P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), Ss. 22 & 25‑-Finality of orders of Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities Ouster of jurisdiction of civil Courts)‑Jurisdiction of civil Courts not barred where parties do not challenge orders of Settlement Authorities‑Each party transferred one of two adjacent plots of land having a pathway between Suit by one party for declaration that the pathway belonged to him‑Civil Court entitled to determine dispute‑Bar of jurisdiction not to be readily inferred ‑ Burden on defendant to establish such bar‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.

9. Where none of the parties challenges the correctness or validity of an order passed by the Settlement Authorities and in fact both the parties claim their respective rights based on the orders passed by the Settlement Authorities, and do not in any way question the finality attached to them under section 22, Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958: Held, that jurisdiction of the civil Courts to hear and deter mine the suit cannot be questioned. Where plot A was transferred to plaintiff and adjacent plot B eras transferred to defendant but the dispute related to a pathway between the two plots, plaintiff claiming the path as belonging exclusively to him which the defendant denied: Held, that by the fact of transfer the parties were vested with rights in the respective properties. Subsequent to the creation of these rights, if a dispute has arisen as to the material rights between them in respect of certain area, the dispute was of a civil nature and the civil Courts had the jurisdiction to decide it. It is an undisputed proposition of law that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts cannot be taken away except by express provision or by necessary implication. By section 9, Civil Procedure Code the civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain all suits of civil nature except those the cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred. Whether the civil Courts have jurisdiction or not has to be decided with reference to the initial assumption of jurisdiction by that Court. It is; therefore, for the part, who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Court, to establish his contention. The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, having created special jurisdiction affecting pre‑existing powers and jurisdiction of the civil Court, its provisions are to be scrutinized keeping in view the principle referred to above. There is no express provision in Act XXVIII of 1958 barring the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to adjudicate upon the respective rights of the parties arising out of the final orders passed by the Settlement Authorities, which they were competent to do under the said Act. Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 can be pressed into service to bar the jurisdiction of the civil Courts only in those matters which the Central Government or an officer appointed under the Act (Act XXVIII of 1958), is empowered to determine. No implied ouster of jurisdiction can be spelt out from the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. A suit would be impliedly barred if it could be shown that the civil Courts could not hear it under general principles of law or on ground of public policy. Popuri Ramayya v. Putcha Lakshminarayana A I R 1.934 P 'C 84 rel. Major Ishaq Muhammad S. C. (Legal): Amicus curiae. The appellant has been transferred plot No. 92, Block D, Model Town. The respondent was transferred plot No. 91 in the same Block. There is a path between the two plots., Both the appellant and the respondent claim the path as constituting part of the property transferred to them. The trial Court returned the plaint under Order VII, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, holding that the civil Court had no jurisdiction. The decision was upheld in appeal. The appellant has come up in second appeal. The learned counsel for the respondent took preliminary objection founded on the provisions of sections 22 and 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, that the civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Section 22 reads as under: "

22. Finality of orders.‑Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer appointed under this Act, shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court." Section 25 reads as under:‑ "

25. Bar of jurisdiction.‑Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Central Government or an officer appointed under this Act is empowered under this Act to determine, and no injunction, process or order shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act." This being the position an order passed by a Settlement Authority is final in law, and civil Courts have no jurisdiction to question it, and they have moreover no jurisdiction in respect of any matter which is within the competence of the officers appointed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. The question which arises for determination is whether any of these two sections is violated or contravened by the present suit.

2. Both the parties are in agreement that Plot No. 92, Block D, Model Town, was transferred to the appellant and that the respondent is transferee of plot No. 91 in the same Block. The transfer was made by the Settlement Authorities. None of the parties objects or takes exception to the transfer. The bone of contention is the path between the two plots. Each party claims the same against the other as constituting a part of the property transferred to him.

3. On the question of jurisdiction being raised, it became necessary to enquire into the fact whether the civil Courts have jurisdiction or not. I recorded the statements of the learned counsel for the parties. Both of them unequivocally stated that they did not want anything more than what had been transferred to them by the Settlement Authorities and that none of them wished interference with the order so passed. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, stated that although the appellant had been transferred property No. 92, the dimensions given in Appendix X issued to him did not conform to the description of the property given in the records of the Model Town Society, and that if the dimensions were adhered to, it would result in diminishing the area which in fact formed part of the property transferred to the respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant readily agreed to this proposal and stated that notwithstanding the dimensions given in Appendix X the appellant would be entitled only to what was actually property No. 92, Block D, according to the records of the Model Town Society, and that he would not rely on the dimensions mentioned in Appendix X. He further stated that it should be open to the Court to inspect the spot; if necessary, to verify this fact. Mr. Mazhar‑ul‑Haq made a similar statement that the respondent would not rely on the area given in his Appendix for the determination of the area of plot No. 91, and he would be entitled to the plot in accordance with the dimensions mentioned in the records of the Model Town Society. 4. 1t is thus clear that none of the parties challenges the correctness or validity of an order passed by the Settlement Authorities. The order is clothed with finality under section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (Act XXVIII of 1958). In fact both the parties claim their respective rights based on the orders passed by the Settlement Authorities, and do not in any way question the finality attached to them under the Act. No objection under the circumstances can be taken under section 22 of the Act to the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to hear and determine this suit.

5. The nature of the dispute between the parties is clearly indicated above. Each of the parties asserts that the path in dispute constitutes a part of the property which has been transferred to him. They are clear in their minds as to the properties which they acquired by transfer. A question arises as to who can determine this dispute. It may be noted that there is no provision in the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, empowering the Settlement authorities to decide such issues. The parties moreover were at no time claiming against each other before the Settlement organization and they had no ‑conflict whatsoever at that time. They were transferred the properties in their own rights without any clash of interest between them. By the fact of transfer they were vested with rights in the respective properties. Subsequent to the creation of these rights, if a dispute has arisen as to the material rights between the partie in respect of certain area, the dispute is of a civil nature and the civil Courts have clearly the jurisdiction to decide it. It is an undisputed proposition of law that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts cannot be taken away except by express provision or by necessary implication. In Popuri Ramayya v. Putcha Lakshminarayana (A I R 1934 P C 84), it was observed that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but that either it must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is, in fact, clearly indicated by section 9, Civil Procedure Code, that the civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain all suits of civil nature except those the cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred. Whether the civil Courts have jurisdiction o not has to be decided with reference to the initial assumption o jurisdiction by that Court. It is, therefore, for the respondent, who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Court, to establish his contention. The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, having created special jurisdiction affecting pre‑existing powers and jurisdiction of the civil Court, its provisions are to be scrutinized keeping in view the well‑known principle referred to above. The respondent, however, could not make out a case for the ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. There is no express provision in Act XXVIII ‑of 1958 barring the jurisdiction of the Courts in matters like the present one to adjudicate upon the respective rights of the parties arising out of the final orders passed by the Settlement authorities, which they were competent to do under the said Act. I have, moreover, not been shown any provision in the Act, the Schemes or the Rules made thereunder, whereby such disputes between the parties, arising out of the orders of transfer, could be determined by the Central Government or the Settlement Authorities appointed under the Settlement Act XXVIII of 1958. The present suit is, therefore, not barred under section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation) and Rehabilitation) Act, which section can be pressed into service to bar the jurisdiction of the civil Courts only in those matters which the Central Government or an officer appointed under the Act (Act XXVIII of 1958); is empowered to determine. No implied ouster of jurisdiction can be spelt out from the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The suit could be impliedly barred if it could be shown that the civil Courts could not hear it under general principles of law or on ground of public policy. The civil Courts under the circumstances, have the jurisdiction in the case. The plaintiff had thus rightly instituted the suit and the lower Courts were not justified in declining to exercise jurisdiction in the case.

6. The appeal is accordingly accepted, the orders of the Courts below are set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial Court for decision on merits. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. A. H. Appeal accepted.