1998 PLP 1390 (CLC)

"M/s. Zaheeruddin Khan and Mr. M.K. Shikoh, Advocates undertake to hand over all the relevant transportation documents and tickets to the representative of the decree‑holder on their arrival in Baku. Mr. Zaheeruddin Khan, also makes a statement that he and Mr. Neel Kishov, learned counsel for the D.H. would be accompanying the D.H. to Baku for observing above compliance. " On 19‑111997 Mr. Tasawar Hussain Rizvi, Advocate for the Judgment‑Debtor filed the abovereferred application for recall of the Order, dated 10‑11‑1997. His grounds in support of the application are as follows:‑‑‑ (1) The Counsels for J.D. were not authorized to concede to delivery of tickets to the representative of the agent in view of the New Policy, dated 8‑10‑1997 (Annexure D/5) which was a part of the Counter Affidavit filed by the J.D. He has relied upon Order 3, Rule 4, C.P.C., 1987 CLC 1208, 1987 CLC 813 and PLD 1984 SC (Azad Jammu and Kashmir) 13. (2) Under Rules 145 and 148 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 an advocate shall not represent conflicting interest. The two counsels were representing conflicting interests. (3) The Decree‑Holder cannot go beyond the terms of the Consent Decree under the law of estoppel. According to him under Article 7 of the Consent Decree which reads as follows: "Traffic Documents: All travel documents including passenger tickets and baggage checks, exchange vouchers required by the Agent in connection with the sale of transportation herein shall be supplied by Principal provided always: (a) Such documents shall remain the absolute property of Principal. (b) The G.S.A. shall be responsible for the safe custody and care of such documents. " The Head of the organisation of the Plaintiff must go to Baku to get the transportation documents and not his representative. In support of his argument he has relied upon PLD 1985 Lah. 229 and PLD 1987 SC

107. Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada, learned Advocate for the Decree‑Holder has argued that a counsel has implied authority to settle a suit which authority was exercised to avoid an order of appointment of a Receiver and has relied upon 1981 SCMR 1081, AIR 1949 Cal. 63 and AIR 1935 Allahabad 480 in support of his contention. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Advocates of both parties. My findings are as follows:‑‑‑ By Vakalatnama, dated 27‑7‑1997, the Judgment‑Debtor appointed Messrs Zaheeruddin Khan, Babar Zaheer and M.K. Shikoh, Advocates, "...to appear, plead and act for me/us as my/our Advocates in the above matter or proceedings and to conduct, prosecute and/or defend the same .... " The learned Advocate for J.D. has urged that in the presence of Annexure D‑5 which clearly states that "Heads of appointed agents abroad should come to Head Office to get the transportation documents", the counsel had no authority to consent to handing over of the documents to the representative for the D.H. It is well established law that a counsel has authority to take all actions necessary for the proper conduct of his clients cause. This includes the power to withdraw interlocutory applications and even a Suit. The counsel also has implied authority of his client to enter into compromise and settle disputes unless such authority has been expressly excluded in the Vakalatnama. The wordings of the Vakalatnama given by the Judgment‑Debtor to their counsel does not expressly limit their authority. The Application for appointment of a Receiver (Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.2133 of 1997) was pending. A receiver had previously been appointed in the suit and could again be appointed by the Court. To avoid such an eventuality, the counsel, in my opinion, rightly agreed that the transportation documents would be given to the representative of the D.H. instead of the Head of the agent. The Judgment‑Debtor was, thus, saved from a possible adverse order. It is an established principle of law that a principal can appoint an agent to act for him. Under section 188 of the Contract Act, 1872 an agent having an authority to do an act has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act. The counsels were conscious of this principle of the law of agency when they consented to the impugned order. They acted properly in the performance of their duties in the interest of their client. To safeguard their client's interest they went to the extent of ensuring the presence of the counsels of both parties in Baku at the time of delivery of the required documents. I am clearly of the opinion that the counsels for J.D. did not exceed their authority but acted in the best interest of their client under the prevailing circumstances. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the Judgment Debtor are general proposition of law relating to appointment of pleader and Karinda and do not appear to support his contention. Rule 145 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 states that an Advocate shall not acquire an interest adverse to a client in the property or interest involved in the case while Rule 148 states that an Advocate shall not represent conflicting interests. There does not appear to be any conflict of interest between J.D. and their counsel. I fail to understand the relevancy of the aforesaid Rules to the present case. The terms of the Consent Decree nowhere specify that the Head of the agent would have to go to Baku. Further, the alleged Annexure D‑5, dated 8‑10 1997 has been issued by the officers of J.D. long after the passing of the Consent Decree on 8‑12‑1996 and therefore, cannot be referred to in the implementation of the same unless expressly required by its terms. Learned counsel for I.D. has not shown any provision in the Consent Decree whereby Annexure D‑5 can be read therein for its enforcement. He has also not been able to explain how the impugned order is going beyond the Consent Decree and is barred by estoppel. PLD 1987 SC 107 at p. 120 E and PLD 1985 Lah. 229 at p.233 relate to the general law of estoppel which does not appear to be applicable here as the Decree Holder is not backing out from any responsibility imposed upon it in the terms of the Consent Decree. The argument is, therefore, rejected. In view of the above, the Application is dismissed with costs of Rs.2,000 (Rupees two thousand only). A.A./H‑48/K Application dismissed.