1989 PLP 295 (PLC)

9. Sub‑rule (3) of Rule 19 requires that such alteration should be with the prior approval of the competent authority. Admittedly the period of apprenticeship under the contract expired on 14‑11‑1986 whereas the approval of the competent authority for first extension of period of apprenticeship for three months was accorded on 11‑2‑1987. Such an approval cannot be considered prior approval. It may be pointed out that the word `prior' is not used for the approval of the period of apprenticeship under sub‑rule (3) of Rule 19, as the decision has to be taken by the competent authority himself. Whereas the contract under rule 18 is not between the competent authority and the apprentice but between the employer and the apprentice. Therefore, word `prior' is used before word `approval' in sub‑rule (4) of rule

18. There is no ambiguity as to the meaning of the word `prior'. In Black's Law Dictionary the word `prior' is defined to mean `earlier, preceding'. The extension of the period of apprenticeship from 15‑11‑1986 to 14‑2‑1987; if any, was made by the employer without the prior approval of the competent authority. Similarly the approval for the alleged extension of period of apprenticeship from LS‑2‑1987 to 14‑5‑1987 was also made without any prior approval of the competent authority. In fact this approval has been received much after termination of the services of the appellants and after service of grievance notices upon the respondents.

10. It is argued that the fact that the appellants continued to work without requesting for permanent appointment would amount to their implied consent of apprenticeship and alteration of original contract. Even this implied consent would not be effective as the employer without prior approval of the competent authority had no power to extend the period of apprenticeship.

11. It is submitted by Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani that the preamble to the Ordinance spells out the purpose of Ordinance which reads as under: ‑ "An `Ordinance' to make provision for promoting, developing and regulating systematic apprenticeship programmes in the industries and for securing certain minimum standard of skill." It is further submitted that section 4 of the Ordinance which spells out the obligations of employer does not provide that after completion of the period of apprenticeship the employer is bound to employ the apprentices. It is further submitted that under rule 23 it is clearly provided, that it shall not be obligatory on the part of the employer to offer an employment to an apprentice on the completion of his apprenticeship. It is also submitted, that admittedly no appointment order of permanent employment had been issued to the appellants after 14‑11‑1986 or at any time. There is no dispute about the legal proposition put up by the learned counsel. However, neither the law nor rules forbid the respondents from employing the apprentices. No doubt, under the law they are bound to issue written order/tickets to the permanent workers but they cannot take advantage of this lapse on their part if the appellants are able to show that they are permanent workers.

12. It is not disputed that after the expiry of the period of apprenticeship under the contract on 14‑11‑1986, the appellants continued to work with the respondents upto 14‑5‑1987. Under rule 1.8, the person who engages apprentices under the contract is termed as "employer". Under Standing Order I the apprentices are shown in the category o workmen. They are (~ Permanent, (2) Probationers, (3) badlis, (4) temporary and (5) apprentices. Thus the Standing Orders Ordinance is applicable. The appellants, after 14‑11‑1987, after expiry of the apprenticeship period, still continued to work as workmen of the respondents. It may be pointed out that all the twelve grievance petitions were consolidated and only one of the appellants was examined in support of their case. In the grievance application as well as in the affidavit‑in‑evidence of the appellants it is averred that they were working against permanent jobs which fact does not appear to be disproved. Under Standing Order No. 1, as pointed above, there are only five categories of workmen viz. (1) permanent, (2) Probationers, (3) badlis, (4) temporary and (5) apprentices. The appellants ceased to be apprentices after 14‑11‑1986. It is not the case of the respondent that the appellants were working against any temporary job. Therefore, they cannot be considered temporary. Similarly they cannot be termed, as badlis as at is not alleged that they have been appointed in the posts temporarily due to absence of permanent workers. They are, therefore, either permanent or probationers. Only difference between the two categories is that a probationer does not complete three months of service. When he completes three months of service then he becomes permanent. In the instant case the appellants had completed six months of their service.

13. Mr. Ali Amjad, counsel for the appellants, had relied upon P L D 1979 Note 85 at p. 60 wherein the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court held: "the petitioner completed his period of apprenticeship on 9‑4‑1974, but was allowed to continue in service upto 21‑1‑1975 or 3‑3‑1975 after which date he was not allowed to work therefore the termination of service without written order as required under Standing Order 12(3) was without lawful authority therefore, the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated with back benefits." In appeal, against this decision, which is reported in 1988 P L C 295 the Division Bench of Lahore High Court had observed: "The contention that once an apprentice always an apprentice was not maintainable in law and the employment after the period of apprenticeship was to be treated as workman." In this case also a plea was taken that there was no written order passed by the employer employing the petitioner. It was observed by their Lordships: The employer cannot treat its own failure to deny to the respondent the right due to him under the law. Written Order is not a sine qua non for establishing the relationship of the employer and the employee. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Tribunal in appeal of M/s. Zeal Pak Cement Factory Limited v. Syed Mushtaq Ali and others being Appeals Nos. 399 to 405 of 1987 and Appeal No. 43 of 1988. In that case also the apprentices were removed from service without complying with the provision of Standing Order 12(3), therefore, appeals were allowed by the learned Tribunal holding that the apprentice was a workman within the meaning of Standing Order and therefore, compliance of Standing Order 12(3) was necessary.

14. Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani has relied upon the decision of this Tribunal reported in 1988 P L C

472. This appeal was also between Zeal‑Pak Cement Factory Limited (respondents in this appeal) and certain apprentices. In that case the period of apprenticeship under contract expired on' 31‑12‑1985 but apprentices were allowed to work till 30‑9‑1986. Therein it was held that the competent authority could extend the period of apprenticeship by nine months and such approval could be communicated by any person on behalf of the competent authority.

15. I have already referred to the relevant rules. Applying the rules to the admitted facts of this case there can be no doubt that there has been no valid extension of the period of the apprenticeship under rule 18(4) 9(3) and as such the period of six months worked by the appellants after the expiry of the period of apprenticeship would confer upon them the rights of permanent workmen, in view of the classification of the workmen under Standing Order No. I, in spite of the fact, that no such written order was passed by the employer viz. the respondents.

16. It is submitted by Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani that in the instant cases compliance of Standing Order 12(3) has been made as order in writing has been passed terminating the services of the appellants and showing the reasons of the same. The word `reason' signifies that reason should be valid, justifiable and reasonable. Mere showing of some reason would not fulfil the requirement of Standing Order 12(3). The word "reason" has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary as under: - "Reason" A faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil, and which enables the possessor to deduce inferences from facts or from propositions. Also an inducement, motive or ground for action, as in the phrase `reasons for an appeal'." The reason shown in the order is that the apprenticeship period of appellants has expired. As already pointed out on the date when order was passed the appellants were no longer working as apprentices and, therefore, this cannot be considered as a ground for termination of their services. By showing a reason, which is not valid for terminating the services of the appellants the provision of Standing Order 12(3) cannot be said to have been complied with.

17. For the aforesaid reasons I allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order and direct the reinstatement of the appellants with back benefits. Order is to be implemented within one month. M.Z.S./1354/Lb. S Appeal allowed.