P L D 1977 Supreme Court 442 (PLP)

Leave was granted to consider the true interpretation of section 13(3) (a) (ii) (b) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, as it was contended that the view taken by the learned Single Judge was based on an erroneous interpretation of this provision. It was the case of the appellants that they were carrying on their business in a shop and paying monthly rent of Rs. 200 and that they required their own shop for carrying on the business of general merchandise. The Courts below concurrently held that they needed it in good faith for their own personal use. The learned Single Judge reversed the concurrent finding of fact on the ground stated above. As to what meaning should be given to the words 'any other such building' in sub-clause (ii) (b) of subsection (3)(u) of section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is the question for consideration. On the one hand the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the expression 'any other such building' means a building owned by the landlord and on the other it was urged that it refers to a tenanted premises. It would thus be necessary to examine the language of this provision which reads "13(3) (a).-A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession (i) in the case of a residential building, if . (ii) in the case of a non-residential building or a scheduled building or rented land, if (a) he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children ; (b) he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situated for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land, as the case may be, suitable for his needs at the time 1 and (c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance, in the said urban area ; Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this subsection before the expiry of such period." In the introductory part of clause (ii) the word 'non-residential building' can have no other meaning except that which is owned by the landlord for it is in respect of that building that he is required to make an application for any order directing the tenant to put him in possession in terms of clause (a) of section 13(3) of the Ordinance. In sub-clause (b) the word 'building' occurs twice and each time it is prefixed by the word 'such'. Considering its implication that it refers generally and naturally to its last antecedent the use of this word is with a definite purpose, i.e. to identify the ownership of the building with that before mentioned in the introductory part of clause (ii). In? this connection we would also refer to the rule as to how the word 'such' should be construed as stated by Maxwell in his book on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition at page 30 "Where the word 'such' occurs in a section it must not be ignored, but' must be read as referring back to the preceding provisions. even though this gives rise to a result which appears anomalous." The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the word building can have no other meaning except that which is owned by the landlord. This is in" accord with the rule of construction i.e., to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. We would here also refer to the observations of this Court in Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Pervaz 1976 S C M R 52 which are as under "The requirement that the landlord should not be in occupation of another residential building suitable for his need at the time does not, in our view, extend to cover rented premises, for, otherwise the result would be that no landlord would be able to get his own premises vacated for his own occupation unless he can show that he is actually on the streets and has no place to live at all. It would be more reasonable to hold that the other residential accommodation, which the landlord is occupying at the time, must be shown to be his own and not merely rented premises. The law in the United Kingdom is somewhat different. There the case of a person who purchases a premises after the coming into force of the special law has been dealt with separately. In the law prevailing in this country, there is no such separate treatment and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Legislature did not intend to disqualify a person occupying a rented premises from getting his own premises vacated for his own occupation." It is true that the observations turn on the language of the expression 'another building' in clause (b) of sub-clause (i) of section 13(3) (a) but the guiding principle underlying those observations was to discover the real intent of the Legislature while construing the word 'another building' and on this principle it was held that those words should not be construed to extend to cover a rented premises and we would re-affirm it for it could not have been intended to prescribe a different criterion for a residential building. Accordingly the requirement in this sub-clause does not extend to cover the rented premises. The learned Single Judge in the High Court erred in reversing the concurrent finding of fact on the ground that the appellants have failed to show that the rented premises was not suitable for their needs. We would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller. The parties are left to bear their own costs. The respondent is, however, allowed two months' time to vacate the premises subject to the payment of rent. S. A. H. ????????? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ? Appeal allowed.