PLD 1963

P L D 1963 Dacca 705 (PLP)

ABU FARID KHAN‑Petitioner Versus (1) PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
Writ Petition No. 295 of 1962, decided on 2nd July 1963.
Honorable Judges
A. Sattar and A. S. Chowdhury, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1963 Dacca 705 (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members A. Sattar and A. S. Chowdhury, JJ
Parties ABU FARID KHAN‑Petitioner Versus (1) PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN
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Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1963 Dacca 705 (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1963 Dacca 705 (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: A. Sattar and A. S. Chowdhury, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1963 Dacca 705 (PLP) (ABU FARID KHAN‑Petitioner Versus (1) PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Moazzem Hossain for Petitioner.
  • Maksumul Hakim, Advocate‑General and Siddique Ahmad Chowdhury for Respondents 1 and 2.
  • Dates of hearing: 30th May and 10th June 1963.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, Arts. 79 & 225‑Ordinance promulgated before coming into force of Constitution and kept in force by Art. 225‑Approval by Provincial Legislature under Art. 79, not necessary‑East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance (LXXVIII of 1958). (b) East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance (LXXVIII of 1958), S. 31‑Riotin.e on large scale by large number of people‑Collective fine imposed by notificationReference, in notification, to actual acts resulting in damage to property‑Not necessary. (c) East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance (LXXVIII of 1958), S. 31‑Provisions attracted only where prejudicial acts, defined in Ordinance, continue to be committed in particular locality‑Single incident of an abrupt or sporadic nature‑Does not justify imposition of collective fine.

Judgment & Decree

It has then been contended that on the admission of the respondents the local residents of the villages mentioned above did not take any part in incidents that took place on the date men tioned above and, therefore, the imposition of collective fine on the residents was without any lawful authority. In the affidavit‑in- opposition it has been clearly stated that not only the students but the residents of the locality took part in the incidents. The peti tioner in his application has stated that neither he nor any of the inhabitants of the locality was in any way concerned in or abetted the commission of any offence prejudicially affecting the public safety, the maintenance of public order, nor were they concerned in any of the offences narrated in the notification. In reply to this, the respondents have asserted that the local residents also took part in the incidents that happened at the railway station. We have read the affidavit‑in‑opposition carefully, we must say that it does not make any precise statement in this regard but it cannot be said that there is any admission of the petitioner's allegation. The next point that has been urged is that the order, in the face of it, show that the Provincial Government was not sure as to the actual acts of commission or omission for which the inhabitants of the localities mentioned in the notification were responsible. The notification in question runs as follows: "No. 213 Poll. (II)‑12th October 1962.‑Whereas it appears to the Provincial Government that the inhabitants of the area described in the Schedule hereto annexed within the jurisdiction of Netrokona police‑station in the district of Mymensingh are concerned in or abetting the omission of offences prejudicially affecting the public safety, the maintenance of public order, the maintenance of services essential to the life of the community, or harbouring persons concerned in the commission of such offences, or are failing to render all the assistance in their power to discover or apprehend the offenders, or are suppressing material evidence of the commission of such offences; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 31 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordi nance, 1958 (East Pakistan Ordinance No. LXXVIII of 1958), the Governor is pleased to impose a collective fine of Rs. 5,000 (Rs. five thousand only) on the inhabitants of the area describ ed in the said Schedule subject to any order which may be passed exempting any person or class or section of such inhabitants from liability to pay any portion of the fine; So much of the area under police‑station Netrokona lying in Mauza Satpai (Jurisdiction List No. 318) including Mahallas (1) Satpai, (11) Ukilpara and (111) Chalkpara, under Ward No. 1 and Mahalla Teribazar under Ward No. 2 of the Netrokona Town Committee. No. 214 Poll. (H)‑12th October 1962.‑In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of section 31 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958 (Ordinance No. LXXVIII of 1958), the Governor is pleased to empower the Deputy Com missioner of Mymensingh to exercise the powers under sub sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the said section." The learned Advocate for the petitioner contends that the notification shows that the provisions of section 31 of the East Bengal Public Safety Ordinance have been quoted without reference to the actual acts for which the inhabitants were found respon sible. We do not find any substance in this contention also the occurrence took place on a large scale in which a large number of people were involved. It cannot, therefore, be said that each of the acts alleged in the notification was not committed. It may be that some of them were responsible for some acts while the others were not but there is nothing before us to hold that all the acts mentioned in the notification were not committed in the occurrence. The next point urged by the learned Advocate is that the apportionment of the compensation was made without any enquiry as contemplated by subsection (3) of section

31. In the affidavit‑in‑opposition it has been stated that in apportioning the fine the Deputy Commissioner took into account the assessment list of the Netrokona Town Committee. In this view of the matter, we do not find that the assessment has been made in violation of the provisions of subsection (3) of section

31. Mr. Moazzem Hossain has then argued that the notice demanding payment of collective fine was signed by an un-autho rised person. We do not find on what basis it has been asserted that the person had no authority to sign the demand notice. There is no question of any delegation by the Deputy Commis sioner in this respect as it is not the case of the petitioner that in connection with apportionment of the fine the Deputy Commis sioner asked someone else to do it. There is no legal bar to the signing of the demand notice by a subordinate of the Deputy Commissioner. The last contention of the learned Advocate is that in order to attract the provisions of section 31 of the East Bengal Public Safety Ordinance, there must be a series or president repetition of occurrence constituting one or more of the offences specified therein and that one single instance of an abrupt occurrence happening on a particular occasion as in the instant case even though that may produce one or other of the baneful effects con templated by that section cannot warrant its application so as to justify imposition of collective fine. The relevant portion of the section reads: "31 (1) If it appears to the Provincial Government that the inhabitants of any area are concerned in or abetting the com mission of offences prejudicially affecting communal harmony, public safety, the maintenance of public order, the maintenance of supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or harbouring persons concerned in the commission of such offence, or are failing to render all the assistance in their power to discover or apprehend the offender or offenders, or are suppressing material evidence of the commission of such offences, it may, by notification, impose a collective fine on the inhabi tants of that are: The offences envisaged in this section are offences prejudicially affecting communal harmony, public safety, the maintenance of public order, the maintenance of supplies or services essential to the life of the community or harbouring persons concerned in the commission of such offences or failing to render all the assistance in their power to discover or apprehend the offender or offenders, or suppressing material evidence of the commission of such offences. Can it be said, if on a particular occasion something happened which resulted in the disturbance of communal harmony or prejudicially affected public safety or the maintenance of public order etc., that the provisions of this section are attracted or can such a solitary incident be regarded as sufficient to show that the inhabitants of the area around the scene of that incident were concerned in or abetted the commission of the offence ensuing there from or rendered themselves liable for any of the other offending acts of omission and commission contemplated by the section. The more we read the section the more we are convinced that such a situation was not in the mind when the pro visions contained in the section were made. This section makes liable some persons for acts for which they may not themselves be directly or indirectly responsible. Justification for this is perhaps to be found on the assumption based on a repetition of certain offences of a public nature in a particular area, that the inhabitants of that area, i.e., the majority or the bulk of its inhabi tants are actually committing those offences or lending encourage ment and support thereto actively, or passively. A single incident of an abrupt or sporadic nature cannot, we are afraid, afford a valid foundation for such an assumption. The Preamble of the Ordinance says that, in order to provide for "special measures" for ensuring the public safety and the maintenance of public order, the suppression of prejudicial acts endangering communal harmony or the safety or stability of the Province, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it was thought expedient to make the provisions in the Ordinance. Does not the Preamble clearly indicate that the intention is to take recourse to the "special measures" contemplated by the Ordinance more by way of preven tion of prejudicial acts as defined in the Ordinance than of punish ing the culprits for ordinary crimes? If that were not the intention, what then is the justification for imposing punitive fine on persons who may or may not concerned with any prejudicial act? In our view, the justification for such punishment is failure to render such assistance which the Government require in main taining law and order in an extraordinary situation for their failure to do it through the ordinary machinery. It is no doubt the duty of the State to maintain order in society but the members thereof are also bound to co‑operate and more so on an occasion of emergency. Does failure to do this on one particular occasion like the unforeseen one under consideration became punishable? Before we conclude we also note that the present one cannot be said to be a local affair exclusively or for that matter even mainly inasmuch as there cannot be any dispute as to the presence and participation of outsiders as well in sufficient strength. In fact even the possibility of their preponderance cannot be ruled out. Indeed, we have not been able to lay our hands on any autho rity on this point. Nevertheless, we have felt, on a reading of the entire Ordinance in question, that imposition of collective fine could not have been contemplated in a situation as the present. L Only when some prejudicial acts, as defined in the Ordinance, continue to be committed in a particular locality, it is then and then alone that the Provincial Government may impose collective fine on the inhabitants thereof. The result, therefore, is that this rule is made absolute. The order of the Provincial Government imposing collective fine on the petitioners is directed to be cancelled. Having regard to the facts of this case, we make no order as to costs. A. S. CHOWDHURY, J.‑

I agree. K. B. A. Rule made absolute.