1985 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

MUHAMMAD IRSHAD KHAN (MEMBER).‑‑ The appellant, an officer of erstwhile Grade‑20 of the Secretariat Group and posted as a Member of the Service Tribunal, had proceeded on leave on "full pay" for three weeks from the 18th of June, 1983, to the 12th of July, 1983. In the meantime the Scheme of Basic Pay Scales and Fringe Benefits of Civil Employees of the Federal Government, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme) was enforced with effect from 1‑7‑1983, whereby then existing revised National Pay Scales were replaced by the Basic Scales of Pay as shown therein. The appellant on resuming duty on 13‑7‑1983, had submitted his pay bill claiming pay as raised by enforcement of the Scheme, with effect from the 1st of July, 1983. Respondent No. 1, the Accountant‑General, Pakistan Revenue, Islamabad, refused to allow the enhanced pay with effect from 1‑7‑1983, on the ground that the appellant was not on duty on that date. Aggrieved thereby the appellant preferred a departmental appeal/ representation to the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, endorsing a copy thereof to the President of Pakistan, requesting therein to allow him the benefit of the Scheme with effect from 1‑7‑1983. The same, however, remained un-responded even after the expiry of statutory waiting period of ninety days. He then filed the present appeal with a prayer that he may be held entitled to the enhanced pay under the Scheme with effect from the 1st of July, 1983, irrespective of the fact that he was on leave on that day, and for a direction accordingly to the respondents.

2. The appellant's case is that the Scheme had replaced the then existing revised National Pay Scales by the Basic Scales of Pay, 1983, in respect of all those who have been in Government service since before the 1st of July, 1983. By paragraph 27 of the Scheme all existing rules and orders on the subject stood modified to the extent indicated in the Scheme. It was, therefore, claimed that the appellant being in Government service since before the 1st of July, 1983, would be entitled to all the benefits accruing from the Scheme from the date of its introduction i.e. the 1st of July, 1983, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any letter of the Finance Division, rules or orders. It was urged that, in any case, such letter, rules and orders, relied upon by the respondent No. 3, being inconsistent with section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, are ineffective and inoperative. It was mainly contended on behalf of the respondents that the appellant during the leave, was entitled only to leave pay equal to the average monthly pay earned during twelve months immediately preceding the month in which the leave began or equal to the rate of pay drawn on the day immediately before the beginning of the leave, whichever is greater. Therefore, under the Scheme his pay in the B.P.S.‑20 was to be fixed with effect from the 1st of July, 1983, but the monetary benefits would be admissible with effect from the date he resumed duty after expiry of leave and began to perform duties of that post. It was thus suggested that the benefit of rise in pay by the enforcement of the Scheme would be admissible to the appellant only with effect from the date he resumed duties on return from leave. Reliance was greatly placed on rule 32 of the Revised Leave Rules, 1980, which reads as under:‑ "Pay during leave.‑‑ (1) Leave pay admissible during lave on full pay shall be the greater of :‑ (a) the average monthly pay earned during the twelve complete months immediately preceding the month in which the leave begins; and (b) the rate equal to the rate of pay drawn on the day immediately before the beginning of the leave. (2) When leave on half pay is taken, the amounts calculated under clauses (a) and (b) of sub‑rule (1) shall be halved to determine the greater of the two rates." A bare reading of the above provisions (rule 32) makes it quite clear that it does not exhaustively define the expression "full pay" but only prescribes a manner for calculation thereof. According to the rule enunciated in Muhammad Haroon v. Crown and another P L D 1951 F C 118 the language of a statute is generally extended to new circumstances which could not have been contemplated by the legislation when it was passed. Again, it was laid down in P L D 1956 F C 209 that "when a literal construction would lead to repugnancy to good sense, the Court may add words to the provision to be construed". In the instant case, therefore, the words "rate of pay drawn" used in the above provision shall be given as extended meaning so as to cover the rise in pay by enforcement of the Scheme. It further seems to me that the said rule 32 is not restrictive in nature and does not intend to deprive a civil servant of a benefit otherwise accrued to him over and above the rate of pay as calculated in the manner indicated therein.

4. Another elementary rule of construction of statutory instruments is that effect should be given to every part and every word of the Statute. Hence, as a general rule, the Courts and Tribunal should lean in favour of a construction which will render every word operative rather than of one which may make some words idle and naugatory. It is not permissible for us whilst interpreting a statutory instrument to hold that any part thereof or any word therein is surplusage. Every word has to be taken into account and a meaning given to its. Having recourse to these rules of construction, the words "full pay" employed in the Revised Leave Rules, 1980, given its literal, natural and ordinary meaning, shall mean "full amount of pay without any curtailment". This being the position, rule 32 cannot be availed for curtailing the rise in pay by the introduction of the Scheme. Be that as it may, there is sufficient force in the contention of the appellant that he is entitled to the full benefit of the Scheme regardless of all existing rules and orders inasmuch as paragraph 27 of the Scheme has modified all such previous rules and orders to the extent provided in the Scheme. Indeed the combined effect of paragraphs 3 and 27 of the Scheme would be that the said Scheme is applicable to all persons who have been in Government service since before the 1st of July, 1983, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any existing rules or orders. Therefore, reliance of the respondents on rule 32 is wholly misconceived.

5. Placing reliance upon F.R. 17, it was further contended on behalf of the respondents, that the appellant being on leave from the 18th of June, 1983, to the 12th of July, 1983, did not perform duties of the post held by him during that period, and as such was not entitled to draw pay of that post. It may be advantageous to reproduce F.R. 17 below:‑ "F.R. 17.‑‑ (1) Subject to any exceptions specifically made in these rules and to the provisions of sub‑rule (2), an officer shall begin to draw the pay and allowances attached to his tenure of a post with effect from the date when he assumes the duties of that post and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties."

6. Having given a careful consideration it appears to me that the expression "ceases to discharge those duties" occurring in the above provision extends to the case where an officer 'ceases to discharge the duties permanently due to transfer, retirement or any other such exigencies.' Only in such a case the incumbent shall cease to draw the pay and allowances attached to the post. While, in case of a temporary absence from duty due to availing of admissible and granted leave, normally he does not cease to draw the pay and allowances attached to the post rather continue to draw such pay and allowances. Obviously, if F.R. 17 is made applicable to a case of temporary absence from duty on account of leave then the incumbent will not be allowed any pay, which produces an absurd result. It is a well‑recognised rule of inter pretation that a construction which would lead to an absurdity or obvious injustice should not be adopted but a construction which appears to be most in accord with reason and justice should be adopted. I am. therefore, of the view that a case of temporary absence from duty on account of short leave, as in the instant case, is not covered by F.R. 17 and respondents' reliance thereon is misplaced. In any case, paragraph 27 of the Scheme overrides F.R. 17 and thus renders it inoperative for the purpose of enforcement of the Scheme.

7. Apart from the above, in view of the provisions of section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, it is a guaranteed right of the appellant to receive the sanctioned pay of the post held by him. It has been specifically admitted in paragraph 3(iv) of the written statement that on the date of enforcement of the Scheme of Basic Pay Scales the appellant was on the strength of the Service Tribunal, which clearly means that he held the post of Member, Service Tribunal and therefore, any curtailment in the sanctioned pay of the post such held by him, is wrong on that count also.

8. The respondents took a stand that section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, itself mentions that such entitlement to the pay shall be 'in accordance with the rules and, therefore, the appellant's case is to be regulated by aforesaid F.R. 17 and rule

32. The fallacy of this argument is well brought out by the plain language of section 17 which clearly directs the payments of the sanctioned pay of the post in accordance with the rules, and does not at all make it subject to any rules simply because the words used therein are 'in accordance with the rules' and not 'subject to the rules'. Indeed the right guaranteed by section 17 of the Act, cannot be curtailed by rules. To conclude I will again quote a well‑settled principle of interpretation that if the rules are capable of bearing a reasonable interpretation favourable to the employee then that interpretation should be preferred in the interest of justice.

9. In the result I hold that the impugned direction of the Finance Division and the action of the A.G.P.R. was unwarranted and without lawful authority. The appeal is, therefore, accepted and it is directed) that the benefit of increase in pay by the Scheme should be allowed to the appellant with effect from the 1st of July 1983, and payment should be made to him accordingly.

10. No order as to costs. A.E. Appeal accepted.