1984 PLP 1429 (CLC)

(a) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)‑ ‑‑‑S. 6 (2) read with S. 2(d).‑Additional Executive Officer of Canton ment appointed as Additional Rent Controller‑ Such Additional Rent Controller, held. not suffering from lack of` jurisdiction. [Jurisdiction]. (b) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)‑ ‑‑‑Ss. 17 & 24‑Ejectment for personal requirement ‑ Legal heirs of deceased landlord, held, competent to take proceedings to their logical end‑Two of legal heirs dying during pendency of appeal Court can treat proceedings as being continued on their behalf Technical objection by tenant that fresh application ought to have been moved by legal heirs repelled. 1980SCMR758ref. (c) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)‑‑ ‑‑Ss. 17 & 24‑Ejectment for personal requirement ‑ Landlord succeeding in establishing his bona fide personal need‑Objection by tenant regarding desire of landlord to increase rent, held, auto matically fails. (d) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)‑ ‑‑Ss. 17 & 24‑Provisional Constitution Order (1 of 1981), Art. 9‑ Ejectment for personal requirement‑Courts below consciously applying their mind to all aspects of case and observing procedure in accordance with law while reaching concurrent finding about bona fide personal need of landlord ‑ Interference declined in constitutional jurisdiction. (e) Provisional Constitution Order (1 of 1981)‑ ‑‑Art. 9‑Citation of authorities ‑ Court's wrong citation of a judgment which may be due to descriptive error, held, will not render its order without lawful authority‑Independent of cited authority one has to examine decision. 1980 C‑ L C 1036 ref. (f) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)‑ ‑‑Ss. 17 & 24‑Provisional Constitution Order (I of 1981), Art. 9 Ejectment for personal requirement‑Landlord a retired Government servant appearing in witness‑box, withstanding test of cross-examination and his evidence believed by courts below‑Prima facie his desire to carry on business in shop having no element of mala fide‑Interference with ejectment order declined in writ jurisdiction. This is a writ petition by a tenant whose eviction had been ordered by a learned Rent Controller and the same has been upheld in appeal by the learned District Judge, Lahore.

2. The writ petition was chiefly admitted to regular hearing to consider the vires of the notification appointing the Additional Executive officer of the Cantonment as Additional Rent Controller. This matter now stands finally resolved through the decision of the Supreme Court and it has been found that the Additional Rent Controller did not suffer from want of jurisdiction.

3. Now, the learned counsel for the petitioner would like to assail the concurrent judgment of the Rent Controller and the learned District Judge on merits. In respect of the concurrent findings of fact I very much doubt whether any scope is left for interference in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner states that the findings are based on non‑consideration of material evidence, erroneous facts and flouting the provisions of the relevant statute.

4. The learned counsel submits that the shop in question was owned by four brothers whereas the ejectment proceedings were initiated by one of them namely, Abdur Rauf. The Rent Controller rejected the application and during the pendency of the appeal the said landlord Abdul Rauf died. Thereupon, the appellate authority remanded the case to the Rent Controller for consideration whether the premises were still required for personal use by the legal heirs. The learned counsel wanted to build some argument on this but I asked him a simple question whether this order of remand ‑ had been agitated against. He admits that a writ petition was filed by the petitioner against the order of the appellate authority before the High Court but that was dismissed on the ground of laches. Whatever be the ground for dismissal of the writ petition, one thing is sure and that is that the order of the learned District Judge became final. Nothing therefore can be urged in the present proceedings against that decision.

5. The learned counsel further submits that there was fresh application moved by any of the legal heirs before the Rent Controller in support of their personal need. I have asked the learned counsel whether it is a fact or not that the legal heirs appeared in support of their own case. It is admitted that one of the legal nears did appear in support of his own case and asserted his personal need. However, he submits that two of the legal heirs died during the pendency of the appeal and before its decision, therefore in the absence of a fresh application being filed by the legal heirs the previous application became absolute on account of the death of the mover. I do not think this technical objection has much substance for the simple reason that a legal heir by its very nature is competent to take the proceedings to their logical ends.

6. The substance of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the instant case appears to be that respondent No. 4 ought to have filed his own application being otherwise a co‑owner of the property as also brother of the deceased landlord. The two Courts below have treated these proceedings as being continued on behalf of legal heirs.

7. I have gone through the judgment in remand of the learned District Judge, Lahore dated 8‑11‑80 against which it, substance lies the real grievance of the petitioner. This judgment shows that the learned District Judge rightly or wrongly was of the view that the eviction application could be carried on by the legal heirs of the deceased landlord who died during the pendency of the appeal. He, for this purpose, placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1980 S C M R

758. Thereafter this order of the learned District Judge was challenged by the petitioner by way of Writ Petition No. 2272 of 1981. This writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches and the result was that the appellate order of the learned District Judge was allowed to stand. Thereafter, the petitioner partici pated in the remand proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller and led evidence for and against the proposition. The proceedings went on and ultimately terminated with the impugned order of the Additional Rent Controller. It appears that the petitioner was raising a miscon ceived objection before the Rent Controller in remand although he toad failed in raising the same objection before the High Court which refused to interfere with the order of the District Judge. The petitioner's insistence for a formal application was not acceded to in view of the remand order of the learned District Judge. The technical objection of the petitioner was thus rightly thrown out that there should be a formal amended appli cation filed.

8. The further objection of the learned counsel is to the effect that the version of the petitioner regarding the desire of the landlord to enhance the rent has been brushed aside and his evidence has not been correctly appreciated or rather kept out of consideration. The argument is again rather technical for the simple reason that the Supreme Court's view now on the subject is that if a landlord succeeds in establishing his bona fide personal need than the tenants objection of desire to increase rent automatically fails. That being the position, I do not think there is any substance in this objection. At any rate, this would not render the order of the Rent Controller to, be one without jurisdiction.

9. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority have consciously applied their mind to all the aspects of the case and have reached their conclusions after hearing both the parties and observing the procedure in accordance with law. The findings regarding bona fide personal need of the landlord being concurrent the same do not call for any interference in the exercise of my discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction.

10. The further grievance of the petitioner is that the judgment cited as 1980 C L C 1036 did not apply to the case at all and has been wrongly relied upon. I do not think a Court's wrong citation of a judgment which may be due to a descriptive error will have any bearing on rendering the order of the District Judge as without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Independent of the cited authority, one has to examine the decision. Seen in that light, I do not find it suffers from any defect of the nature which will warrant my coming to the aid of the petitioner.

11. It is admitted before me that respondent No. 4 is now retired Government servant. Therefore, prima facie his desire t carry on a business in the shop would not appear to have an element of mala fide. He has appeared in the witness‑box. withstood the test of cross‑examination and his evidence has been believed by the Rent Controller ‑as well as the Appellate Authority. There is thus no foundation laid for interference in the exercise of Constitutional to vacate the premises. Petition dismissed. N.Y.H.