P L D 1976 Peshawar 23 (PLP)

2. Mirza Inamullah (Landlord) sought ejectment of Muhammad Tayyab from a shop situate in Peshawar City. In proceedings for ejectment before the learned Rent Controller, the landlord who is respondent in this appeal, omitted to implead as respondents the legal representatives of Abdul Islam, father of the appellant which was questioned by the respondent, Muhammad Tayyab appellant. Subsequently the learned Rent Controller, reviewing his previous order on the application of the landlord directed the appellant (tenant) for furnishing the particulars of the legal representatives of Abdul Islam. This order is impugned on the ground that the Rent Con troller had no jurisdiction to review his order.

3. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal is incompetent under section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance Reliance is placed on Kandavala & Co. v. Sheikh Fayazuddin and others (1969 S C M R 720). In the cited case, a preliminary issue with regard to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant was decided in favour of the landlord petitioner. Appeal direct to the High Court against this order was dismissed on the ground that the appeal did not lie from such an order, which was taken to Supreme Court in leave to appeal. For advantage, the following is reproduced :- "The decision of the question raised depends upon an interpretation of section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance which runs :- "

15. Appeals.

(1) (a) Government may by a general or special order, by notification, confer on such District Judges (and Additional District Judges) as it thinks fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Ordinance, in such area, or in such classes of cases, as may be specified in the order. (b) Any party aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may within thirty days from the date of such order prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceeding in the matter pending decision of the appeal. (3) The appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending for the record of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Con troller. (4) Any party aggrieved by an order passed on appeal by the appellate authority appointed by the Government under clause (a) of subsec tion (1), and if an appellate authority has not been appointed in respect of any area or class or cases, any party aggrieved by an order of the Controller may, within thirty days from the date of the order of the appellate authority or, as the case may be of the Controller, prefer an appeal in writing to the High Court and decision thereof shall be final. (5) No order passed by the Controller, the appellate authority or the High Court under the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court of law by suit or otherwise, except as provided under this Ordinance." Admittedly there is no notification by the Government to the effect that appeals will lie against a finding of relationship of landlord and tenant by the Rent Controller though this is really not material as will presently appear. The words used in section 15 are "an order", but learned counsel for the petitioner does not find it possible to contend that these words are to be interpreted in their wide generality and he accepts that some qualification has to be added to these words for otherwise an order adjourning a case or summoning a witness would also be subject to appeal and learned counsel agrees that this could not be the intention. The High Court has in a Full Bench case reported as Muhammad Amin v. Jamshed All P L D 1963 Lah. 523 held that "an order" in the section means any order, which is covered by some provision in the Rent Restriction Ordinance. This appears prima facie to be a reasonable qualification to add to "an order". The section envisages orders which the Rent Controller is empowered by the Ordinance to make while learned counsel for the petitioner does not accept-this interpretation he is unable to make a reasonable suggestion as to any other limitation which can be placed on the words "any order". All that he has been able to contend is that an order which goes to the root of the case should also be appealable, but he is unable to explain how the words of section 15 are to be interpreted so as to achieve this result. Even in a civil suit a decision, which goes to the root of the matter is not always the subject-matter of an appeal. When a civil Court decides a preliminary issue as to jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff no appeal lies against the finding. The mere fact that an issue as to jurisdiction has been decided cannot be a ground for granting a right of appeal when on the wording of the relevant provision it is not possible to do so." Another case quoted in support is reported in Allah Ditta and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others (P L D 1965 Lah. 29), holding that "an order" in section 15(1)(b) and section 15(4) means order passed under specific provisions of the Ordi nance and each and every routine order of Controller regulating proceedings under Ordinance are not open to appeal and "an order" of Controller to be appealable directly to the High Court under section 15(4), must be one which conclusively determines the rights of the parties and that the order allowing to implead another as party is not appealable. Both the authori ties have elaborately dealt with the question and there is no ground for holding a contrary view.

4. Another aspect of the matter is that the appellant raised the objection with regard to the failure of the opposite-party to have impleaded the legal representatives of Abdus Salam and it was in this context that the learned Rent Controller ordered him to disclose the names and particulars of the legal representatives of his father. The impugned order is supported by Polegar Meghavaranam Naidu and others v. A. M. Muhammad Mohideen Sahib and another (A I R 1936 Mad. 782). It was incumbent upon the appellant to state who are the legal representatives of his father with particulars. The object of speedy disposal appears to be the main consideration in framing the Ordinance and with this end in view the ordinary forum of civil suits was departed from by giving special jurisdiction to the Rent Controller. Following paragraph from the Lahore Authority at page 31 may be quoted for benefit. . . . . An appeal under section 15(4) of the Ordinance must, there. fore, be from such orders which are formal expression of an adjudica tion which so far as regards the Controller expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the application under one or other of the sections of the Ordinance quoted above. The words which require special attention in this respect are "conclusively determines the rights of the parties." If this consideration is kept in view, there is no scope for the contention that all orders made by a Rent Controller to regulate the proceedings under the Ordinance can be brought in appeal before the High Court."

5. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. S. Q, Appeal dismissed.