P L D 1956 Supreme Court (Ind (PLP)

The station officer at that time: was Sri Surendra Shanker Singh, P. W. 32, and it is stated that he had known the fourth accused since 1941 when the latter was a head constable at Agra and the witness a constable, anal was interested in shielding him. It is suggested that P. 1,N. 32 released the appellant on the night of the 20th, and failed to take action against him with a view to save the fourth accused. P. W. 32 denied that he arrested the appellant on the .20th, but his evidence has not been accepted. To continue the narration, when Sri Kureel discovered that P. W. 32 was not keen on investigating the matter, he complained to the Superintendent of Police, and it was there after that the appellant was arrested on the 8th June. From that time down to 9th August he was‑In Jail. On that day, he was sent for interrogation to the C.I.D. Inspector, P. W. 33, who had been reputed to make the investigation. P. W. 33 held the appellant in custody till 20th August at the Krishna Talkies. On the 20th, the appellant was sent back to jail custody, and on the 21st .he made the confessional statement. Exh. P‑15, to P. W.

28. In this statement, he implicated the fourth accused ass the prime offender. Meantime, the fourth accused had been arrest ed on 4th August 1952, and eventually, the four accused were committed to the Sessions Court for trial on the charge that they had murdered Sumer Singh. The Sessions Judge held that the confessions of accused 1 and 2 had been sufficiently corroborated, and convicted them under section 302, but in view of their age they were aged 14 and 16 sentenced them to transportation for life. As regards the appellant who was the third accused, he held that his confession was corroborated by the evidence of P. Ws. 13 and 15 and by the confessions of accused 1 and 2 and accordingly convicted him under section 302 and sentence him to death. As regards the fourth accused, he held that there was only the confession of the third accused against him, and that that was not sufficiently corroborated by the other evidence in the case. He accordingly gave him the benefit of doubt, and acquitted him. Accused 3 appealed to the High Court of Allahabad, and there was also a reference under section 374, for confirmation of the sentence of death. On a review of the evidence, the learned Judges agreed with the conclusion of the Sessions Judge, and confirmed both the con victions of the appellant and the sentence passed on him. Against this judgment, the appellant has preferred this appeal to this Court by special leave. On behalf of the appellant, it is urged that there is no reliable evidence to connect him with the offence, and that the conviction is accordingly bad. The evidence in support of the conviction consists of the confession of the appellant. Exh. P‑15, the evidence of P. Ws. 13 and 15 which has been relied on as corroborating it in material particulars and the confessions of accused 1 and 2, Exhibits P‑5 and P‑

6. It is argued by Mr. Varma for the appellant that the confes sion, Exh. P‑15, was rot voluntary, that the evidence of P. Ws. 13 and 15, is neither triable, nor does it sufficiently corroborate Exh. P‑15, and the he confessions of accused 1 and 2 are inadmissible as against the appellant, and should not have been acted upon. The question how far the confessions of co‑accused, could be treated as evidence against an accused was considered elaborately in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh', (A I R 1952 S C 159) and it was held therein that such statements, were not evidence as defined in section 3 of the Evidence Act, that no conviction could be found ed thereon, but that if there was other evidence on which a convic tion could be based, they could be referred to as lending assurance to that conclusion and for fortifying it. Exhs. P‑5 and P‑6 are, therefore, not substantive evidence, and could only be taken into consideration if there is other inde pendent evidence on which the conviction could be based. In the present case, that evidence consists only of the confession of the appellant, Exh. P‑

15. It is contended for the appellant that this confession cannot be aced upon, firstly because it is not voluntary, and secondly because there is no evidence worth the name to corroborate it. On the question whether Exh. P‑15 was voluntary, the cardinal feature to be noted is that the appellant was kept separately in the custody of the C. I. D. Inspector (P. W. 33) from the 7th August to 20th August, and the confession was recorded on the 21st August. It appears to us that the prolonged custody immediately preceding the making of the confession is sufficient, unless it is properly explained, to stamp Exh. P‑l5, as involuntary. P. W. 33 made no attempt to explain this unusual circumstance. It is true that with reference to this matter the appellant made various suggestions in the cross‑examination of P. W. 33, such as that he was given `bhang' and liquor, or shown pictures, or promised to be made an approver, and they have been rejected‑‑and rightly‑‑as unfounded. But that does not relieve the prosecution from its duty of positively establishing that the confession was voluntary, and for that purpose, it was necessary to prove the circumstances under which this unusual step was taken. There being no such evidence, we are unable to act upon Ex. P‑15, as a voluntary confession. It was argued that better evidence was not forth coming, as the investigation by P. W. 32 was, as already stated, half‑hearted and perfunctory, and no adequate steps were taken to secure evidence before P. W. 33 took up the matter on 18th July 1952. All this is true, and the result is no doubt very unfortunate but that does not care the defect from which Exh. P‑15 suffers. It was also argued that both the courts below had found that Ex. P‑15 was voluntary, and that that was a finding with which this Court would not interfere in special appeal. But then, the Courts below have, in coming to that conclusion, failed to note that P. W. 33 has offered no explanation for keeping the appellant in separate custody from the 7th to 20th August, and that is a matter which the prosecution had to explain, if the confession made on 21st August 1952, was to be accepted as voluntary. In this view, the only substantive evidence against the appel lant, Exh. P‑15, falls to the ground, and in strictness, the further questions whether that has been corroborated by the evidence of P. Ws. 13 and 15, and whether Exhibits P‑5 and P‑6 lend assurance to it do not arise. We may, however, add that the question whether the evidence of P. Ws. 13 and 15 affords sufficient corroboration to the con fession of the appellant is not wholly free from doubt. The deposition of P. W. 13, as it appears in the record, is incomplete, and if true, it shows that the appellant was seen with the deceased and accused I and 2 near the scene of occurrence at about midday. P. W. 13 deposes that he gave this information to P. W. 32; but the latter does not speak to it, and he has not been asked about it. P. W. 15 also gives evidence similar to that of P. W. 13, but admits that he did not know the deceased or accused 1 and

2. It is argued for the appellant that in view of these infirmities the evidence of P. Ws. 13 and 15 should not be accepted. There can be Vo doubt that their evidence, if believed, would be corroboration of Exh. P‑15 on a material point, viz., that the appellant was seen with the deceased at about the the time of the occurrence near the garden, and it is also true that the question whether that should be believed is one on which this Court would not ordinarily interfere with the views of the Courts below. But in the view that Exh. P‑15 is not shown to be voluntary, there is no need to further discuss the question whether if it was voluntary, the evidence of P. Ws. 13 and 15 affords sufficient of corroboration thereof. Then, 'there remain the confessions of accused I and 2, Exhibits P‑5 and P‑

6. There being in our view, no substantive and independent evidence on which a conviction could be based, the confessions cannot be used for sustaining the convic tion, and should be left out of consideration altogether. We may also add that we are not satisfied that those statements can be regarded as lending assurance to the confession recorded in Exh. P‑

1. On the contrary, the difference between the two is such as to throw considerable doubt on both. While according to Exhibits P‑5 and P‑6 the appellant was the prime offender, according to Exhibit P‑15 Bagh Ali, the fourth accused, was the moving spirit and it was he that actively intervened and spurred him on to commit the crime while he was wavering. Both these statements cannot be true, and if either of them must be untrue, the question arises as to how and why the untruth' in the one or the other was brought about. In this situation, we should be reluctant to hold that Exhs. P‑5 and P‑6 lend any assurance to the truth of the con fession in Exh. P‑

15. We are, therefore, of opinion that there is‑ no reliable evidence on which the appellant could be convicted. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside, and it is directed that he be set at liberty. M.I.B. Appeal allowed.