1981 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN): Mr. Rab Nawaz has filed an appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, whereby he has impleaded Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala, D. I. G. Police, Lahore Range and Additional I. G. Police as respondents. By virtue of his appeal be has prayed that the impugned orders dated 14‑7‑1977 and 16‑5‑1979 be set aside and he be re‑instated in service with effect from 14‑7‑1977 with full benefits of pay and allowances, etc. 2. The brief facts of the case are that Rab Nawaz was issued a show cause notice by the competent authority and was dismissed from service. On his appeal to the D. I. G. Police, Lahore Range, the said officer took a lenient view and re‑instated him and the intervening period on which he did not work was considered as leave of the kind due. The Additional Inspector‑General of Police in exercise of his powers under rule 12(iii) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules issued the appellant a fresh show‑cause notice, heard him and rescinded the order of D. I: G. Police Lahore Range and maintained the order of Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala thus dismissing him front service with effect from 14‑5‑1979. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the Government pleader and have perused the impugned orders carefully with their assistance. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Additional Inspector‑General of Police had no power of revision in this case in view of the fact that D. I. G. Police had re‑instated him and did not make any award of punishment. His contention is that power of revision under rule 12(ibid) is limited only to those cases where 'award' has been made by subordinate Police Official and that the word 'award' as used in rule 12 (ibid) relates to the `award' as contemplated in substantive rules, namely, rules 6(2), 6(5) and 9(b) of the Punjab Police (E & D) Rules. Since in these rules the term 'award' has been used in the context of various punishments, therefore, the Additional Inspector‑General of Police was not competent to invoke the mischief of rule 12(iii) in case of the appellant. 4. On the other hand the Government Pleader has vehemently contested this view point as Advocated by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant and has submitted that the word 'award' would also include the word 'order' because the term has not been defined in these Rules. He has submitted that the Additional Inspector‑General of Police was fully competent to invoke the powers conferred by section 12(iii) (ibid) as he could enhance or annul or modify the award (order) of his subordinate. It may be pointed out at this stage that the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on Saeed Shah's case recently decided by the Lahore High Court in which this very proposition has been discussed and settled. He has also at this stage further pointed out that the power contemplated by this rule is available only where some punishment has been awarded by a subordinate official. It has been contended that the conversion of the absence period into 'leave of the kind due has never been considered a punishment within the meaning of rule 4 of the Punjab Police (E & D) Rules which enumerates the various kinds of punishments. The learned counsel for the appellant has further argued to substantiate his point with regard to his interpretation of the word 'award' that this word does not find any mention in rule 18 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 which empowers the Government to call and examine any proceedings before any authority for the purposes of satisfying as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, penalty or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such authority. The reference to the above said rule has been made to show that if the rule making authority in police Rules had emphasized this procedure or action they would have adopted these Rules and would not have used the word 'award'. 5. We have given our anxious thought to the points raised by both the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the Government Pleader and find ourselves in accord with the point of view as presented by the learned counsel for the appellant. In Writ Petition No. 757 of 1980 Mr. Justice Gul Muhammad Khan has arrived at a decision while discussing the implica tion of rule 12(1) as under: ‑‑ "Rule 120) shows that the Inspector‑General can call for the records of awards made by his subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same or make further investigation or direct such to be made before passing further orders. Rule 6 deals with the punishment proceedings and notes three different kinds of procedures. Rule 6(2) dealing with police summary proceedings lays down in clause (ii) that if the explanation of the accused is unsatisfactory he may be awarded minor punishment. Rule 6(3) (4) deals with General‑Police proceedings. Rule 6(5) provides that in case charge is proved, the authority may award one or more of the punishment. The same is the case with regard to the Special Police proceedings given in rule 9. It is stipulated in rule 9(b) that the authority may award any of the punishments specified in section 7 of the Police Act, 1861. "The above resume makes it quite clear that the award is only of punish ment and not of acquittal. Rather, the proceedings fall through if the authority finds that no case of awarding of punishment is made out. The power of the Inspector‑General to call for the records of awards thus means only record of such a case where punishment has been given and not the one where no case had been made out against an accused police officer. This conclusion is further supported by the contents of rules 1201) and 12011)." Thus the learned Judge has interpreted the meaning of the word 'award, in the context of police rules mentioned above nothing but punishment only. Therefore, we have and hesitation to hold that under rule 12(ii) of Police Rules the Addition II.‑G. Police was only competent to interfere with the orders of the D. I. G. Police if there was punishment awarded to the appellant. In the presence case the D. I. G. Police did not award any punishment to the appellant and thus he had no justification to interfere with the order of the D. I. G. P. on the revisional side. 6. In view of above we proceed to set aside the impugned order as violative of rule 12(11) being without lawful authority and accept the appeal. Appeal accepted.