shah, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1999 PLP 1972 (CLC)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members S. Deedar Hussain Shah, J
Parties Messrs INDUS MOTOR COMPANY LTD. ‑‑‑Plaintiff Versus GOVERNMENT OF SINDH through
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1999 PLP 1972 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1999 PLP 1972 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: S. Deedar Hussain Shah, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1999 PLP 1972 (CLC) (Messrs INDUS MOTOR COMPANY LTD. ‑‑‑Plaintiff Versus GOVERNMENT OF SINDH through). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Headnotes / Summary

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑

0. XXXIX, Rr.l & 2‑‑‑Temporary injunction, grant of‑‑‑Plaintiff/applicant, for grant of an injunction at an interlocutory stage of suit, only needed to show that he had a prima facie case, that balance of convenience between parties as well as for avoidance of complications would lie in his favour, and lastly that he would suffer irreparable harm if injunction was refused‑‑‑Prima facie neither balance of convenience was in favour of plaintiff/applicant nor there was arguable case on his behalf and he was not likely to suffer an irreparable loss or injury‑‑‑Application for grant of temporary injunction was dismissed in circumstances. PLD 1990 Kar. 402; 1990 MLD 317; Muhammad Matin v. Mrs. Dino Manekji Chinoy and others PLD 1983 Kar. 387; Messrs Bisvil Spinners Ltd. v. Superintendent, Central Excise and Land Customs Circle, Sheikhupura and another PLD 1988 SC 370; Corporation of Madras v. Madras Electric Tramways Ltd. AIR 1931 Mad. 152 and Me Carthy and Stone (Developments) Ltd. v. London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames 1994 SCMR 1393 ref. Akhtar Ali Mahmood for Plaintiff. ., Syed Sharifuddin Prizada and S.I.H. Zahidi for Defendants.

Judgment & Decree

on the basis of the aforesaid submissions/proofs application for refund be made and if the case is made out, refund shall be allowed." That the plaintiff did not declare itself as the exporter or that the vehicles were being sold outside the Sindh Province. That in the absence of the compliance of the requirement under the observations of this Court referred hereinabove or the Provincial directive there is no basis for filing of the suit. That claim by plaintiff is by a person who did not export or paid the export tax. The plaintiff is an alien to the situation. That even according to the plaint it is averred that plaintiff is the exporter of Toyota vehicles or such vehicles were sold in an), other Province or contains declaration nor is it a fact that the export tax/tool/Rawangi Mahsool was charged from or paid by the plaintiff. That plaintiff has no locus standi in the matter and that claim in suit has no nex6s or entitlement with the plaintiff. That without prejudice‑to the above the vehicles if exported out of the territorial limits of the Rawangi Mahsool (the taxable territory) the refund of export tax, could be claimed back as refund through other procedure laid down otherwise than by the present suit. That there is adequate remedy for refund. That the real persons who paid export tax, and if established relevant facts, can claim the refund in view of the two decisions of 1990 referred hereinabove. That no prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff, balance of convenience also does not favour the plaintiff. That realisation of the tax was lawful. That serious and irreparable harm and injury shall afflict the defendant No.3 Mr. Akhtar Ali Mahmood has referred; (1) Muhammad Matin v. Mrs. Dino Manekeji Chinoy and others PLD 1983 Kar.

387. The decision of learned D.B. of this Court consisting of by their Lordships Abdul Hayee Kureshi and Munawar Ali Khan (Acting Chief Justice and Judge as they then were), the rule laid down by their Lordships is that for the grant of an injunction at an interlocutory stage of the suit, the plaintiff only needs to show that he has a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience between the parties as well as for avoidance of complications would lie in favour of the party seeking the injunction, and lastly that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm by refusal of an injunction.

2. Messrs Bisvil Spinners Ltd. v. Superintendent, Central Excise and Land Customs Circles, Sheikhupura and another PLD 1988 SC

370. Their Lordships dealing with the Sales Tax and interpretation of statute citing the case Corporation of Madras v. Madras Electric Tramways Ltd. AIR 1931 Mad. 152, reproduced the dictum which is as follows:‑‑ "If the special Act is made after the general Act, the position is even simpler. Having made the general Act if the Legislature afterwards makes a special Act in conflict with it, we must assume that the Legislature had in. mind its own general Act when it made the special Act and made the special Act, which is in conflict with the general Act, as an exception to the general Act. The special provision made in SRO‑580(1)/83 would be an exception to the earlier general provision made in SRO‑666(1)/81 and, therefore, will hold away and the earlier S.R.O. will yield." In my humble opinion this caselaw is not relevant to the case in hand. Admittedly the tax involved in the matter is being charged by the defendant No.3 which is sanctioned by defendant No.1 under Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979 and subsequently, in pursuance to the observations of the case reported in 1990 MLD 317, the observations are already referred hereinabove in the earlier part of the order and the Government of Sindh issued Notification bearing SOV‑DC‑VII(94)/96, dated 19th September, 1996 the relevant portion is as follows:‑‑ "In view of the above and in the interest of the Councils, till such time any proper rule is framed, the exporters shall deposit the amount of export tax with the Chief Executive of the Council and on production of proof that the goods have been exported outside the territorial limits of Sindh to any other area of Pakistan, the amount of export tax so deposited with the Chief Executive shall be refunded to the exporters." The defendant No.3 is charging tax being contractors who has taken the contract from defendant No. 2 which was duly approved by defendant No. 1, tax so levied and charged in any case is not in violation of the Article 151 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances this authority in my humble opinion is not applicable to the matter in hand.

3. Sayphire Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Government of Sindh and others PLD 1990 Kar.

402. The learned D.B. consisting of his Lordships Saleem Akhtar Judge (as he then was) and my learned brother Wajihuddin Ahmed, J. has held that:‑‑ "Here, too, though not on the arguments of the petitioners, we have to record favourable findings, by holding that an export tax, of the kind questioned in these proceedings, on inter‑Provincial movement of goods cannot be levied or enforced, being in contravention of Article 151 of the Constitution of Pakistan." As referred hereinabove the export tax/tool/Rawangi Mahsool is not being charged on inter‑Provincial movement of goods if any charge has been made. The mechanism for refund of the same has been provided by the Government in their notification referred hereinabove, therefore, the tax so charged or collected by the contractor in my humble opinion is duly sanctioned lawfully and is not in violation of the Article 151 of the Constitution, therefore, this authority in my humble opinion is not favourable to the case of the plaintiff.

4. Mc Carthy and Stone (Developments) Ltd. v. London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames 1994 SCMR 1393 wherein it ha.c been held that Local Government cannot charge for a service unless it is required by statute to provide ‑such service and is also authoriser) by law to charge for such service The tax which is heing charged by the Contractor is duly sanctioned by the defendant No. l under the provisions of Sindh Local Government Ordinance and the subsequent Notification issued by the Government of Sindh Local Government, dated 19‑9‑1996 referred hereinabove also provide mechanism for the refund, if due. With due respect to the authority I am of the firm opinion that this authority is not relevant to the facts of the present case. I have gone through the material placed with the case and I have also minutely perused the caselaw referred and discussed hereinabove. Admittedly defendant No.3, the contractor is charging the tax which is duly sanctioned under the provisions of Sindh Local Government Ordinance, subsequently, the Government of Sindh in pursuance to the observations made in the case reported in 1990 MLD 317 and PLD 1990 Kar. 402 the tax on the inter‑Provincial movement of goods is not being charged but Rawangi Mahsool/tool tax is being charged for the vehicles which are to be used in the Province of Sindh only. The plaintiff himself is not exporter and he himself does not pay the export tax whereas persons who took away the vehicles outside the jurisdiction of District Council have to pay the tax and after proper proof that the vehicle so taken out of jurisdiction of District Council was actually taken away to the up‑country viz. Punjab, Balochistan, N.‑W.F.P. and Azad Kashmir, after proper and authentic proof regarding the vehicle that the same is used in the above Provinces the concerned persons can get the refund of the amount if so paid. Mr. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada learned counsel for defendant No.3 stated at the Bar that if any proof is furnished in pursuance to the Notification issued by the Government of Sindh, Local Government referred hereinabove the concerned party will definitely get the refund as provided in the Notification. The basic principles for the grant of injunction are prima facie balance of convenience, arguable case and irreparable loss and injury if any to be suffered by the party as well as for avoidance of complications that would lie in favour of the party seeking injunction. In my humble opinion prima facie neither balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff nor there is arguable case on their /a behalf. Moreover, they are not likely to suffer an irreparable loss or injury. Furthermore, in order to avoid further complications application is liable to be dismissed which must fail and order dated 1‑4‑1997 is hereby recalled. After hearing the parties, by short order I have rejected the application 4‑1997 and these are the reasons for the same. 8/K Application rejected