P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

(7) Whether the Court has no jurisdiction? (8) Whether the application is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? (9) To what relief, if any, is the applicant entitled? (10) What should the order be?" The Rent Controller held that the appellant was not entitled to evict the respondents, but disposed of another application of the appellant simultaneously which was for the fixation of fair rent by fixing that rent to be Rs. 100.00 per month from the 7th of February 1960, onwards. The appellant was not satisfied with that order; therefore, preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge, Sukkur, who has dismissed it.

2. While dismissing the appeal, the learned District Judge has held that the Government is not a `person' within the meaning of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1958; therefore, the respondents were not tenants of the appellant and could not be evicted from the premises. The appellant has come in second appeal to this Court.

3. Mr. Chishti appearing for the appellant has pressed two points: firstly, that the fair rent which has been fixed by the Rent Controller and upheld by the First Appellate Authority is not correct. Counsel relied on the amount of rent demanded by the appellant at the rate of Rs. 700‑00 per month. Mr. Shah Jamil Alam, with his characteristic fairness offered on behalf of the respondents to pay rent in terms of section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1958, in accordance with the latest assessment. The latest assessment, admittedly, is Rs. 240.00, in terms of Exh. 31, which is already on the record. This document for some reason has not been given due importance by the Rent Controller and the First Appellate Authority, but Mr. Shah Jamil Alain as well as Mr. Chishti conceded that that was the assessment made by the Excise and Taxation Department and legally represented the correct rate of rent.

4. Mr. Shah Jamil Alam took the stand that he could not support the judgment of the learned District Judge, Sukkur which is under appeal in so far as it has been held by the learned Judge that the Government is not a `person' and, therefore, not a tenant of the appellant. Mr. Chishti has cited three judgments in support of the proposition that the Government does fall within the meaning of the expression `person'. Those judgments are: (1) Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Sind Light Ry. Co. A I R 1932 Sind 189. (2) Bijoy Ranjan v. B. C. Das Gupta A I R 1953 Cal. 289 and (3) Gir Raj Kishore v. State A I R 1954 All.

421. Mr. Shah Jamil Alain said that he could not go as far as support ing the proposition that a statute does not bind the Government unless that statute has been specifically made applicable to the Government. He said that the definition of the word "person", as given in the General Clauses Act, includes any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, and is wide enough to be applicable to the Government; but he contended that this concession from the legal point of view does not entitle the appellant to evict the respondents because if her stand is that the respondents are her tenants, then which ever respondent is the tenant, or if they are jointly the tenants, then jointly a notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1958, had to be given by her before the respondents could be treated and deemed to be tenants.

5. The above argument of Mr. Shah Jamil Alam was resisted by Mr. Chishti by raising the contention that the Central Government was not the tenant, but only the Assistant Controller, Central Excise and Land Customs, Sukkur, was the tenant, and that a notice had been given to him. This contention of Mr. Chishti has no legal force because the words "Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Sukkur" signify the designation of a Government Officer and do not refer to any particular individual who may happen to occupy that office for the time being. Mr. Shah Jamil Alam has stated that the bungalow is in the occupation of the Government from 1947, and that from that year up‑to‑now a number of officers have lived in it. It is obvious that a designation does not come within the definition of a person as given in the General Clauses Act; therefore, a designation cannot be the tenant; nor can any particular person who holds the designated office be said to be the tenant because the individuals who hold that office are equally referable by that designation and all of them will be entitled to occupy the same position as anyone of them, with the result that no particular person can be possibly singled out as the tenant. Mr. Chishti did not find it easy to appreciate this difficulty which is involved in his argument, but passed on to contend further that even if the Government of Pakistan is the tenant, then a notice has been given to the Secretary, Central Board of Revenue, Lahore, which is a sufficient notice in terms of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. This contention of counsel, A again, obviously suffers from serious defects, for instance, the notice required under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, is to be given to the tenant, and if the tenant is the Central Government, then it is not enough to send a notice to the Secretary, Central Board of Revenue, Lahore. The reason is that, under section 80, C. P. C., the Central Government has to be informed through the Secretary of the relevant Department. Mr. Chishti took the further stand that section 80, C. P. C. was not applicable because the notice was not meant to start proceedings in a Court of Law against the Government, but only to satisfy the requirements of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensa tion and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. From this point of view also, the difficulty in the way of the present appellant is that the Central Government being the tenant, the notice ought to have been given to the Government itself; if it is given to the Secretary, Central Board of Revenue or to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Sukkur, then neither of these designations is adequate substitute for the Government of Pakistan itself.

6. At the above stage of argument, Mr. Chishti changed his stand and said that the question as to whether the notice served under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was adequate or not, has not been considered by the First Appellate Authority; nor has it been considered by the Rent Controller, because this question was not embodied in the issues at all. If there were an issue to this effect, then, according to counsel, it might have been possible for the appellant to produce evidence to substantiate that an adequate notice in terms of section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act had been given to the Government. There is some force in this contention of counsel, although it is not clear from the record that there were any other notices which had been given but have not been produced on the record. Mr. Chishti says that copies of two notices have been produced, but Mr. Shah Jamil Alam says that he has not verified this fact. However, that may be, it is I think fair that the appellant should get an opportunity of producing evidence in support of the contention that he has complied with the requirements of section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act in this regard.

7. The overall conclusion of the above discussion is that the fair rent of the bungalow is, by agree ment, the same as has been lastly assessed by the Excise and Taxation Department. Exhibit 31, is a copy of Property Tax Form (P. T. I.) Sukkur Town Rating Area, and indicates the date of the order to be the 29th of December 1960, by which the rent according to the copy was fixed to be Rs. 240 per month. This copy, according to Mr. Shah Jamil Alam, is to be tallied with the basic order to which reference is made in it; therefore, he would like that a certified copy of the order itself be produced on the record or otherwise proper evidence be produced. Subject to this reservation, the rate of rent is agreed to be according to the latest assessment. Before that date, the rate of rent will be Rs. 100.00 per month. As to the question of ejectment the case is to be remanded so that the appellant may get an opportunity of producing evidence as to whether a notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 has been duly given to the tenant or not.

8. In these circumstances, I accept the appeal and remand the case for decision of the question, firstly, as to whether a proper notice as required by section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, has been given to the Central Government or not; secondly, whether the latest assessment stated in Exh. 31 to have been made by the Excise and Taxation Department is Rs. 240.00 per month or not. The rate of rent shall be as indicated above according to the finding of the rate mentioned in the latest assessment, and in the event of a finding that a notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, has been duly given, an order for ejectment will follow; otherwise, the prayer with respect to ejectment shall stand dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs of these proceedings. K.B.A. Appeal accepted. Case remanded.