1989 PLP 219 (CLC)

This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution by Raja Sher Ali defendant in the suit under section 9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 is against affirming order of learned District Judge dated 1‑10‑1988 passed in civil revision No.18 of 1988. For proper appreciation of the points raised in the writ petition, it is desirable to state facts at some length. Plaintiffs now respondents 3 to 10 before this Court are owners of a non‑residential building on Grand Trunk Road near Dina of which two rooms in possession of defendant, subject‑matter of present litigation, were a part. Various portions of this , building were in occupation of different persons including defendant as rent‑paying tenants of owner‑landlords. Plaintiffs required the building for its reconstruction in accordance with the building plan approved by Municipal Committee, Dina. Defendant, alike others vacated the shop in his possession upon plaintiffs' agreeing to let out some shop to him in the reconstructed building. Before reconstruction was complete and building was fit for occupation, defendant, on the intervening night of 19th/20th March, 1987 re‑entered and occupied two shops in the incomplete building. In this background, plaintiffs instituted civil suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act to regain possession of the aforesaid property in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Jhelum alleging that they were dispossessed without their consent and otherwise than in due course of law. Defendant repudiated the material allegations and leaded that he had entered possession with the agreement of the plaintiffs and had not breached the law. Pleadings gave rise to following issues:‑ (i) Whether the suit is not maintainable under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act? OPD (ii) Whether the suit is mala fide, if so, to what effect? OPD (iii) Whether the plaintiffs were in possession of suit property within six months prior to their dispossession? OPP. (iv) Relief . The trial Court on consideration of evidence adduced in the case held that plaintiffs were in actual possession of the property in dispute and were illegally dispossessed therefrom as was the case set up in the plaint by them and consequently decreed restoration of possession to the plaintiffs. Defendant preferred civil revision to the learned District Judge, Jhelum. It was dismissed on 1‑10‑1988. In this background, defendant has come up for relief to this Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction. It is not in dispute that plaintiffs are owners of the building and that the defendant was in possession of its part as tenant of the owners. Plaintiffs deny to have agreed to relet a shop to the defendant in the reconstructed building, whereas defendant's version is that he vacated the shop in his possession upon agreement to re‑enter and that his entry in possession was with clear consent of the plaintiffs. In so far as the question of possession was concerned it was found as a question of fact by the learned trial Court and affirmed by revisional Court that plaintiffs were in actual possession and were dispossessed by the defendant,. It being a finding of fact is binding and cannot be upset on a mere argument that a different view on evidence was possible. Decision in section 9 Specific Relief Act is neither appealable nor reviewable, These remedies are expressly excluded and are not allowed to an aggrieved party under section 9 of the Act. Though remedy by way of revision is not excluded, yet interference in revision is exceptional such as when the rights of the aggrieved party may be so clear that it may not be equitable to force him to another suit or the case may have been disposed of on an obvious misapprehension as to the true legal position or there may be some defect of jurisdiction in the proceedings. But where no exceptional circumstances are brought out and the only contention is that finding on a question is not based on adequate evidence or is erroneous, interference may not be justified. Each case, however, depends on its own facts. Remedy in revision cannot be treated like an appeal which is prohibited expressly by the section itself. Plain purpose behind section 9, Specific Relief Act appears to confer finality to orders and decrees in the suits under this section. It provides quick and expeditious remedy for recovery of possession to a person dispossessed from immovable property without his consent and otherwise than in due process of law. Even orders passed in execution of the decree passed in suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act are subject to similar legal restraints. Likewise these orders are also neither appealable nor reviewable. In this behalf, reference can with advantage be made to Brij Lal v. Mohadeo A I R 1954 All. 19.Section 9 is not concerned with the legality of the transaction under which the possession is shown to have been taken. It clearly becomes applicable when the plaintiff is dispossessed "without his consent" and otherwise than in due course of law. Erstwhile tenant could not force his own reinstatement in shops without consent of the owner‑landlords. There is no evidence to establish owners' consent for his reoccupation. Assuming existence of an agreement for reletting some shop or shops in the reconstructed building, it gave no right to the tenant to force his entry. For this, he could take recourse to law only. Use of force is not recognized by a civilized system for settlement of civil disputes. There is yet another circumstance and that is that extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is not meant for correction of mere errors if law or fact committed by the subordinate Courts during the proceedings of a suit. For that purpose, adequate machinery has already been provided by the Civil Procedure Code or the relevant law by way of appeal, revision or review. When the appropriate remedy has been utilized, the controversy must come to an end. If the Code or other law provides no further remedy to the aggrieved party, finality must attach to the order deciding the controversy one way or the other. Therefore, when the law does not provide for a further revision against the order of learned District Judge, Article 199 could not be invoked as a substitute for section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Even if the revisional order could be demonstrated to be somewhat erroneous, normally it should not be interfered with. It is only in exceptional circumstances where grave injustice has been caused that the extraordinary jurisdiction could be invoked. No such circumstance appears to exist in this case. Having regard to the records and the law under which the proceedings were taken and decided, there is no scope for interference by this Court. In my opinion, dispute was correctly resolved by the learned Courts below. Writ petition is dismissed in limine. However, this decision shall not, be a bar for the petitioner to avail of other remedies available to him at law. A . A . / S .314 / L Petition dismissed.