1997 PLP 1155 (CLC)

(b) For a declaration that the threatened action of the defendant is mala fide, illegal, ultra vires, and unlawful and further the defendant has no right power, authority and jurisdiction to dispossess the plaintiff. (c) For declaration that the construction of dust bin by the defendant on the plaintiff's plot of land is mala fide illegal and unlawful. (d) For permanent injunction restraining the defendant its agents, workers, contractors, factors, and any person or persons claiming through or under the defendant from interfering with the lawful and peaceful possession of the plaintiff on the said plot of land. (e) For mandatory injunction against the defendant, its agents, workers, contractor, factors and any person or persons claiming through or under the defendant to demolish the said illegal and unlawful dust bin constructed by the defendant with mala fide intention on the said plot of land. (f) Cost of the suit. (g) Any other relief or reliefs which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the of case. The suit was dismissed by the Ist Senior Civil Judge on 11‑2‑1989 against the judgment and decree an appeal was filed in the Court of District Judge, South being Civil Appeal No.32 of 1989. The Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal with the following observations on 21‑5‑1989: "Admittedly only a temporary lease 'sanction' for a period of 3 years was granted to the plaintiff/appellant vide Letter No. 143 of 1954 for installation, of an ice factory. It is not the case of the plaintiff/appellant that he had paid the cost of land etc., to the defendant/respondent. It is a matter of record that only land rent at the rate of 15 % of the market value of the land was charged from the plaintiff/appellant for that temporary lease/sanction. It is also not the case of the plaintiff/appellant that any permanent lease was executed in his favour and it is also evident from the fact that plaintiff/appellant himself made an application on 27‑3‑1980 for the grant of lease in his favour, and the same admittedly has not been yet granted. No doubt that the name of the appellant/plaintiff appears in Excise and Taxation Record and also in the Jamabandi of K.M.C. against the column of owner but in absence of any lease‑deed or sale‑deed in favour of plaintiff/appellant these documents connot confer any right of ownership in respect of the suit plot upon the plaintiff/appellant. Therefore, in these circumstances I hold that the learned trial Court has rightly held that the plaintiff/appellant cannot be considered to be the owner/lessee of the disputed plot. Accordingly I do not find any mints in this appeal. Before parting with the judgment, I would like to observe that it is not within the jurisdiction power of the Court to ask/direct the defendant/respondent to grant a particular plot to a particular person but keeping in view the fact that he temporary lease as back as in 1954 was granted to the plaintiff/appellant, therefore, it will be a matters of the pleasure for the Court if the defendant/respondent finds it possible, under the relevant rules, to consider the application of the plaintiff/appellant for grant of lease." Against this judgment and decree this Revision Application has been filed. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant is that the temporary lease was granted in 1954. After the expiry of temporary lease period of three years, in spite of the fact that no ice factory was constructed, now show‑cause notice was given and the applicant remained in possession of the property, paid the dues to the various authorities and continued to remain in possession until he filed the suit with the above prayer. According to him that by virtue of the provisions of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act he is entitled to the lease and his prayer ought to have been granted. His subsequent contention is that the observations made by the learned Additional District Judge while disposing of the appeal be made rule of the Court, and his third contention is that he has been removed from the possession of the property during the pendency of the case, therefore, he is entitled to some relief. Mr. Manzoor Ahmed, learned counsel for the K.M.C. has opposed this application and stated that no cause of action arose to the applicant he was not entitled to the relief and has supported the impugned judgment. I have given anxious consideration to the various pleas urged by the parties and have perused the record with the assistance of the learned counsel. The shelter taken by the learned counsel for the applicant behind section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available to him. In the first instance there was no lease executed in his favour, secondly the temporary lease at page 57 of the record for the construction of ice factory was not complied with in that no ice factory was constructed till he was removed from possession A and thirdly it will be not in accordance with law to consider that no legitimate rights have been created which result in filing of the suit. The payment of dues to the authorities would not confer title upon the applicant which may be adjudicated by the Civil Courts. Consequently, therefore, the suit was rightly dismissed. and equally the appeal was also dismissed with legal justification. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the observations made by the District and Sessions Judge should be made or reinforced through further observations of this Court, I find myself unable to do so as the dismissal of Revision Application would revive the order passed by the Courts concerned and it is within the exclusive domain of the administration to pass any appropriate order for which the Courts will not interfere. Even otherwise the Courts in the revisional jurisdiction have limited jurisdiction. Moreover, the trichotomy of powers which is already delicately balanced in the Constitution could not be disturbed which grants administration 8 autonomy to decide the matters in its allotted sphere. It cannot be distrubed by the Court. Let out the aplicant apply for the relief in accordance with law and the orders of any will be passed by the administration in accordance with I law. Coming to the third contention that since the applicant was deprived of the possession during the pendency of the case, therefore, observations may be given by this Court regarding availing of appropriate remedy. The observations of the Court do not confer jurisdiction on the Courts. Even otherwise dispossession was not subject‑matter in this Revision Application. The permission of the Court is not given for the purpose of availing the legal rights. Any citizen in this country is entitled to adopt legal course for which the Courts neither can hinder such right nor can confer such right, as the right is conferred by law. The petitioner may adopt any course permissible under the law With the above observations this Revision Application has no merits and is dismissed with no order as to costs. A.A./A‑109/K Revision dismissed.