1979 PLC 310 (PLP)
BADSHAH KHAN ETC. Versus PECO LTD.
| Citation | 1979 PLC 310 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal |
| Bench Members | M. Jamil Asghar, Chairman |
| Parties | BADSHAH KHAN ETC. Versus PECO LTD. |
| Primary Law | 18. In the case of Ghulam Abbas v. State (P L D 1968 Lah. 101) it was held :‑, ORDER, 2. All the five petitioners are employees of Pakistan Engineering Com pany Limited, Badami Bagh Works, Lahore. Before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act they filed separate petitions under section IS (2) of the Payment of Wages Act for the payment of delayed wages in respect of heat allowance for the period mentioned below against their names :‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1979 PLC 310 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: 18. In the case of Ghulam Abbas v. State (P L D 1968 Lah. 101) it was held :‑, ORDER, 2. All the five petitioners are employees of Pakistan Engineering Com pany Limited, Badami Bagh Works, Lahore. Before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act they filed separate petitions under section IS (2) of the Payment of Wages Act for the payment of delayed wages in respect of heat allowance for the period mentioned below against their names :‑, 17. In the case of Nazir Ahmad v. King‑Emperor (A I R 1936 P C 253) it was observed :‑, 11. From the above, it is clear that an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is revisable by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. In the instant cases, the impugned order was passed by the Labour Court acting as an Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act which is not an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but nevertheless it will be deemed to be an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in view of section 35 (d) (5) of the said Ordinance, which reads as under :‑, 20. In the case of Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property, West Pakistan, Lahore v. Muhammad Din and another (P L D 1971 Lah. 217) it was held :‑, (a) Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1979 PLC 310 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal bench comprising: M. Jamil Asghar, Chairman.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1979 PLC 310 (PLP) (BADSHAH KHAN ETC. Versus PECO LTD.). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Asghar Malik for Petitioners (in all Petitions).
- Javed Altaf for Respondent (in all Petitions).
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑ S. 17, proviso‑Law prescribing a particular mode of doing an act‑Act in order to gain validity must be done in that mode and in no other Memorandum of appeal accompanied with a certificate of Authority under Payment of Wages Act; 1936, such certificate being to effect of a cheque for amount having been received‑Law requiring memo. of appeal to be accompanied by a certificate stating amount payable under direction appealed against having been deposited with Authority and amount not meaning a cheque, such being no legal tender, amount, held, not deposited as required by law. Col. Bashir Hussain and 10 others v. Land Acquisition Collector, Lahore improvement Trust, Lahore and 2 others P L D 1970 Lah. 521 ; Nazir Ahmad v. King‑Emperor A I R 1936 P C 253 ; Ghulam Abbas v. State P L D 1968 Lah. 101 ; Muhammad Sharif v. Sh. Muhammad Rafiq, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others P L D 1968 Lah. 263 ; Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property, West Pakistan, Lahore v. Muhammad Din and another P L D 197 Lah. 217 ; Mst. Sardar Begum v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore P L D 1972 Lah. 458 and Mian Abdul Majid and 7 others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore P L D 1972 Lah. 66 ref. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ ‑‑ S. 35 (5) (d)‑Jurisdiction‑Expression "or any other law"‑Order passed under Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969‑Revisable by Labour Appellate Tribunal‑Impugned order passed by Labour Court acting as Appellate Authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 Such order though not an order passed under Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 nevertheless deemed to be‑ an order passed under such ordinance in view of S. 35 (5) (d)‑Labour Court, held, can pass order not only under Ordinance XXIII of 1969 but also under any other law‑Revision petition, held further, competent and Labour is Appellate Tribunal possessed of jurisdiction to entertain such petitions. These are five separate revision petitions against the orders dated 17‑7‑1977 of the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act/Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore. (i) Islam‑ud‑Din s/o Siraj‑ud‑Din From 16‑3‑71 to onwards (ii) Muhammad Sadiq s/o Fazal Din From 16‑3‑71 to onwards (iii) Badshah Khan s/o Rahim Gul From 24‑4‑72 to onwards (iv) Abdur Rashid s/o Muhammad Ali From 22‑4‑72 to onwards (v) Dil Muhammad s/o Diwan Ali From 19‑12‑72 to onwards
3. Since the claims in respect of Messrs Islam‑ud‑Din and Muhammad Sadiq were for the period exceeding three years, they also filed an application for condonation of delay , wherein it was contended that since they had been diligently pursuing the matter with the respondent, they could not file their claims within the statutory period of limitation of three years. The respondent in all the five petitions contested their claims.
4. All the petitions were consolidated and the following issues were framed :‑ (i) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the Heat Allowance claimed. (ii) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present application. (iii) Relief.
5. All the petitioners claimed Heat Allowance relying on the Govern ment of West Pakistan's Notification No. 2‑15 (L‑IV)‑65 published in the Extraordinary Gazette of 19th November, 1966, according to which, workers in the re‑rolling industry (melting, re‑heating or hot re‑rolling) performing any operation in the mill sections from the billet feeding to the stacking of hot material (both operations inclusive) shall be entitled to Heat Allowance and paid an additional wage at a flat rate of Rs. 1.50 (Rupees one and paisas fifty only) per day engaged on daily wages basis and Rs. 39 (Rupees thirty nine only) per month if engaged on monthly basis. This issue was decided in favour of the petitioners. It was held that they were entitled to Heat Allowance at the rate of Rs. 39 per mensem.
6. Second issue was also decided in favour of the petitioners it was held that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had jurisdiction to entertain their petitions.
7. In the light of the above decision, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act held that the petitioners were entitled to the wages claimed as Heat Allowance as under :‑ (i) Islam‑ud Din s/o Siraj Din Rs. 1,872 (ii) Muhammad Sadiq s/o Fazal Din Rs. 1,872 (iii) Badshah Khan sin Rahim Gui Rs. 1,365 (iv) Abdur Rashid s/o Muhammad Ali Rs. 1,365 (vl Dil Muhammad s/o Diwan Ali Rs. 1,058
8. Against the above order, the respondent filed appeals before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act/Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, which consolidated the same and held that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act bad no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions and as such the order appealed against was set aside and the appeals were accepted.
9. Aggrieved by the above order, all the five petitioners have preferred these separate revision petitions. Since all the five revision petitions arise out of the same order, they will be disposed of together by one order.
10. The first point for determination is as to whether the revision petitions are competent. According to section 38 (3‑A) of Industrial Rela tions Ordinance, 1969, the Tribunal may on its own motions at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance, in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit. . "A Labour Court shall exercise and perform such other powers an functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance or any other law."
12. From the above it is clear that a Labour Court can pass an order not only under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but also under any other law, which is covered by the expression "or any other law".
13. In view of the above, the revision petitions are competent and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain them.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the appeals before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act were not competent, because the memorandum of appeals was not accompanied by a certificate of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to the effect that the appellant had deposited with the Authority the amount payable under the direction appealed against.
15. According to the proviso to section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, no appeal is competent unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate of the Authority to the effect that the appellant had deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against. According to section 17 (2) of the said Act, save as provided in subsection (1), any direction under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 17 shall be final. In other words, if the memorandum of appeal is not accompanied by the requisite certificate, the direction given by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act becomes final.
16. From the perusal of the record I find that alongwith the memorandum of appeal a certificate dated 13‑12‑1976 of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was appended which is to the effect that a cheque for the amount had been received. The said certificate did not say that the amount had been deposited as required under law. It is well established that if law prescribed a particular mode of doing an act, it must be done in that mode to gain validity. In the case Col. Bashir Hussain and 10 others v. Land Acquisition Collector. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and 2 others (P L D 1970 Lah. 521) it was held :‑ "It is an accepted principle of law that if a statute requires something to be done and also prescribes the mode for doing it, the requirements of law can be fulfilled by the act, in the manner prescribed." "The rule which applies is a different and not less well‑recognised rule, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all‑other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden." "It is well settled that where a power is given to a particular person to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden."
19. In the case of Muhammad Sharif v. Sh. Muhammad Rafiq, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others (P L D 1968 Lah. 263) it was held :‑ "That when a particular act is directed by the Legislature to be done in a particular manner it should be done by that and that manner alone." "Whenever a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular manner it necessarily includes in itself, a negative, viz., that the thing shall not be done otherwise."
21. In the case of Mst. Sardar Begum v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore (P L D 1972 Lah. 458) it was held that when law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular way, the provisions of such law Must be complied with. Failure to do so renders the proceedings invalid. In the case of Mian Abdul Majid and 7 others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore (P L D 1972 Lah. 66) it was held that when Legislature intends a thing to be done in a particular manner, the thing must be done in that and in, no other manner.
22. In view of the above rulings, it is established that law requires that when an appeal against the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is filed before the Appellate Authority under the same Act the memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a certificate that the amount, payable under the direction appealed against, had been deposited with the Authority. The amount does not mean a cheque, which is not legal tender.
23. I, accordingly, accept the revision petitions, set aside the order of the Labour Court/Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and dismiss the appeals filed before it by the respondent. Petitions accepted.
Judgment & Decree
7. In the light of the above decision, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act held that the petitioners were entitled to the wages claimed as Heat Allowance as under :‑ (i) Islam‑ud Din s/o Siraj Din Rs. 1,872 (ii) Muhammad Sadiq s/o Fazal Din Rs. 1,872 (iii) Badshah Khan sin Rahim Gui Rs. 1,365 (iv) Abdur Rashid s/o Muhammad Ali Rs. 1,365 (vl Dil Muhammad s/o Diwan Ali Rs. 1,058
8. Against the above order, the respondent filed appeals before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act/Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, which consolidated the same and held that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act bad no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions and as such the order appealed against was set aside and the appeals were accepted.
9. Aggrieved by the above order, all the five petitioners have preferred these separate revision petitions. Since all the five revision petitions arise out of the same order, they will be disposed of together by one order.
10. The first point for determination is as to whether the revision petitions are competent. According to section 38 (3‑A) of Industrial Rela tions Ordinance, 1969, the Tribunal may on its own motions at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance, in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit. .
11. From the above, it is clear that an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is revisable by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. In the instant cases, the impugned order was passed by the Labour Court acting as an Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act which is not an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but nevertheless it will be deemed to be an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in view of section 35 (d) (5) of the said Ordinance, which reads as under :‑
"A Labour Court shall exercise and perform such other powers an functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance or any other law."
12. From the above it is clear that a Labour Court can pass an order not only under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but also under any other law, which is covered by the expression "or any other law".
13. In view of the above, the revision petitions are competent and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain them.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the appeals before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act were not competent, because the memorandum of appeals was not accompanied by a certificate of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to the effect that the appellant had deposited with the Authority the amount payable under the direction appealed against.
15. According to the proviso to section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, no appeal is competent unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate of the Authority to the effect that the appellant had deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against. According to section 17 (2) of the said Act, save as provided in subsection (1), any direction under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 17 shall be final. In other words, if the memorandum of appeal is not accompanied by the requisite certificate, the direction given by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act becomes final.
16. From the perusal of the record I find that alongwith the memorandum of appeal a certificate dated 13‑12‑1976 of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was appended which is to the effect that a cheque for the amount had been received. The said certificate did not say that the amount had been deposited as required under law. It is well established that if law prescribed a particular mode of doing an act, it must be done in that mode to gain validity. In the case Col. Bashir Hussain and 10 others v. Land Acquisition Collector. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and 2 others (P L D 1970 Lah. 521) it was held :‑ "It is an accepted principle of law that if a statute requires something to be done and also prescribes the mode for doing it, the requirements of law can be fulfilled by the act, in the manner prescribed."
17. In the case of Nazir Ahmad v. King‑Emperor (A I R 1936 P C 253) it was observed :‑
"The rule which applies is a different and not less well‑recognised rule, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all‑other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden."
18. In the case of Ghulam Abbas v. State (P L D 1968 Lah. 101) it was held :‑
"It is well settled that where a power is given to a particular person to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden."
19. In the case of Muhammad Sharif v. Sh. Muhammad Rafiq, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others (P L D 1968 Lah. 263) it was held :‑ "That when a particular act is directed by the Legislature to be done in a particular manner it should be done by that and that manner alone."
20. In the case of Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property, West Pakistan, Lahore v. Muhammad Din and another (P L D 1971 Lah. 217) it was held :‑
"Whenever a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular manner it necessarily includes in itself, a negative, viz., that the thing shall not be done otherwise."
21. In the case of Mst. Sardar Begum v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore (P L D 1972 Lah. 458) it was held that when law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular way, the provisions of such law Must be complied with. Failure to do so renders the proceedings invalid. In the case of Mian Abdul Majid and 7 others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore (P L D 1972 Lah. 66) it was held that when Legislature intends a thing to be done in a particular manner, the thing must be done in that and in, no other manner.
22. In view of the above rulings, it is established that law requires that when an appeal against the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is filed before the Appellate Authority under the same Act the memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a certificate that the amount, payable under the direction appealed against, had been deposited with the Authority. The amount does not mean a cheque, which is not legal tender.
23. I, accordingly, accept the revision petitions, set aside the order of the Labour Court/Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and dismiss the appeals filed before it by the respondent. Petitions accepted.