1995 PLP 1016 (MLD)

Syed Raza Hussain Shamsi for Respondents Nos. 7 and

8. Maudood Akbar Mian for Respondent No.

9. Date of hearing: 28th June, 1994. This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan seeks to quash order, dated 13‑9‑1992, passed by the Director- General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab, by getting a declaration that it is entitled to grant of L‑2 licences for sale of liquor, applied for to the Excise and Taxation Authorities in order to continue its business in that behalf.

2. The background of this case is that the petitioner and six others filed Writ Petition No. 538 of 1988, praying therein that the Excise and Taxation authorities be directed to consider their application for issuance of licence and licences of respondents Nos. 3 to 10 therein i.e. M/s. Hotel Pearl Continental, Lahore, M/s. Hotel Hilton International, Lahore, M/s. Faletti's Hotel, Lahore, M/s. Flashman Hotel, Rawalpindi Cantt., M/s. Holiday Inn, Islamabad, M/s. Islamabad Club, Murree Road, Islamabad, M/s. Hotel Cecil, The Mall Murree, M/s. Faisalabad Serena Hotel, Club Road Faisalabad, be cancelled and that the Inspector‑General of Police, Punjab, Lahore, be directed to get a criminal case registered against the aforesaid respondents for their involvement in illegal business of liquor. The writ petition was dismissed with the observations that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the licences issued in favour of the aforesaid respondents by means of Constitutional petition. As regards prayer of the petitioners for grant of licences/consideration of their application for issuance of licences, it was observed:‑‑‑ " ....suffice it to say that the petitioner had a vested right to demand that their application is decided, justly, fairly and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Order, but no direction can be issued by this Court for issuance of such licences. This is function of the Provincial Excise and Taxation Department to be discharged strictly in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of the Order."

3. The petitioner and six others sought leave to appeal against the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5561 of 1988 by means of Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 104‑R of 1989. The same was, however, declined by order dated 1g‑3‑1990 inter alia with the following observations:‑‑‑ "If a Law is being violated, it is open to the petitioners to proceed against the violators thereof" individually and independently and not by & Constitution petition. In the circumstances, we do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave to appeal which is hereby refused." After dismissal of the aforesaid petition, the petitioner herein singly filed Writ Petition No. 3502‑Misc‑91, seeking a direction to the Excise and Taxation Authorities to consider its application for grant of licence (L‑2) for retail of intoxicating liquor. The said writ petition was disposed of by order, dated 7‑5‑1991 with a direction to the Director‑General, Excise and Taxation, Government of Punjab, Lahore, to dispose of application of the petitioner in accordance with law. In consequence, Director‑General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab, vide its Letter No. 4351‑91/1496‑Ex (P) III, dated 24th August, 1991, informed the petitioner that their request for grant of licence is refused being not in public interest. Being aggrieved with this order, the petitioner moved another Writ Petition No. 9937 of 1991, in which on concession made by the Excise and Taxation Department, without prejudice to the respective contentions of the parties, it was agreed to dispose of afresh the application of the petitioner on merits and in accordance with law, vide order, dated 20‑5‑1992.

4. Consequent upon the order dated 20‑5‑1992 passed by this Court, the Director‑General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab, after considering the matter afresh declined to grant to licence to the petitioner by Letter No. 5351‑92/876 EX‑III, dated 13th September, 1992. It was observed "that the vends in Punjab are meant for non‑Muslim Pakistanis and non‑Muslim foreigners. This facility has been provided in different hotels where retail sale also takes place... all these licences Fs have been granted to body‑corporate and not to individuals. These organizations are required to cater to the needs of both the foreigners who are staying in these hotels alongwith the local non‑Muslims who are non- residents ... These vends so far have been found to be an adequate arrangement where all the requirements of law are properly met and the permit‑holders are suitably accommodated it is found out that the arrangements are working quite satisfactorily, there does not appear to be any reasons to grant a new licence for any other retail vend by way of retail sale shop. This office is not in a position to grant licence to you. Your request is, therefore, not accepted."

5. In view of the position explained above, it was pointed out to the learned counsel for the petitioner that in earlier round of litigation it was held by this Court that the petitioners have no locus stand to challenge the grant/renewal of licences to the other licensees. This order having been upheld by the Supreme Court, they cannot be permitted to re‑agitate this controversy in these proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to rebut this proposition. Thus, visualised, the question of grant/renewal to the other licence is matter `past and closed'. As to the other prayer for the grant of licence in favour of petitioner, suffice it to say, that the Director‑Genera, Excise and Taxation, Punjab, has recorded a finding of fact that the existing arrangements are adequate to cater the need of permit‑holders and grant of new licence for any other retail vend by way of retail sale shop is not called for. The petitioner has, therefore, no vested right to demand the grant of a licence in view of the fact that the existing arrangements are sufficient to cater the needs of both the foreigners who are staying in the hotels to whom the licences have been issued as well as the local non‑Muslim residents.

6. There is also no merit in plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground that it has been passed without independent application of mind by the Director General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab, on behest of the Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore. A bare perusal of the impugned order shows that the Director‑General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab, after considering the material before him independently passed the order without being influenced by any extraneous considerations. As to the contention that the administrative authority must give reasons for having passed the order and the same must be germane to the issues raised by a party in a cause, in the light of dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Solyail Jute Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 SC 329, suffice it to say, that there is no cavil with the proposition laid down in the precedent case. In the instant case, however, reasons have been given for declining to grant licences to the petitioner to which no exception can be taken here.

7. As to the contention that effective hearing was not granted to the petitioner pursuant to the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 9937 C of 1991, therefore, the order was a nullity, I am afraid, the case of Zahid Iqbal Raza v. The Controller of Examinations, University of the Punjab, Lahore PLD 1975 Lah. 1385, relied upon by the petitioner, has no relevance in the context of present controversy. No direction was given in order dated 20‑5‑1992 passed in Writ Petition No. 9937‑91 to afford personal hearing to the petitioner while disposing of its application. It is not even a requirement under the law. The said writ petition was disposed of merely with the observation that the matter shall be considered afresh. This is exactly what has been done by the Director‑General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab, therefore, there is no violation of any direction issued in Writ Petition No. 9937‑

91. In view of above, I find no force in the writ petition which is hereby dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs. AA./D‑46/L Petition dismissed.