P L D 1956 Privy Council 43 (PLP)

Particulars of Offence. The accused on the 15th day of December 1955, at Galini, in the District of Nicosia, did discharge firearms at Major Brian Jackson Coombe of the 37th Field Squadron Royal Engineers. Statement of Offence Second Count Carrying firearms, contrary to Regulation 52(c) of the Emergency Powers (Public Safety and Order) Regula tions, 1955 and the Criminal Code, Cap. 13, sections 20 and

21. Particulars of Offence The accused at the time and place in count 1 hereof mentioned, did carry firearms." The relevant parts of Regulation 52 are as follows ; "52, Any -person who shall without lawful .authority, the burden of proof of which shall lie upon him, (a) discharge any firearm at any person or any group or body of persons or at any place where persons may be (c) carry any firearm or ammunition or any bomb or grenade shall be guilty of an offence and shall .on conviction be liable Ito be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or for such lesser term as the Court may see fit to impose." Sections 20 and 21 of the Cyprus Criminal Code to whip the charge also referred were as follows "

20. When an offence is committed each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may b;, charged with actually committing it, that is to say- (a) every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence ; (b) every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence; (c) every person who aids or abets another person in committing the offence ; (d) any person who counsels or procures any other person to commit the offence ; In the fourth case he may be charged either with himself committing the offence or with counselling or procuring its commission. A conviction of counselling or procuring the commission of an offence entails the same consequences in all respects as a conviction of committing the offence. Any person who procures another to do or omit to do any act of Such a nature that, if he had himself done the act or made the omission, the act or omission would have constituted an offence on his part, is guilty of an offence of the same kind, and is liable to the same punishment as if he had himself done the act or made the omission ; and he may be charged with himself doing the act or making the omission.

21. When two or more persons from a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in connection with one another, and to the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such pur pose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence." Upon these charges the submission of the appellants was that sections 20 and 21 of the Code had no application to the Regulation and that therefore they were charged with offences unknown to the law of Cyprus. They were not, it was said, found guilty of themselves discharging or carrying firearms : their "offence" lay in the application to their case of one or other of the provisions of section 20 or section 21 of the Code : if these provisions did not apply to Regulation 52, then there was no offence of which they could lawfully be convicted. The argument proceeded thus. In the Criminal Code an "offence" is defined in section 4 as meaning an act attempt or omission punishable by law : the Criminal Code does not contain a definition of law, but by section 2 of the Interpre tation Law (Chapter 1 of the Laws of Cyprus 1949) as amended by Law No. 30 of 1953 "Law" is defined as meaning "any enactment by the competent legislative authority of the Colony but does not include . . . . . an Order of Her Majesty in Council, Royal Charter or Royal Letters Patent": Regulations made by the Governor under the Emergency Powers Orders in Council of 1939 and 1952 are the act of the executive authority and do not fall within the definition of "Law" : therefore an offence against the Regulations is not an offence punishable by "Law": therefore sections 20 and 21 have no application to such an offence. In their Lordships' opinion the answer to this contention is supplied by the Regulations themselves, which by para graph 2(2) provide that "the Interpretation Law shall apply to the interpretation of these Regulations and of any Order made or direction given thereunder, as it applies to the interpretation of a Law and, for the purposes of the said Law, these Regulations shall be deemed to be Laws". It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the sole effect of this provision was to provide that the provisions of the Interpretation Law as to the proper interpretation of laws should apply to the interpretation of the Regulations. But this is the meaning and effect to be given to the first part of the sub-paragraph the latter part of it appears to their Lordships precisely to meet the present case and to provide that, where, as for instance in the relevant sections of the Criminal Code, the word "law" is used, it shall be deemed to cover the Regulations. But apart from this consideration it is by no means clear to their Lordships that the word "law" where it is used in the definition of "offence" in the Criminal Code has the meaning ascribed to the word "Law" by the Interpretation Act. In its context it more appropriately means the whole body of law for the infraction of which penalties are imposed. It was then urged that if, contrary to the appellants' contention, the Regulations fall within the definition of "law", yet sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Code do rot apply to their case because it is provided by section 2(a) of that Code that "nothing" in the Code shall affect the liability, trial or punishment of a person for an offence against any Law in force in the Colony other than the Criminal Code". There is no validity in this argument. At the time when the Criminal Code came into operation, other legislation creating offences remained in force are it must have been contemplated that further legislation dealing with particular offences might be passed. The purpose and effect of section 2 (a) was merely to provide that the Criminal Code should not be regarded as exhaustive. It cannot reasonably be construed as excluding the operation of the; Code where it is not inconsistent with the provisions of particular legislation. This is equally true whether sections 20 and 21 are under consideration or sections such as sections 16 and 17 which are for the benefit of accused persons. This view is emphasised by the further provisions of section 2 itself and in particular by the proviso which provides that, if a person does an act which-is punishable under the Code and. is also punishable under another Law of any of the kinds mentioned in the section, he shall not.4be punished for that act under both Laws. Finally, it was urged that sections 20 and 21 or at any rate section 20 of the Code had been impliedly repealed by other Regulations made under the Emergency Powers Orders in Council and particularly by Regulations 72 and

73. This contention also fails. It is true that many of the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Code are repeated (some of them verbatim) in Regulation 74 but this duplication does not involve the repeal of the Code or any part of it. This is clearly recognised by Regulation 76 (the counterpart of the proviso to section 2 of the Code) which provides that "Nothing in these Regulations shall affect the liability of any person to trial and punishment for any offence otherwise - than in accordance with these Regulations: Provided that no person shall be punished twice for the same act or omission." In their Lordships' opinion therefore this appeal fails on all the points of law which have for the first time been raised before them. But the contention last referred to, that the, relevant sections of the Code had been impliedly repealed by the Regulations, leads them to' make a final observation. Whatever be the correct view with regard to sections 20 and 21 of the Code a study of the careful judgment of Mr. Justice Shaw indicates that a conviction under Regula tions 52 and 72 must have resulted if the charge had been so framed without reliance on these sections. Their Lordships have for the reasons herein appearing humbly advised Her Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. A. H. Appeal dismissed.