PTD 1960

1960 PLP 443 (PTD)

SULTAN BROTHERS (PRIVATE) LTD. Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BOMBAY CITY II

Jurisdiction / Court
Bombay (India)
Decided Date
I. T. Reference 69 of 1958, decided on July, 2, 1959.
Honorable Judges
: Shah and S. T. Desai, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1960 PLP 443 (PTD)
Forum / Court Bombay (India)
Bench Members : Shah and S. T. Desai, JJ
Parties SULTAN BROTHERS (PRIVATE) LTD. Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BOMBAY CITY II
Primary Law STATEMENT OF CASE
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1960 PLP 443 (PTD)?

This judgment primarily cites: STATEMENT OF CASE as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1960 PLP 443 (PTD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Bombay (India) bench comprising: : Shah and S. T. Desai, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1960 PLP 443 (PTD) (SULTAN BROTHERS (PRIVATE) LTD. Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BOMBAY CITY II). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

STATEMENT OF CASE

Headnotes / Summary

Incometax Act (XI of 1922), Ss. 9, 10, 12 (3), (4)‑Construc tion of building‑Installation of furniture and fixtures‑Lease of building, furniture and fixtures for use as hotel‑Rental income from building‑Income from property‑Rental income from furniture and fixtures‑Income from other sources‑Provisions of section 12 (4) Applicability. It is only when the primary letting is of machinery, plant or furniture and together or along with such letting there is a letting of buildings, the two lettings being inseparable from each other, that the taxable income of the buildings will be computed under section 12 (4) of the Incometax Act and the allowances specified therein will be made available. The assessee company obtained on lease a plot of land, put up a residential building thereon and furnished it by installing furniture and fixtures. The company let it out to a tenant to be used as a hotel and under the lease deed the lessee agreed to pay a net monthly rent of Rs. 5,950 for the building and of Rs. 5,000 for the furniture and fixtures : Held, (i) on the facts, that there was no material on the record to support an inference that the letting out was a business venture and the income derived by the assessee from the letting of the building and furniture and fixtures could not be computed under section 10 of the Incometax Act ; (ii) that what was let out by the assessee was the building and for making it fit for running a hotel furniture and fixtures were installed therein : the lease was not primarily of furniture and fixtures and therefore section 12 (4) of the Act did not apply ; (iii) that the income of the assessee from the building had to be computed under section 9 and the‑income from furniture and fixtures under section 12 (3). By this application, Messrs Sultan Brothers Private Ltd., the assessee company, requires the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court some questions, said to be of law and which are said to arise out of its order under section 33 (4) made on December 28, 1957. Inasmuch as, in our opinion, a question of law does arise out of the aforesaid order, we hereby draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922.

2. This reference application arises out of the assessment made upon the assessee company for the assessment year 1953‑

54. The appeal was argued before the Tribunal by Mr. N. A. Palkhi vala and the main point that arose then for consideration was formulated by him in these words: "When a person is the owner of a building and also of furniture and fixtures installed therein and lets out for rent all these assets together in one inseparable lease, should com putation of income be made exclusively under section 12 in respect of the entire rent to the exclusion of section 9 or partly under section 9 and partly under section 12". The material facts are as follows: The assessee company was incorporated in January, 1942. It obtained lease of Plot No. 7 of Backbay Reclamation Estate some time in 1941. A building suitable for running a residential hotel was constructed thereon by January, 1943, and immediately thereafter that building together with furniture and fixtures was let out on lease. The said furniture and fixtures consisted of the various items described in the second schedule to annexure A'. The original lease agreement was not produced before the Tribunal, but the one made on August 30, 1949, and which was in operation for the account year ended June 30, 1952, was before it. A copy of the said lease agreement is marked annexure `A' and form parts of the case. The said lease agreement is for a period of six years commencing from December 1, 1946. It stipulated that during the said period, a net monthly rent of Rs. 5,950 shall be paid for the said "land hereditaments and premises" and a sum of Rs. 5,000 "for the hire of the said furniture and fixtures". Clause I set out the covenants to be performed by the lessors; clause II those by the lessee. Clause II (b) provided for renewal of the said lease for a further term of six years "on the same rent" and on terms contained therein. Clause II (d) stipulated that the lessors shall at their own expense provide at all times during the continuance of the lease and the renewal thereof certain furniture in each room on a certain scale and certain fixtures such as gas stoves, hot cases etc. It may be added that according to the Tribunal, clause II (b) provided for renewal of the lease of the building but did not contain any reference to the renewal of the hire agreement in respect of furniture and fixtures. Clause III (2), provided for determination of the lease or its renewal at the option of the assessee "in, case the demised premises or any material part thereof e destroyed or damaged by fire so as to be unfit for the lessee's occupation or use for the purposes of his aforesaid business". In this clause there is no specific reference "to furniture and fixtures". The business of the lessee as mentioned in clause I (a) was to run a "hotel, boarding and lodging house, restaurant, confectionery, and such other ancillarybusiness". The lessee has been carrying on business in the leased premises of running a hotel known as "Ambassador Hotel". Up to and including the assessment year 1952‑53, the income derived from letting of the said property and of furniture and fixtures was being computed under section 12 of the Incometax Act, 1922. But for the assessment year 1953‑54, the Incometax Officer computed, after giving a fair opportunity to the assessee, income from property leased under section 9 and income derived by hiring of furniture and fixtures under section

12. At‑no time, it was contended before the Incometax Officer that the assessee company was carrying on the business of, to quote the words of Mr. Palkhivala, letting out the totality of the assets" (consisting of the building, furniture and fixtures) so that the income derived was liable to be wholly computed under section

10. In appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner substantially confirmed the Incometax Officer's views even though he gave some relief in the matter of computation of income and the matter ultimately came to the Tribunal.

3. On these facts and having regard to several clauses (particularly those mentioned below) of the lease agreement (annexure `A' and the provisions contained in sections 12 (3) and 12 (4) of the Incometax Act, the following submissions were made to the Tribunal: (i) if letting out of the building on the one hand and of furniture and fixtures on the other hand is inseparable then the computation of the income derived from such letting out has to be made under section 12 ; (ii) if the letting of the building is incidental to the letting of a first class hotel premises fully equipped, then the requirements of (i) above are satisfied and as such the income has to be computed under section 12 exclusively. In support of this, Mr. Palkhivala relied upon the recitals and clauses I (a), (c), (e) (f), and (i) ; clauses II (a), (b), (d), (e) to (n) and clause III of the lease agreement dated August 30, 1949 ; (iii) the last submission is that if income cannot be computed wholly under section 12, then it should be wholly computed under section 10 inasmuch as "letting out totality of the assets" is the assessee's business and the building that is leased is used for the purpose of that business." For the reasons given by the Tribunal in paragraphs 7 and 8 of its order, a copy of which is marked annexure `B' and forms part of the case, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the letting out of the building on Plot No. 7 was not inseparable from the letting of furniture such as fans, beds, etc. The Tribunal particularly added that in coming to that conclusion though it relied upon a good deal of material indicated in its order; it was not influenced "by the fact that the lease deed has mentioned separately the rent payable for the building on the one hand and the hire payable for furniture and fixtures on the other hand": The Tribunal therefore, rejected the first two of these three contentions. The Tribunal also rejected the third contention as it held that letting out on hire of furniture and fixtures did not amount to carrying on business.

4. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, one more contention in general terms was taken on behalf of the assessee company it being that "whatever expenses incurred by the assessee could not be allowed in computing income under section 9, should be allowed in computing the assessee's income under section 12". No particular sum was specified. For reasons given by the Tribunal in paragraph 13 of its order, it rejected this contention.

5. On these facts, the assessee company requires the Tribunal to refer the following four questions to the High Court as questions of law arising out of its order: "(1) Whether the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the rent in respect of the building leased out along with the plant, machinery and furniture under the lease dated the 30th August 1949; was taxable under section 9 of the Indian Incometax Act? (2) Whether the whole of the rent payable under the said lease is taxable either under section 12 or under section 10 of the Indian Incometax Act and whether the assessee is conse quently entitled to depreciation and other allowances and expenses in respect of the building covered by the lease? (3) Whether the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the letting of the building was not inseparable from the letting of the machinery, plant and furniture? (4) Whether, in any event, the Tribunal should have allowed under section 12 the expenses which were not allowed under section 9 of the Act? " In put opinion, the finding of the Tribunal that letting out on hire of furniture and fixtures did not amount to carrying on business is essentially a finding of fact, but, in arriving at its another finding, viz., letting of the building on Plot No. 7 was not inseparable from the letting of furniture and fixtures, the Tribunal relied upon the recitals and certain clauses contained in the lease agreement of August 30, 1949, (annexure `A'). Hence, in our opinion, the only question of law that arises is: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the income derived from letting of the building constructed on Plot No. 7 is properly to be computed under sections 9, 10 or under section 12 of the Incometax Act? " As regards the fourth question formulated in the application of the assessee, it is too vague and of academic nature for being referred to the High Court. We, accordingly, refer to the High Court only the question as set out above.

6. Statement of the case was placed on the table and both the parties agree that no material facts have been omitted. N. A. Palkhivala with Kolah for the Assessee. G. N. Goshi with R. J. Joshi for the Commissioner.

Judgment & Decree

(iii) the last submission is that if income cannot be computed wholly under section 12, then it should be wholly computed under section 10 inasmuch as "letting out totality of the assets" is the assessee's business and the building that is leased is used for the purpose of that business." For the reasons given by the Tribunal in paragraphs 7 and 8 of its order, a copy of which is marked annexure `B' and forms part of the case, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the letting out of the building on Plot No. 7 was not inseparable from the letting of furniture such as fans, beds, etc. The Tribunal particularly added that in coming to that conclusion though it relied upon a good deal of material indicated in its order; it was not influenced "by the fact that the lease deed has mentioned separately the rent payable for the building on the one hand and the hire payable for furniture and fixtures on the other hand": The Tribunal therefore, rejected the first two of these three contentions. The Tribunal also rejected the third contention as it held that letting out on hire of furniture and fixtures did not amount to carrying on business.

4. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, one more contention in general terms was taken on behalf of the assessee company it being that "whatever expenses incurred by the assessee could not be allowed in computing income under section 9, should be allowed in computing the assessee's income under section 12". No particular sum was specified. For reasons given by the Tribunal in paragraph 13 of its order, it rejected this contention.

5. On these facts, the assessee company requires the Tribunal to refer the following four questions to the High Court as questions of law arising out of its order: "(1) Whether the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the rent in respect of the building leased out along with the plant, machinery and furniture under the lease dated the 30th August 1949; was taxable under section 9 of the Indian Incometax Act? (2) Whether the whole of the rent payable under the said lease is taxable either under section 12 or under section 10 of the Indian Incometax Act and whether the assessee is conse quently entitled to depreciation and other allowances and expenses in respect of the building covered by the lease? (3) Whether the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the letting of the building was not inseparable from the letting of the machinery, plant and furniture? (4) Whether, in any event, the Tribunal should have allowed under section 12 the expenses which were not allowed under section 9 of the Act? " In put opinion, the finding of the Tribunal that letting out on hire of furniture and fixtures did not amount to carrying on business is essentially a finding of fact, but, in arriving at its another finding, viz., letting of the building on Plot No. 7 was not inseparable from the letting of furniture and fixtures, the Tribunal relied upon the recitals and certain clauses contained in the lease agreement of August 30, 1949, (annexure `A'). Hence, in our opinion, the only question of law that arises is: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the income derived from letting of the building constructed on Plot No. 7 is properly to be computed under sections 9, 10 or under section 12 of the Incometax Act? " As regards the fourth question formulated in the application of the assessee, it is too vague and of academic nature for being referred to the High Court. We, accordingly, refer to the High Court only the question as set out above.

6. Statement of the case was placed on the table and both the parties agree that no material facts have been omitted. N. A. Palkhivala with Kolah for the Assessee. G. N. Goshi with R. J. Joshi for the Commissioner. SHAH, J.‑The assessees who are a limited company obtained on lease a plot of land at the Backbay Reclamation in Bombay and put up a residential building which could be adapted for use as a hotel, and furnished the same by installing furniture and fixtures and let it out to a tenant under a deed dated the 30th August 1943, for six years for using it as a hotel. After the expiry of the first period of lease another deed of lease was executed on the 13th of August 1949. Under that lease the lessee agreed to pay a net monthly rental of Rs. 5,950, for the lease of the building and at the rate of Rs. 5,000, for the hire of furniture and fixtures, Initially, the Incometax Officer assessed the income received under the lease under section 12 of the Incometax Act. For the assessment year 1952‑53, the assessment proceedings were brought before the Tribunal and the Tribunal observed in the course of its judg ment, though that question did not arise in .the case, that "the question whether the income from that property should be com puted under section 9 or under section 12 deserves further scrutiny." The Incometax Officer then computed for the assess ment year 1953‑54 income out of the building under section 9 of the Incometax Act and the income derived from hiring of the furniture and fixtures under section 12 of the Act. Against the order passed by the Incometax Officer, the assessees appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. That Officer substantially confirmed the order passed by the Incometax Officer. There was an appeal by the, assessee to the Tribunal and the Tribunal affirm ed the view of the taxing authorities. At the instance of the assessee, the Tribunal has referred the following question: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the income derived from letting of the building constructed on plot No. 7 is properly to be computed under sections 9 and. 10 or under section 12 of the Incometax Act? " The question whether the income derived from the letting of the building and the furniture can be assessed under section 10 is easily answered. Neither before the Incometax Officer, nor before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, was the question ever advanced that the assessees were letting out the building as a business venture. This contention was advanced for the first time before the Tribunal and the Tribunal negatived that contention holding that there were no materials which justified it. It was suggested that from the ownership of the property used as asset of a business concern income was being obtained. In our view, there is nothing in the deed of lease which supports the contention of the assessee, nor are there any materials on the record which justify that inference. The income derived from the letting of the building and the furniture and fixtures cannot be computed under section 10 of the Act. Section 9 of the Incometax Act makes provision for compu tation of the income under the head "Property." Section 10 makes provision for computation of income received from business and section 12 for computation of income received from other sources. By clause (3) of section 12 which was added by Act VII of 1939 it was enacted that where an assessee lets on hire machinery, plant or furniture belonging to him, he shall be entitled to allowances in accordance with the provisions of clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of subsection (2) of section

10. Evidently by enacting this clause, the Legislature intended to give the benefit of the four clauses of section 10 (2) to an assessee who was not carrying on a business of letting out on hire machinery, plant or furniture but who had as an owner of the property let out the same. By clause (4) which was added by Act XXIII of 1941, an additional provision was made granting the benefit of the provisions of clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of subsection (2) to the owner of the building when he had let oh hire machinery, plant or furniture belonging to him, and also building, and the letting out of the building was insepar able from the letting of the machinery, plant or furniture. For computation of income received from buildings under section 9, a provision for granting allowances in accordance with clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of subsection (2) of section 10 has not been made. Evidently by clause (4) of section 12, a different category was sought to be created in respect of which the prescribed allowances were to be given to the owner of the building in the computation of his income. Clauses (3) and (4) of section 12 have, in our judgment, to be read together. By clause (3) an assessee becomes entitled to the prescribed allowances before his income received from letting out of machinery, plant or furniture is included in his total income, and to a similar allowance in respect of certain buildings under clause (iv). But that benefit can only be given in respect of buildings, provided the conditions prescribed by sub section (4) of section 12 are fulfilled ; and these conditions are that there is a letting on hire machinery, plant or furniture belong ing to the assessee, that along with that letting the buildings are let out and that the letting of the buildings is inseparable from the letting of the said machinery, plant or furniture. In our judgment, it was intended by the Legislature that the primary letting must be of the machinery, plant or furniture and that together with such letting or along with such letting there is a letting of buildings, the two lettings being inseparable from each other. It is only if these conditions are fulfilled that the taxable income of the build ings will be computed under subsection (4) of section

12. We are unable to accept the argument of Mr. Palkhivala that if there is a letting on hire of machinery, plant or furniture and there is also a letting of buildings and that the two lettings are inseparable, in computing the income from the buildings, the lessor will be entitled to the allowances under clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of subsection (2) of section

10. The condition of inseparability of the lettings is not the only condition prescribed by the Legislature to enable the lessor of the building to qualify for the benefits of the allowances under the specified clauses of section 10 (2). We are, therefore, of the view that if the primary letting is of machi nery, plant or furniture and the secondary letting is of the buildings, and the two lettings are inseparable, then only will the provisions of subsection (4) of section 12 apply. Mr. Palkhivala contends that even if that be the true interpreta tion of subsection (4) of section 12, in the present case, the primary letting is of the furniture and fixtures and the secondary letting is of the building. He invites our attention to the fact that a substantial amount has been spent for providing furniture and fixtures, and the monthly rental of the furniture and fixtures alone is Rs. 5,000 whereas the rental of the building is Rs. 5,

950. Mr. Palkhivala contends that under the terms of the lease no special importance having been given to the letting of the building on the one hand or furniture and fixtures on the other, the Court must have regard to the fact that the entire unit was intended to be let for the purpose of a hotel and was in fact let out for the purpose of running a hotel, boarding and lodging house or a res taurant, arid that it must be held that the intention was to let out the unit in which the primary letting was of the furniture or fittings or fixtures. We are unable on the plain words used in the docu ment to accept that contention. What has been let out is the build ing constructed by the assessees, and for making the building fit for running a hotel or a boarding and lodging house or a restaurant, furniture and fixtures have been installed. It cannot be said in the case of such a lease that the lease was primarily of furniture and not of the building. Mr. Palkhivala invites our attention to the facts that in para graph 7 of the judgment of the Tribunal, an erroneous statement was made by them as to the true effect of section 10 (2) (vi) and (v) but we do not think that anything turns in this case upon the allege d erroneous statement relating to the true effect of these clauses. On the view taken by us, the question will be answered as follows: "The income from the building will be computed under section 9, income from furniture and fixtures under section 12 (3) and that no part of the income is taxable under section 10." The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner. No order on the notice of motion. Reference answered accordingly.