1983 PLP 1024 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 11‑12‑1979 of the Lahore High Court, whereby a civil revi sion petition‑arising out of an examination result in educational field, was dismissed. The petitioner claimed to have passed the F. Sc. (Medical Group) Ex amination in 1973. He obtained admission in the First year of M. B., B. S.; in King Edward Medical College, Lahore, for the then current session. However, in 1974 he was served with charges of impersonation and unfair means including smuggling of outside material in the examination hall. He was afforded an opportunity to appear before a Disciplinary Committee. Although he had sent a reply to a charge‑sheet on 31‑3‑1974, he did not appear before the Committee till the end of 1974, when an ex parte order was passed on 30‑I1‑1974, disqualifying him till the Autumn Examination, 1974. The petitioner challenged the punishment through a writ petition which was withdrawn in March, 1975, on the understanding that he would avail remedy by way of appeal. An appeal having been filed, according to the petitioners, a unanimous decision was taken thereon on 19‑4‑1971 exonerat ing him from all 'charges; but this decision was substituted by another unanimous decision on 11‑6‑1975 whereby the original order of disqualifica tion was upheld. The petitioner challenged the orders dated 30‑11‑1974 and 11‑6‑1975 before a civil Court. His suit was decreed with regard to the order dated 11‑6‑1975 but was dismissed insofar as the order dated 30‑11‑1974 is concerned. Both the sides preferred appeals before the learned District Court. Petitioner's appeal was dismissed while that of opposite party was allowed, mainly on the ground that civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. Reliance was placed on sections 29 and 31 of the West Pak istan Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education (Multan and Sargodha), Ordinance VII of 1968. It was also observed on merits that the so‑called decision at the appellate stage on 19‑4‑1975 purporting to exonerate the petitioner was not a final decision by any competent forum. A civil revision petition was moved by the petitioner (and failed) in the High Court. He has now sought special leave to appeal. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the decision dated 19‑4‑1975 (a photo copy was produced during the hearing of the argument) amounted to a final decision of the appeal of the petitioner which could not be subsequently changed or reviewed without affording another opportunity of hearing to him. Regarding question of jurisdiction, learned counsel con tended that the order dated 11‑6‑1975 not being in accordance with rules governing the case, the jurisdiction of the civil Court was not ousted. There are two aspects of the appellate proceedings during which the purported decision 'dated 19‑4‑1975 was taken and the order dated I 1‑6‑1975 was passed one, that the proceedings were in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court when the writ petition was withdrawn by virtue of which both parties had agreed on certain proceedings for resolving the controversy Secondly, that the appeal was in pursuance of the rules framed under the Ordinance. Learned counsel contends that it was an appeal flied in pursuance of the rule made under the Ordinance. Sections 29 and 31 of West Pakistan Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education (Multan and Sargodha) Ordinance VII of 1968, reads at; follows :‑ "Section

29. Bar of suit.‑‑.No acts done, orders passed or proceedings taken by a Boar in pursuance of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court by a suit or otherwise. "Section 31‑‑‑Protection of acts and orders under Ordnance.‑‑No suit for damages or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against Government, the Controlling Authority the Board, any committee, any member of the Board or committee, or officer or employee of the Board in respect of anything done or purported to have been done in good faith in pursuance of this Ordinance and the Regulations and rules made thereunder." Section 29 ousts the jurisdiction of civil Court when the action is in pur suance of the provisions of the Ordinance. While section 31 amongst others, makes provision for exclusion, of the jurisdiction of the civil Court when the action stay not be strictly in accordance with the relevant provisions but only purports to be in accordance therewith. However, in that case it should have been done in good faith. There is nothing in this case to establish lack of good faith. That being so, the mere fact that according to the petitioner, the appeal was ultimately decided in a wrong manner would trot confer jurisdiction on a civil Court. The intention of the law maker is obvious. In addition to the jurisdictional question we in order to do justice, have' also seen the so‑called order said to have been passed on 19‑4‑1975. Its language and the manner are indicative of the fact as if the authors thereof wanted to make notes of some thoughts in the process of decision‑making. And, that it was intended to be followed by a proper formalization which took place in form of the final order passed on 11‑6‑1975. We accordingly, uphold the appellate judgment brought under challenge in the revision before the High Court, in this behalf also. This has become necessary to save the parties from any further litigation including, in the Constitutional jurisdiction. Accordingly we uphold the view, that the civil Court had no jurisdiction. That being so this petition is dismissed. S. Q. Petition dismissed.