P (PLP)

Inam‑ur‑Rahim, F.C

‑This is a second petition for revision purport ling to be under section 11 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1941 against the order, dated the 9th March 11,149 passed by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, West Punjab, whereby he accepted partially the first petition of revision by remanding the case for fresh decision after further enquiry and examination of such accounts books as may be produced by the assessee. 2 An order of assessment was passed by the Excise and Taxation Officer, Lahore, on 20th March 1947 determining the petitioner's turnover to be Rs. 70,00,000, for the year 1945‑46 and accordingly imposing on the petitioner‑firm a tax of Rs 43,750 under section 8 (4) of the Act read with rule 7 (4) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Rules, 1943. Against this order an appeal was filed before the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner who rejected the same on 18th October 1948 Thereafter the matter was agitated before the Excise and Taxation Commissioner who partially accepted the same as mentioned above.

3. The Firm has now, filed this second revision petition before me. The petitioner has throughout been claiming exemption from the tax under rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules. According to this rule in a series of sales in the Punjab affecting any timber the tax should be levied on the first of such sales. The words "in the Punjab" occurring in this rule were inserted‑vide Punjab Government notification No. 513‑E and T, dated the 21st that the rule as it stood before 21st February 1947 contemplated that if the first sale of timber had taken place outside the Punjab, its subsequent import and sale in this province rendered it exempt from sales Tax. As the petitioner it is alleged purchased the timber from Kashmir State the first sale of the commodity took place outside the Punjab. It is contended that any further sale of the commodity in the Punjab being not the first sale, no tax should be leviable thereon.

4. This case hinges upon the interpretation of the word "sales" as it occurs for the first time in rule 12 framed under section 19 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1941. The point for decision is whether this word in rule 12 as it stood in Punjab Government Revenue Depart ment, notification. No. 1038‑TXN, dated the 31st May 1943 can be rightly interpreted to mean only the sales in the Punjab. The preamble of fins Act reads as follows :‑ An Act to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Punjab. Section 19 of the Act gives the Provincial Government the power to male rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. It is contended on behalf of the Crown that the Provincial Government had no authority to frame any rules contrary to the purposes of the Act which were to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Punjab It is obvious, therefore, that no interpretation can be placed on rule 12 which militates against the purposes of the Act as defined in the Act including its preamble.

5. It is further contended on behalf of the Crown that the extent of the Act is also clearly defined in clause (2) of section 1 which lays down that the Act extends to the Punjab. It is, then fore, submitted that the word under dispute, namely " saps ", as it occurs for the first time in Rule 12 cannot be interpreted to extend beyond the territorial extent of the Act given in clause (2) of section 1.

6. On behalf of the petitioner it is submitted that Maxwell lays down that one of the recognised principles of jurisprudence is that the preamble of an Act cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part when the language and the object and scope of the Act are not open to doubt. It is further contended that it has been held by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in 1942 I.L.R. 349 that a fiscal statute has to he interpreted strictly whether it be in the interest of subject or in the interest of Government. It is agued that as rule 12 clearly lays down that the sales Tax was only leviable on first sales it is not open to the Crown to bring in the preamble in order to restrict the interpretation of the word sales to those in the Punjab. It is further contended that the Crown recognised that a lacuna existed in the law and supplied a casus ommissus in February, 1947 by enacting an amendment of rule 12 by notification .No. 513‑E. and T, dated the 21st February, 1947 by which the words in the Punjab "were inserted after the word "sales" where it occurs for the first time in rule 12.

7. Maxwell lays down that the true meaning of any passage is to be found not merely in the words of that passage, but in comparing it with other parts of the law, ascertaining also what were the circumstances with reference to which the words were used and what was the objective appearing from those circumstances which the Legislature had in view. Every clause of a statute should therefore be construed with reference to the context and the other clauses of the Act, so as so far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject- matter. The preamble of an Act is obviously included in the context with reference to which a clause of a statute has to be interpreted. Lord Harshelll in Statute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood lays down that where a section gave powers to make rules the rules are to be read as part of the sec tion, In this case section 19 gives powers to the Provincial Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, Rules 12 cannot therefore be interpreted in such a manner as to be consistent with the purposes given in the Act and there is nothing in Maxwell to debar a court from taking the preamble of the Act into account in determining the purposes of the Act for which the Provincial Government was authorised to frame rules. Moreover, in case of doubt even the Maxwell dictum quoted by the learned counsel for petitioner allows a reference to the preamble. The very fact J that subsequently the Provincial Government found it necessary to clarify rule 12 shows that a doubt existed as regards the interpretation of the rule as it originally stood. To resolve this doubt it is quite legitimate to take the preamble into account.

8. There is no adequate case for any interference with the order of the lower court. The petition of revision is hereby rejected with costs. K. M. A. Revision dismissed.