1984 PLP 1146 (CLC)

(3) Shelter Belt area being Provincial Government land was not available for allotment. Regrant of this land to 6 different local proprietors from 1965 to 1975, was mentioned in Memo. No. Thal/50/786,.dated 17‑1‑1977, from the Settlement Officer, Leiah to the Officer on Special Duty to the Minister for Revenue and Colonies and Extra Assistant Colonization Officer Memo. No. Thal/ADH/2082, dated 1‑2‑1978, was, therefore, invalid. The Commissioner/Extra Assistant Colonization Officer, Leiah, should be cognizance of these allotments and proceed according to law." Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 4667 of 1978 which was, however, withdrawn to file fresh writ petition impleading the Forest Department as a party. Consequently, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 3014 of, 1979 which was dismissed in limine on 1‑7‑1979. Hence this Intra‑Court Appeal.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out the follow ing guiding rules laid down by the superior Courts :‑

(i) That an aggrieved person can maintain writ petition to redress his grievances. Reliance has been placed on Ch. Muhammad Younus v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan P L D 1972 Lab. 847 ; (ii) that right of hearing has to be read in every statutory provision unless it is specifically prohibited and that orders passed without hearing the aggrieved or affected parties being violative of the principles of natural justice do suffer from inherent disability and the superstructure would tumble down. Reliance has been placed on Cresent Sugar Mill v. Central Board of Revenue and others P L D 1982 Lah. 1 ; (iii) that principle of locus poenitentiae cannot be invoked once the order has taken legal effect creating certain legal rights in favour of a party. He relied upon Pakistan through the Secretary, Min istry of Finance v. Muhammad Hamaitullah Farrukhi P L D 1969 SC407; (iv) that anybody or person having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and having duty including administrative duty to act judiciously if acts in excess of legal, authority its orders subject to controlling jurisdiction of High Court. Relies on Khawaj Din v. Ration Controller, Food, Faisal abad P L D 1980 Lah. 15 ; (v) that in review or revision the authority concerned shall apply its independent mind and not merely to countersign the note put up by subordinates. Reliance has been placed on Ghulam Mohy‑ud- Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner Pak., Lahore and others PLD 1964$C829; (vi) that when some land is given to proprietor in lieu of the land acquired from him the same has to be deemed to have been given with full proprietary rights. Relies on Muhammad Iqbal and another v. Member, Board of Revenue and 2 others P L D 1978 Lab.

372. The examination of these principles and the relevant case‑law cited at bar would make crystal clear that for the proper application of these rules the existence of some legal and vested right in favour of the individual is a condition precedent because an individual cannot be termed as an aggriev ed person' or 'affected person' unless the decision or order has wrongfully refused him something, which he had a right to demand.

4. After having elaborately explained the principle and case law cited above the learned counsel adverting to the merits of the case raised the following points;‑-- (i) That in pursuance to the order, dated 11‑5‑1978, the land in dis pute was actually allotted to the appellant and the Forest Depart ment took physical possession of the land situated in Chak No. 223‑AITDA in lieu of the land reserved as shelter belt area in Chak No. 249/TDA and as such the appellant has acquired a right and was entitled for an opportunity of being heard before withdrawing decision, dated 11‑5‑1978 ; (ii) that the order, dated 11‑5‑1978 having been implemented, the same could not be reviewed by the Board of Revenue without notice to the appellant ; (iii) that since the order, dated 31‑8‑1978 was made on secret and one sided enquiry, the same was illegal and without jurisdiction ; (iv) that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition with out discussing the points raised therein. As against this, learned Assistant Advocate‑General on behalf of the respondents has vigorously defended the impugned order of the learned Single Judge.

5. As observed earlier, the question which shall engage our attention is the existence of any legal/vested right of the appellant in the particular piece of land reserved for the Forest Department as a shelter belt area in Chak No. 249/TDA so as to term him as aggrieved person' or 'affected person' in the juristic sense, entitled to any opportunity of being heard at the time of re‑examination of the decision, dated 11‑5‑1978, through order, dated 31‑8‑1978, impugned in the writ petition. The learned counsel relies on Annexures C, C/1 and B to contend that order, dated 11‑5‑1978 having been implemented and the land reserved for Forest Department in Chak No. 249/TDA having been allotted and proposed to the appellant, he had a vested right in the disputed land and as such the Board of Revenue, by passing order, dated 31‑8‑1978, without notice to the appellant and at his back has condemned them by violating the rules of natural justice.

6. In the interest of justice we propose to examine the documents i.e. Annexures C, C/1 and B to satisfy ourselves whether these documents do create any legal or vested right in the appellant entitling him to claim show‑cause notice and opportunity of being heard before undoing decision dated 11‑5‑1978. After having examined Annexures C, C/1 we find that these are the mere proposals for allotment. We are convinced that proposals after all are proposals and by itself do not give the appellant any right tote demand the proprietary rights of that particular land. As for Annexure i.e. decision, dated 11‑5‑1978, we see that this decision does not create or confer right or interest in the disputed property, in favour of the appellant and as such to our mind he had no right to demand the application or proprietary right of this piece of land. It is remarkable that it is not the case of the appellant that the particular piece of land reserved for Forest Department in Chak No. 249/TDA originally belonged to his father or was taken away from him. Furthermore, we do not find any proof of the actual allotment of the disputed land to the appellant or of the delivery of the possession of the land situated in. Chak No. 223,TDA to the Forest Department in lieu of the land recovered in, Chak: No.‑249(TDA. , We further find that in pursuance to the re‑examination of the decision, dated 11‑5‑1978, no decision has been pronounced against the appellant refusing him something which he had a right to demand.

7. For all these reasons, we are of the view that in law as well as equity the appellant stands nowhere and this is an answer to the points (i) and (ii), raised by the learned counsel.

8. As for Point No. (iii) we find that since the appellant had no right to the disputed land, he had no locus standi to raise this point. Even other wise, in the circumstances of the case, the order, dated, 31‑8‑1978 cannot be declared as illegal or without jurisdiction.

9. So far as Point No. (iv) is concerned, we find that the learned Single Judge has applied his mind to the legal and factual aspects of the matter, has discussed the material points and has given sound reasons in support of the conclusions arrived at by him.

10. For what has been stated above, we are fully convinced that on 31‑8‑19‑78, when the order, impugned in the writ petition, was passed, the appellant had no legal or equitable right to claim the allotment and confir mation of the disputed land and as such he being not affected person was not entitled to any show‑cause notice or opportunity of being heard. Needless to add that it is well‑settled that the regal light to enforce the performance of duty must be in the individual himself. It must be a specific right as distinguished from general interest in the property. The upshot of the discussion is that the appellant has hopelessly failed to show his immediate and specific right to demand the disputed property.

11. As for the guiding principle laid down in the case‑law cited by the learned counsel there hardly can be any dispute with these guiding rules but since the conditions precedent for the application of these rules and authorities are lacking in the case in hand, the same do not help the appellant.

12. Before parting with the judgment we would like to observe that the learned Assistant Advocate‑General undertakes that the appellant would be fairly accommodated in accordance with the rules. 13: Resultantly this I.C.A. is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M. Y. M. Appeal dismissed.