P L D 1972 Lahore 177 (PLP)

Dates of hearing: 14th, 18th May and 2nd July 1970. Vide his judgment dated the 12th of March 1963, 'Mr. Ijaz Ahmad Cheema, M. I. C., Lahore, convicted Mehraj Din, Ata Muhammad, Muhammad Nazir and Muhammad Hussain, who has since died, under section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, with an award of six months' R. I. each, for having allegedly exhibited some objectionable placards on the 15th of May 1962, in Hazuri Bagh, Shahi Mosque, Lahore. The other five co‑accused were, however, acquitted. Having failed in appeal b‑.fore the Additional Sessions Judge, the convicts preferred the present revision petition.

2. So far as the factual aspect of the matter is concerned, a concurrent finding of the two Courts below has been given against the petitioners that their presence at the spot along with the so‑called objectionable placards stood fully established by evidence on the record. As such this would not be op.‑n to question in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners firstly, that the placards contained innocent statements one of which was merely in the form of a question or query which reduced into English would mean "notwithstanding its assertion Government has not so far established as to what violent conspiracy was hatched by Allama Mashhraqi". Therefore, by no stretch of imagination could they be construed as being likely to further any activity prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order; secondly that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish as to which of the petitioners carried which of the placards which considered in the light of the innocence of the above‑quoted inscription would render the entire prosecution version extremely doubtful ; and thirdly that in the absence of the invocation of section 34, P. P. C. either at the time of the registration of the case or at any subsequent stage during the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not justified in applying the same particularly when one or more of the placards could be justifiably brought within legitimate limits of immunity. Fourthly, it is contended that even otherwise such a peaceful demonstration, by the petitioners as members of the Khaksar Movement, who had visited the mosque in order to offer Eid prayers, could not be justifiably construed as furthering or likely to further any activity prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order.

4. Having considered the evidence on the record, I am clearly of the view that it stood established beyond any shadow of doubt that Mehraj Din, Muhammad Nazir and Ata Muhammad petitioners carried on placard each bearing respectively the following inscriptions: This position becomes abundantly clear from the statements of the two eye‑witnesses Muhammad Shakir P. W. 1 and Abdul Rehman P. W. 5 who signed the relevant recovery memo. Exh. P. A. prepared by Qaisar Abbas A. S. I. P. W.

16. In the circumstances, therefore, there is no force in the contention that the placards carried by the petitioners were not specified and that if one of the placards were found to contain an innocent inscription, the petitioners would be entitled to benefit of doubt in the absence of section 34, P. P. C. Since, however, from the facts and circumstances brought on the record the existence of a common intention on the part of all the accused persons, who A admittedly at one time belonged to the Khaksar Movement, to stage a silent demonstration against the arrest and detention of their leader Allama Mashraqi can be clearly spelt out, even the inscription on one of the placards is found to be hit b section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1961 as being likely to further any activity prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order the invocation of section 34 would be quite justifiable. The only relevant question that would arise for determination in this context would be as to whether any prejudice has been caused to the petitioners on account of the non‑application of section 34 during the trial. I am clearly of the view that no such prejudice was caused to them as result of non‑reference to section 34 in the charge‑sheet which otherwise gives a clear indication of allegations of a common intention inasmuch as all the accused persons were mentioned in the charge‑sheet as having jointly demonstrated before the public exhibiting objectionable placards. Thus the irregularity, any was not of any substantial nature which stood fully cured under section 537, Cr. P. C. inasmuch as the petitioners knew the precise nature of the allegations that they had to meet and thus no prejudice was caused to them. In the circumstances, there fore, the invocation of section 34 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge was quite justified.

5. The crux of the matter really is as to whether the above‑mentioned three inscriptions born on the placards carried by the petitioners fell within the mischief of section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. It reads thus "S. 16.‑Dissemination of rumours, etc.‑Whoever‑ (a) makes any speech, or (b) by words whether spoken or written or by signs or by visible or audible representations or otherwise publishes any statement, rumour or report, shall be punished with imprison ment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both if such speech, statement, rumour, or report‑ (i) causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the, public ; (ii) furthers or is likely to further any activity prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order." It has thus to be seen whether the inscriptions were likely to cause fear or alarm to public or were likely to further any activity prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. As stated earlier it was a silent demonstration held by members of the Khaksar Party to whom no utterances by mouth were otherwise attributed. The object of the demonstration obviously was to protest against the arrest and detention of their] leader Allama Mashraqi. It is thus clear that the demonstration was not actuated by any desire on the part of the petitioners to incite the public or any section thereof to acts of violence or crime. The occasion thus furnished to them by the arrest of Allama Mashraqi coupled with their silent and otherwise' peaceful conduct completely belies the existence of any such motive on their part. It is in this background that we hay to interpret the inscriptions. I have already reproduced an English rendering of one of the incriptions which was attributed to Muhammad Nazir petitioner and which was addressed to the Government as a challenge or even a query seeking clarification of the alleged violent conspiracy (tashaddud aamaiz saazish) of. Which Allama Mashraqi was accused. Obviously by no stretch of imagination can such an inscription be construed as being prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. No offence is, therefore, made out against Muhammad Nazir in his individual capacity. Ata Muhammad petitioner carried the placard of which the inscription rendered into English would read thus: "the Government apprehends its own end and therefore it is arresting innocent persons". The inscription has two parts. The first is merely a statement referring to the apprehensions of the Government that it would come to an end and even though unfounded would not be hit by any of the charging expressions used in section 16 of the Ordinance. The other is in the form of an accusation against the Government, that it is arresting innocent persons and even though found to be false would at the most give rise to a certain amount of prejudice in the minds of some persons against the Government. By no means, therefore, can it be reasonably construed as being likely to further any activity prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. Criticism of the policies of Government in general and the detentions of political leaders in particular, by means of public speeches or through publications in press in a democratic State have invariably been held to fall within the legitimate bounds of liberty of speech and as such immune from penal action. Reference may be made in this regard to Maulvi Farid Ahmad v. Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1965 Lab. 135) which is a Full Bench judgment by five Judges of the former High Court of West Pakistan, delivered by my learned brother Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, J.

6. Lastly, we come to the case of Mehraj Din petitioner who was found to have carried the placard with the inscription: Obviously the first part is Quite innocuous being compli mentary in nature. It is only the latter portion which needs examination. As stated earlier the petitioners did not utter a single word and only silently displayed the placards. The question would, therefore, arise as to whether this one sentence derogatory to the then President would per se be good enough to either cause fear or alarm in public mind or further any activity prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The peaceful mode and conduct of the demonstration for which at least a semblance of justification or excuse was furnished by the Government to members of the Khaksar Party coupled with venue namely the Shahi Mosque on the occasion of Eid‑ul‑Azha, when the petitioners had also gone to offer prayers, would in my view completely negative the existence of any casual connection between an activity prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. In the Full Bench authority referred to above, a much stronger language was used by Maulvi Farid Ahmad petitioner who had used the expression that instead of strengthening the hands of the President "we wish that his hands should be broken" and yet their Lordships took the view that this did not attract the penal consequences referred to in section 16 of the Ordinance.

7. As a result of the above discussion, I am of the view that no offence was made out against the petitioners whose conviction and sentences are accordingly set aside. The revision petition is allowed. The petitioners who are on bail stand discharged of their bail bonds.