P L D 1952 Lahore 161 (PLP)

A. R. CORNELIUS, A. C: J.‑The facts of the case out of which the Letters Patent appeal arises are very simple. On the 3rd February 1947, one Muhammad Asghar mortgaged with possession 364 kanals 10 marlas of agricultural land for Rs. 9,000 in favour of four persons, namely, Murad, Nawab, Mutalla and Mughla, who will be described in the sequel as the "first mortgagees." Subsequently, on the 27th March 1947, Muhammad Asghar created a fresh mortgage over the same land as well as other land. for a sum of Rs. 21,116 in favour of Bakhsha and others, who will be referred to for convenience as the "second mortgagees". The latter moved a Collector ‑under the Redemption of. Mortgagees (Punjab) Act, 1913, to redeem the first mortgage and obtained an order to that effect. The first mortgagees thereupon instituted a suit on the 14th January 1948, for a declaration that the order of the Revenue Assis tant was not valid on the ground inter alia that since the amount of the mortgage money was in excess of Rs. 5,000, the Revenue Assistant, who acted as the Collector in the case, had no power to make the order redeeming the mortgage. This is the sole point with which the present appeal is concerned; and if is, therefore, not necessary to consider the other matters in dispute which arose in the suit. The trial Court held that the order of the Collector was not ultra vires for the reason advanced by the plaintiffs. He accordingly dismissed their suit. They appealed in the Court of the District judge, who accepted their appeal, and holding that the order of the Collector was ultra vires, decreed the plaintiffs' suit. The grounds advanced by the learned District judge in support of this conclusion appear to be self‑contradictory and some of the conclusions reached by him in the argument, which he has advanced in support of his conclusions, seem clearly to support the opposite view, namely, that the Collector's order was intra vires of the Act. The second mortgagees then preferred an appeal in this Court and the learned Single judge has held that, on a true construction of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act, the Collector's order was intra vires. He, at the same time, held that the matter of the Collector's jurisdiction was not free from difficulty and certified the case as a proper one for appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. Hence the present appeal. The case involves construction of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Act, which determines the application of the provisions of the Act to mortgages, by reference to two factors, namely, the amount of the principal of the mortgage money and the area of land mortgaged. The Act is intended to provide a summary procedure for the redemption of certain mortgages of agricultural lands, and its intention is obvious, namely, to enable agriculturists, whose lands are encumbered, to obtain their release by a short, simple and speedy procedure to be conducted exclusively before officials of the Revenue Depart ment who are readily accessible, thus avoiding the admittedly lengthy procedure of a suit at law. The Act is, however, not intended to extend to all mortgages of agricultural lands. The limitations imposed by the Act in this respect are contained in subsection (3) of the first section which is in the following terms :‑ "(3) It shall apply to mortgages of land‑ (a) in which, whatever the mortgage money, the land mortgaged, after excluding the area of any share in the com mon land of the village or of a sub‑division of the village appertaining thereto and mortgaged therewith, does not exceed an area of 50 acres ; or (b) in which, whatever the area, the principal money secured under the mortgage does not exceed 5,000 rupees." The intent of this subsection is concisely described in the marginal note as "Limitation of Scope of Act to certain mortgages." It is clear from the words employed in this provision that the intention of the Legislative was to confine the relief to cases involving either a moderate area of lard or a moderate amount of money, as principal of the mortgage. It may be inferred that as to large areas of valuable lands mortgaged for considerable sums, the Legislature thought that the parties would be best left to the ordinary remedy of a redemption suit in the law Courts, but that in the case of a small agriculturist under encumbrance it is desirable that he should be assisted to rid himself of the burden of a mortgage by an expeditious and inexpensive proceeding before an easily accessible Revenue Officer. At the same time, since the statute is plainly intended to afford relief, is provision, must be construed so as to advance and not to restrict this relief. These principles must be borne in mind in construing the words of the relevant provision in the statute. The learned Sub‑Judge of the trial Court came to the conclusion that by the words of the subsection, the jurisdiction of the Collector was only excluded where in a mortgage, the area of land exceeds 50 acres and also the principal amount of the mortgage exceeds Rs. 5

000. This point was discussed at some length by the learned District judge, but, it must be remarked, without any near approach to clarity. For example, after stating the provision, the learned District judge remarked that it was clear "that this Act applies only to mortgaged lands, the area of which does not exceed 50 acres" and later he observed that: "If the principal money secured under the mortgage exceeds Rs. 5,000 then the Collector would have no jurisdiction." Neither of these statements correctly represents the purport of the Act. The limitation upon the area is not applicable where the principal money secured is Rs. 5,000 or less. Again, the limitation upon the amount of the mortgage money (this would include principal and interest) is not applicable where the land does not exceed 50 acres in area. However, on these premises, the learned District judge came to the conclusion that the Collector would have no jurisdiction in a case where either the area mortgaged was in excess of 50 acres or the principal money secured was in excess of Rs. 5,

000. Yet, the learned District Judge went on to observe that clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (3) appeared to him to be independent and, with reference to the argument that the conjunction "or" connecting these two clauses should be read as "and" (this was the argument advanced on behalf of the first mortgagees‑appellants before him),he remarked as under :‑ "There does not seem to be any warrant for a Court to supply, the word 'and' connecting these clauses when in the statute the word 'or' has been used. If the Legislature had intended that both the conditions in clauses (a) and (b) must be satisfied before the Collector can exercise jurisdiction, it would have said so." ' The learned District Judge also observed that the provisions of the subsection should be narrowly construed since they created a, special jurisdiction restraining the ordinary jurisdiction of' the Civil Courts. In view of these findings, the final conclusion of the learned District Judge is certainly somewhat surprising. The learned Single Judge in Chambers supported these findings holding that clause (a) was to be kept independent of clause (b) and it was not necessary that a case, in order to come within the juris diction of a Collector under the Act, should satisfy both these clauses. He arrived at the same conclusion as the learned Judge of the trial Court, namely, that the only cases. which are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Collector under the Act, are those in which the area mortgaged is in excess of 50 acres and also the principal money secured exceeds Rs. 5,

000. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants, namely, the first mortgagees, who has put forward the argument that the conjuction or" connecting the two clauses of subsection (3) should be read as "and" and attempted thereafter to draw the conclusion that, with this variation, the effect of the sub section would be to require that a case, in order to fall within the jurisdiction of a Collector under the Act, should satisfy both the conditions affecting the area mortgaged and the principal money secured. It seems to us that this argument ignores the plain fact that by mere substitution of the word "and", for the word "or" no material difference is made in the content of the subsection, for the words "whatever the mort gage money" in clause (a) and the words "whatever the area" in clause (b) still remain as a clear indication that the qualification for coming within the jurisdiction. is two‑fold, namely, an independent qualification in relation to area, and another independent qualification in relation to the amount of the principal money secured. Indeed, the use of the expression whatever the mortgage money in clause (a) can only be with reference to the fixation of the maximum of the principal money by clause (b). It is true that mortgage money has not the same meaning as principal money secured ; mortgage money would include interest in addition to the principal, but the object obviously is to save the operation of the Act from the effect of accumulation of interest with the passage of time. The Legislature appears to have felt that it would be inequit able that a mortgage should be within the Act one year and should not be within the Act, say, in the following year. Similarly, the expression "whatever the area" occurring in clause (b) could only have been used with reference to the limitation of area stated in clause (a), and thus it becomes obvious that the two clauses are distinct from each other and are only to be applied in the alternative, so that it is incon ceivable that they should both be applied at the same time in a particular case. The same conclusion can be reached on another ground, namely, that if the limitation of area applied in every case, the Act would be unmeaning in relation to certain categories of "land" as defined in the statute. It would be seen that in clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of subsection (1) of section 2, cer tain categories of "land" are specified as being within the statute, which are not susceptible of measurement in terms of acres. These are shares in the profits of estates and holdings, dues payable by an inferior landowner to a superior land owner, the right to receive rent and rights to water. In rela tion to mortgages of land falling within these categories, the test of area is not applicable at all, and such cases would clearly fall, for the determination of jurisdiction, within clause (b) of subsection (3) of the first section. It would be impos sible in these cases to apply clause (a) also, and this circum stance militates strongly against acceptance of the argument that subsection (3) of section 1 requires that both its clauses should be satisfied in relation to a particular case, in order to bring it within the jurisdiction of a Collector. It thus appears sufficiently clear that the interpretation adopted by the learned Single Judge in Chambers is correct. However, something should be said concerning the learned District judge's view that the Act should be strictly construed, because it creates a special jurisdiction. On this point, it has already been remarked that the Act is intended to grant relief to a certain section of the agriculturists who were thought to stand in need of such relief and, in view of its evident purpose, it should be construed in a beneficial way, that is to say, so as to afford the largest measure of relief in the intended sense, The determination of jurisdiction under the Act would also follow the same principle. The learned District judge, however, has relied exclusively on the rule requiring strict construction of a statute which restrains the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Courts. So far as we can see, the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act, 1913 is not a statute falling within this cate gory. The statute does not bar parties from going to the Civil Courts to seek relief, although it provides in section 12 that the result of proceedings taken under the Act shall, subject to certain limitations be conclusive. Consequently, in respect, at any rate, of the determination of jurisdiction at the pre liminary stage, the statute has no such restraining effect as that mentioned by the learned District Judge. For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal with costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.