P L D 1955 Azad J (PLP)

ABDUL MAJID, C. J.-The dispute in this case relates to the landed property of one Doctor Muhammad Yusuf Khan Rajput of village Panjeri, Tehsil Mirpur who died on 31st July, 1948. The deceased left a son Abdur Rahim who is a plaintiff and a daughter Mst. Inayat Begum who figures as a defendant. The Revenue Authorities mutated the land in favour of both Abdur Rahim and Mst. Inayat Begum in accordance with the shares prescribed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat). The plaintiff brought a suit in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Bhimber praying for a declaration that the mutation of certain part of the land left by his father in favour of his sister should be declared ineffective as he could only inherit the land left by his father under the Rule of Custom governing his family in the matter of succession to agricultural land. The suit was contested by the defendant on the ground that at the time of the death of her father, Shariat Act in force in the West Punjab had come into force in the Azad Kashmir Territory vide Resolution No. 279 dated the 22nd March, 1948, passed by the Cabinet and consequently the mutation effected by the Revenue Authorities in her favour with regard to the part of the land left by her father was correct. The trial judge dismissed the suit holding that the West. Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948 which came into force in the West Punjab on the 15th March, 1948 was in force in the Azad Kashmir Territory when the father of the plaintiff and the defendant died and consequently the plaintiff could not claim that the rule of custom governed the parties family in matters of succession which deprived the daughter of the inheritance of her father with respect to agricultural land. On appeal to the District Judge by the plaintiff the decision of the trial judge was up-held and hence this second appeal. The decision given by the Courts below was based on a judgment passed by Hon'ble Chaudry Niaz Ahmad as a Single Judge in a Civil Appeal Fazal v. Boroo decided on 9th February, 1953. Hon'ble Chaudry Niaz Ahmad held that the Shariat Act mentioned in Resolution No. 279 dated the 22nd March, 1948 did not refer to the Shariat Act of 1937 but to the West Punjab Muslim Personal law (Shariat) Application Act (IX of 1948) by which it was provided that where the parties are Muslims, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) will apply in all questions regarding succession including succession to agricultural land. In the Shariat Act of 1937 which operated throughout India excluding North West Frontier Province it was provided that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) will be the rule of decision where the parties are muslims in all questions (save question relating to agricultural land) regarding succession, etc. In the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Applica?tion Act IX of 1948 the reservation made in the Shariat Act of 1937 regarding the rule of decision being the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) where the parties are Muslims in matters other than relating to succession to agricultural land was abolished. The question whether the words "The Shariat Act" mentioned in Resolution No. 279 dated the 22nd March, 1948 referred to the Shariat Act of 1937 or to the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948 being important, it was considered proper to hear this appeal by the three Judges of this Court sitting together which was done. By the Resolution referred to above, the Azad Kashmir Government ruled that the following enactments will come into force in the Azad Kashmir Territory as they are in force in the West Punjab and they shall also be deemed to have been in force in the liberated territory as far as Practic?able and subject to the provisions of any other Law for the time being in force :- (i) The Code of Criminal Procedure ; (ii) The Penal Code (iii) The Evidence Act (iv) The Arms Act; . . (v) The Code of Civil Procedure ; (vi) The Shariat Act ; (vii) The Police Act ; (viii) The Land Revenue Act; (ix) The Tenancy Act; (x) The Courts Act. The Resolution was passed on 22nd March, 1948. Before the said date, the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948 which abolished the reservation made in. the Shariat .Act of 1937 concerning the application-of Muslim Personal Law in the matter of succes?sion to agricultural land where the parties were Muslims had come into force. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that if it was ithtended by Resolution No. 279 to enforce the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948 in the Azad Kashmir Territory then the words "The Shariat Act" used in the said Resolution which was passed after the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948 had come into force in the West Punjab would not have found place. In other words, the Counsel for the appellant contends that the words "The Shariat Act" in the said Resolution referred to Shariat Act of 1937 and consequently the defendant respondent could not succeed to the landed property left by her father. In support of his arguments, the learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to certain principles concerning the interpretation of Statutes. These principles may be described briefly as follows :?

It is not for the Court to try to discover what the intention of the legislature is when the Act is passed. Courts have only to deal with the clear language of the Act as passed and endeavour to interpret it. The business of the interpreter is not to improve the Statute ; it is to expound it. The question for him is not what the Legislature meant but what its language means, i.e., what the Act has said that is meant. In other words, sitting as a Court of Law, judges are concerned neither with the equitable side of the legisla?tion nor with the logic of it. They have to interpret the Law in its plain sense and to apply it so interpreted to the facts of any case that arises without reference to logic or equity. The above principles were laid in the cases reported as A I R 1936 Lah. 298 and A I R 1938 Lah. 638, quoted by the ????? learned Counsel for the appellant and other authorities cited by him. The learned Counsel for the appellant has, however, ignored the other important principles concerning interpreta?tion of Statutes which briefly mentioned are given below:-? The State of Law at the time when the Act was passed and the object which the Legislature had in introducing it is a permissible matter to look into for the purpose of construing a statute, provided it is taken with the warning that one must not strain the language of a statute unduly by attempting to bring it within the supposed intention of the Legislature. Expressions used by Legislature in subsequent enactments or amendments of Law can be used for the purpose of interpreting earlier enactments and in giving effect to, intention of Legislature expressed or implied so far as the particular provisions of the Law are concerned. In interpreting a Statute the proper course in the first instance is to examine the language of the Statute and to ask what is its natural meaning and if the words are really and fairly doubtful then according to well known legal principles and principle of common sense, historical investigation may be used for the purposes of clearing away the doubt which the phraseology of the Statute creates. The above principles are elicited from cases reported as A I R 1936 Cal. 64 and 593 and A I R 1938 Cal.

97. It is not mentioned expressly in Resolution No. 279, that Shariat Act of 1937 in force in the West Punjab was enforced in the Azad Kashmir Territory. At the time the Resolution No. 279 was passed, in the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948 was in force. In the circumstances, the natural conclusion which follows is that what was intended to be enforced in the Azad Kashmir Territory was Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1X of 1948 and not the Shariat Act of 1937. When the Azad Kashmir Government began to function an attempt was made to enforce laws which were in conformity with the Islamic Shariat. In the Kashmir State, in the case of Muslims in matters of succession, the presumption was that they were governed by their Personal Law in matters of succession etc. It cannot reasonably be conceived conse?quently that the Azad Kashmir Government wanted the Muslims to be governed by Rules of Custom in matters of succession and for that reason brought into force the Shariat' Act of 1937 which deprived the daughters in the matter of succession to the landed property of their father. This intention is also negatived by section 48 of the. Azad Jammu & Kashmir Courts & Laws Code of 1949 in which it was specifically stated that in questions regarding inheritance to land etc., Muslim Law will be the rule of decision where the parties are Muslims. Similarly the same inference follows from the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Government Muslim Per?sonal Law (Shariat) Application Amendment Act of 1952 in which it was also mentioned that the rule of decision shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) in matters of succession etc., where the parties are Muslims. It appears that the words "The Shariat Act" were used in a general sense and did not refer to the Shariat Act of 1937. Judged by the principles regarding interpretation of Statutes mentioned last, the only pos?sible result is that by Resolution No. 279, Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948 and not the Shariat Act of 1937 in force in the West Punjab was intended to be enforced in Azad Kashmir Territory. For the above reasons, we uphold the decisions of the Courts below and dismiss the appeal. As regards costs, considering that the appellant had some justification to move this Court by way of second appeal, we order that costs of this appeal shall be borne by the parties. Pleaders fee shall be Rs.

50. NIAZ AHMAD AND ABDUL HAMID KHAN, JJ.

We agree Announced. A. H.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.