2026 PLP 559 (MLD)

Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J.

The instant Criminal Miscellaneous Application is pending in our docket since 2011. The applicant sought indulgence of this Court to quash proceedings of FIR No. 253/2006 registered under Section 448, 427, 34 P.P.C at P.S. Ferozabad, Karachi.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant premised his case on the arguments that the respondent/complainant got registered the FIR against the applicant with sole aim to deprive the applicant from inheritance and that the respondent is coloring the civil dispute into criminal solely to pressurize the applicant. He next contended that the FIR was registered on the application moved under Section 22-A Cr.P.C and that the illegal investigation was carried out against the applicant, therefore, the applicant filed the instant application for quashment of proceedings of FIR.

3. In contrast, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant assisted by the learned APG contended that the applicant has an alternate remedy of Section 249-A/265-K Cr.P.C and that too was availed by the applicant. He further contended that upon dismissal of the 249-A Cr.P.C application, the instant criminal miscellaneous application become infructuous. Lastly, he prayed for dismissal of the application.

4. Heard the arguments. I am mindful that under Section 561-A Cr.P.C., it is unequivocally provided that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the Inherent power of the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that a High Court can quash a judicial proceeding pending before any subordinate court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of the process of that court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. At the same time, this inherent jurisdiction cannot be deemed to be an alternative jurisdiction or additional jurisdiction and cannot be exploited to disrupt or impede the procedural law on the basis of presumptive findings or hyper-technicalities. Instead, it is intended to protect and safeguard the interests of justice and to redress grievances of aggrieved persons, for which no other procedure or remedy is provided in the Cr.P.C. The background of exercise of this inherent jurisdiction has been very elaborately discussed in the case of Shahnaz Begum Vs. the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another (PLD 1971 SC 677), wherein it was laid down that inherent jurisdiction of a High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., spans over judicial orders and not orders passed or steps taken during an investigation of a case by the police under the Cr.P.C. At this juncture, it must be noted that the remedy provided under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., cannot be construed as an alternate remedy or substitute for an express remedy provided under Sections 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., as the case may. Therefore, the ordinary remedy provided under the law cannot be bypassed or circumvented. To further elaborate, if we look at Section 249-A provided in Chapter XX (Of the Trial of Cases by Magistrates), Cr.P.C., in juxtaposition, it accentuates the powers of the Magistrate to acquit an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. Likewise, Section 265-K, Cr.P.C., as provided in Chapter XXIIA (Trials before High Courts and Courts of Session), has also vested in the Court the powers to acquit the accused at any stage of the case, if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. However, according to the judicial consensus and unanimity matured on the characteristics of Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., it is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction so conferred is curative in nature.

5. In fact, the expression "abuse of process" used under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., connotes an unwarranted or irrational use of legal proceedings or process which also includes the presence of ulterior motives for activating the process for unjustified arrest or groundless criminal prosecution. The essential purposefulness of this doctrine is to foster and safeguard the judicial system, ensuring that it is not misused or blemished. This terminology can be comprehended as an acuity that if a Court has jurisdiction to hear a case, it may terminate the prosecution if an abuse of process is floating on the surface on record, with logical reason and probability of exasperation, persecution, and unfairness to the opposite side. In the case of Canadian Union of Public Employees Vs. City of Toronto (2003 SCC 63), the Supreme Court of Canada held that "Judges have an inherent and residual discretion to prevent an abuse of the court's process. This concept of abuse of process was described at common law as proceedings "unfair to the point that they are contrary to the interest of justice" (R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at p. 616), and as "oppressive treatment" (R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, at p. 1667). McLachlin J. (as she then was) expressed it this way in R. v. Scott, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, at p. 1007. It was further held that abuse of process may be established where: (1) the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious; and, (2) violate the fundamental principles of justice underlying the community's sense of fair play and decency. The concepts of oppressiveness and vexatiousness underline the interest of the accused in a fair trial. But the doctrine evokes as well the public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper administration of justice" [Ref: https:criminalcpd.net.au/wpcontent /uploads/2017/01/abuse-of-judicial-process-criminalcle-0117]. The definition provided in different law lexicons are also quite relevant, which are reproduced as under:- Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan A, Garner, 9th Edition) at Page 11 Abuse of Process: The improper and tartious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process's scope. Also termed abuse of legal process; malicious abuse of process, malicious abuse of legal process: wrongful process, wrongful process of law. Words and Phrases (West Publishing Co., Vol. 1) at Page 355 Abuse of Process: The gist of an action for "abuse of process" is the use of court process for purpose not justified by the law. An ulterior purpose and a willful act in use of process not proper in the regular, conduct of proceedings are essential elements of "abuse of process". Jowitt's Dictionary of Law (John Burke, Vol. 1) at Page 16 Abuse of Process: Actions manifestly frivolous or brought against good faith will be stayed as an abuse of the process of the court (Edmunds v. Att. Gen. (1878) 47 L.J.Ch. 345). Under R.S.C., Ord. 18, r. 19, the court may order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the Indorsement of any writ on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or is scandalous, vexatious or may prejudice a fair trial or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment entered accordingly. The rule applies to on originating summons or petition. Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary (1988, 10th Edition) at Page 10 Abuse of Process: Improper use of a regular legal process by which an unfair advantage is obtained by a party to a sult. Law Lexicon with Legal Maxims (M.C.Desal, J. Vol. 1) at Page 17) Abuse of the process of the Court: Abusing the process of the Court is a term generally applied to proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and is frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. Making use of the process of the Court as a device to help the jurisdiction of a Civil Court has been held to amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.

6. Since the applicant has already availed his remedy under the prescriptions of Section 249-A Cr.P.C before the learned Judicial Magistrate and that too has already been dismissed which fact was also admitted by the learned counsel for the applicant during the course of arguments.

7. In view of the foregoing, this Criminal Miscellaneous Application, along with pending application, is dismissed as there are no cogent grounds available in the pleadings or on the record justifying the grant thereof. JK/M-85/Sindh ???