1987 PLP 1643 (CLC)

4. Assailing the above reasoning of the learned Additional District Judge, it was submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that as matters concerning the Government are dealt with by several functionaries thereof, it was entitled to some latitude in cases like the one in hand. For this proposition, reliance was placed by him on Secretary of State v Gurmukhdas and another A I R 1929 Sind 211.

5. It is true that in the case of Secretary of State it was held by the then Judicial Commissioner of Sind that in considering an application for extending period fixed by law for presentation of appeal distinction must be made between the Government and private person but in view of recent trend of authorities, view taken in the above case is no longer holding the field. Some of the authorities in point are the cases of Superintendent of Central Excise, Lyallpur v Ch. Faqir Muhammad P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 167, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and another v. Ghulam Ghaus etc. 1974 S C M R 38, Evacuee Trust Board, Government of Pakistan, Lahore and another v Muslim High School through its Secretary PLD 1973 Kar. 618, The Province of West Pakistan, Lahore v. Mian Noor Ahmad and others 1975 S C M R 91 and Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darjee 1969 D L C 642.

6. Opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Superintendent of Central Excise, Lyallpur makes the following reading: ‑ "No extended period of limitation is provided for Government, as litigants before this Court. This is because it is felt that enjoying unusual facilities for preparation and conduct of their cases, as against those available to private litigants, Government do not need any greater latitude in respect of limitation than the ordinary litigant. The reasons advanced for the delay are not, in our opinion, convincing, and we wish to emphasize the necessity for as great vigilance on the part of Governments in these matters as the Court is entitled to expect from, and enforces against, private litigants."

7. In the case of Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and another, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:‑ "It is firmly established principle that when a litigant has allowed the normal period of limitation for a legal proceeding to expire, he has to explain each day's delay beyond a period of limitation. This Court has always adhered to the view that in civil matters, delay in filing appeals or petitions, save in exceptional cases should not be lightly condoned, for a valuable right has accused to the other party of which it cannot be deprived except for very substantial reasons. To make departments of Government exception to this rule would be placing a premium on the negligence and want of proper diligence in public offices. It is pertinent to observe that where Legislature considers it necessary to make the Government an exception to the ordinary rule of limitation, it always makes express provisions in that behalf. Sixty years limitation for suits by the Government under Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Act IX of 1908) and six months limitation for appeal against acquittal by the Government are instances in point."

8. In the case of Evacuee Trust Board, Government of Pakistan, Lahore and another it was submitted that some delay in filing appeal occurred due to "an oversight of the clerk concerned" and thereafter the case was dealt with by various officers of the Department. This explanation was not accepted by the then Chief Justice of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan. According to him, it was really "no explanation at all". Further, observations made by him in this regard, read as under:‑ "Certainly on behalf of a private party such an explanation would not have been accepted and I see no reason why a different standard should be set up for Government."

9. In the case of the Province of West Pakistan, Lahore, while dealing with the question of limitation, it was ruled by the Supreme Court that "Government is not entitled to any preferential treatment as compared to ordinary citizen in adjudication of civil matters".

10. In the case of the Province of East Pakistan, the Government of East Pakistan was late in filing an appeal and, therefore, an application was moved by it, under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay. It was asserted that delay in filing the appeal had occurred due to loss of the relevant file. A Division Bench of the Dacca High Court found that the Government was negligent in filing the appeal and, therefore, delay was not condoned. While making a mention of the fact that "our Supreme Court has laid down the principle that we should make no discrimination between the Government and a private litigant while considering an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act," the learned Division Bench observed as follows:‑ "It has been rightly pointed out to us that the petitioner has not stated on what date the file was lost or since when the file was missing. He asserts that there has been inactivity in the office of the Land Acquisition Collector as well. The petitioner should have found out as to whether or not an appeal has been preferred or a stay obtained. Even without making the inquiries, that petitioner was not carrying out the direction of the Court for sending the said amount to the Court. That shows utter callousness and gross negligence of the servants of the petitioner, Government of East Pakistan???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. We are,. therefore, clearly of opinion that if we have to condone the delay in this case we shall be required to do so in every case. Negligence is well‑established in this case. Law is respecter of no person or authority. It is a very fundamental and salutary principle and can never be departed from."

11. In view of the precedent cases cited by me, I, with respect, express my inability to share the view taken by the learned Judicial Commissioner in the case of the Secretary of State. Like a private litigant, the petitioners were duty bound to explain each day's delay in filing appeal before the learned Additional District Judge but they had failed to do so. The only explanation offered by them was that there was delay in obtaining sanction for filing the appeal. There is nothing on the record to show the date on which the sanction was sought or the date on which it was accorded. Circumstances resulting in delay on the part of the sanctioning authority have also not been spelt out. Impugned judgment does make a mention of application under section 5 of the Limitation Act but it does not reveal that this application was accompanied by an affidavit. On inquiry, learned counsel for the petitioners showed me copy of the said application but not the copy of the affidavit. It, therefore, appears that no affidavit was filed in support of the above application. In the circumstances, I agree with the learned Additional District Judge that a convincing explanation for 13 days' delay in filing the appeal had not been given.

12. In this view of the matter, no legitimate exception can be taken to the judgment and decree assailed herein. This civil revision, accordingly, fails. It is dismissed in limine. M . B . A /P‑10/ L?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Revision dismissed.