MLD 1998

1998 PLP 1972 (MLD)

SOHAIL MUHAMMAD SHEES FAROOQ — Petitioner Versus Mst. MIZNA ROOMANA and another — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
1997-May-31
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1998 PLP 1972 (MLD)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members N/A
Parties SOHAIL MUHAMMAD SHEES FAROOQ — Petitioner Versus Mst. MIZNA ROOMANA and another — Respondents
Primary Law (a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1998 PLP 1972 (MLD)?

This judgment primarily cites: (a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1998 PLP 1972 (MLD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1998 PLP 1972 (MLD) (SOHAIL MUHAMMAD SHEES FAROOQ — Petitioner Versus Mst. MIZNA ROOMANA and another — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

(a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)

Representation

  • Chaudhry Abdul Rasheed for Petitioner.
  • M. Zia Qureshi for Respondents.

Headnotes / Summary

S. 5 & Sched.

Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2(ix)

Dissolution of marriage

Marriage was sought to be dissolved by wife on grounds that, her consent to marriage was obtained by fraud; that there was great difference between ages of parties as husband was nearly fifty years old while she was 26 years old; that she was Post-Graduate while her husband was intermediate; that husband was already married and had five children from his first wife and that husband believed in evil spirits

Wife seeking dissolution of marriage had clearly deposed that it was impossible to live with such a character within limits ordained by God

When a ground was urged for dissolution of marriage that "parties could not live as husband and wife within the limits prescribed by God", Court had to judge case that minimum standard could be held intact if the marriage was allowed to stay and not dissolved

If not, then it would be better to bring an end to such an institution

In view of specific allegations levelled by wife against husband, marriage was rightly ordered to be dissolved.

Art. 199

Constitutional jurisdiction, exercise of

Constitutional jurisdiction could only be exercised once High Court would come to the conclusion that lower Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction, travelled beyond its jurisdiction or acted without jurisdiction

If such Court/Tribunal possessed jurisdiction, findings of fact recorded by Tribunal could not be disturbed simply on the grounds that another view was possible on the same evidence, unless High Court would come to the conclusion that findings of Tribunal were based on no evidence or such findings were fanciful or arbitrary or based on fantasy.

Arts. 35 & 199

West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5 & Sched.

Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.5.2(ix)

. Protection of family

Constitutional jurisdiction in matrimonial matters, exercise of

Constitutional jurisdiction in matrimonial matters would be exercised in only rare circumstances because matrimonial matters involved delicate human relations and they were emotional issues as well

Such relations should not be judged on legal factors alone, but Court should keep in mind entire fabric of society while deciding human issues involved in matrimonial matters and conclusions of the Courts should benefit society as a whole

In such matters concept of social justice rather than legal justice should be advanced-- Such was also obligation of State under Principles of Policy of Constitution of Pakistan, which charged executive to advance social justice and eradicate evils and protect weaker section of society

Courts could not enforce Principles of Policy, but could lay broader contours for dispensation of justice.

Judgment & Decree

(3) Whether the plaintiff in Family Suit No.400 of 1994 is entitled to the decree of restitution of conjugal rights? (4) What should the decree be?"

3. In support of their suits the respondent No.l examined herself and was cross-examined while the petitioner examined himself and was cross-examined. The trial Court examined the evidence and on issue No.2 held the respondent No.l was entitled to the dissolution and after holding on issue No.3 that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief of restitution of conjugal rights decreed the suit of respondent No. 1 and dismissed the suit of petitioner which judgment is assailed in this petition.

4. Chaudhry Abdul Rashid, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that the suit filed by respondent No. 1 for dissolution of marriage is not maintainable as the respondent No. 1 claimed that fraud has been committed on her and her signature on Nikahnama was obtained through fraud as such no grounds mentioned in Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 have been made out and that the trial Court exceeded jurisdiction in granting the relief. He has relied upon the case of Mst. Nighat Aijay v. Muhammad Jamil (PLD 1994 Karachi 46) in which a learned Single Judge expressed the view that suit for jactitation of Marriage should have been filed, instead of Dissolution of Marriage.

5. Mr. M. Zia Qureshi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 on the other hand contended that the marriage had taken place in a manner which does not exclude the element of fraud. Consent of respondent No. 1 was obtained by fraud. No women would, in proper senses marry a man who is father of five children of whom eldest son was 17 years and an student of First Year College. The marriage has taken place in a taxi driver's house of which even the parents of respondent No.l had no knowledge. No Rukhsati took-place. The petitioner is 52 years old while the respondent is half of his age. The petitioner believes in black magic and evil spirits. In such circumstances a God fearing home could not come into existence which is the ultimate purpose of a marriage in a predominant religious society.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the pleas argued by the parties and have gone through the record with the assistance of learned counsel. One of the grounds on which the Muslim Marriage can be dissolved is prescribed by section 2(ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 which reads as under: "

2. A woman married under Muslim Law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for dissolution on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (ix). On any other ground which is recognized as valid for the dissolution of marriage under Muslim Law

" And one such ground so recognised is that "the parties cannot live as husband and wife within the limits ordained/prescribed by God". (i) Marriages are made in heaven and on earth they are manifested. The institution of marriage was created and ordained by God Almighty Himself and blessed the first couple to be fruitful and multiply. It is, therefore, essential purpose of marriage in a religious society such as ours that' Umat should be fruitful and multiply according to God's command as God Himself creates a new home. (In the Constitution it has been declared that the Islam shall be the State religion and the Objective Resolution are adopted in terms of Article 2-A, and also as per our Constitution God is ultimate sovereign, therefore, such provisions in the Fundamental Law characterises the society at large as religious). (ii) I have used the word home, and not house. House is made of bricks (and now perhaps with R.C.C. and cement blocks) while the home is made of love. For the loving couple created through the institution of marriage as husband and wife, if wife should seek dissolution of marriage inter alia on the grounds of fraud would suggest that the element of love was lacking at the inception. (iii) Another essential for a home is that there should be mutual trust amongst the partners. Apart from trust, compatibility of minds is another element, for a home seeking blessing of God the parties should be God fearing and God honouring, such a home is the basis of society. When a ground is urged for dissolution of marriage that "parties cannot live as husband and wife within the limits prescribed by God", the Court has to judge the case (of course, based on evidence) that the minimum standards (some of them stated above) could be held intact if the marriage was allowed to stay and not dissolved. If not, then it would be better to bring an end to such an institution which apparently was not made in heaven, but the marriage has taken place to satisfy the wordly pleasure and lust of eye and flesh, which are earthly reasons. (iv) Reverting to the case of Mst. Nighat Aijaz (PLD 1994) Karachi 46) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that where the marriage is challenged on the grounds of fraud, forgery or mis-representation then the suit for jectitation for marriage could be filed. In that case Nikah Khawan had testified that the lady alleged to have been married did not sign Nikahnama as such there was no Nikah and therefore, no marriage and Family Court would obviously have no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage, as a matter of fact there was no marriage at all. In this case factum of marriage is not denied. Dissolution of marriage has been sought by the wife for other grounds, than fraud. As such the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner is not apt, and does not support him. (v) On the above criteria, from the evidence on record I find that specific allegations have been levelled against the petitioner by the respondent No.

1. The respondent No. 1 entered in witness box and deposed on oath the reasons which according to her would not permit her to live with the petitioner as husband and wife within the prescribed limits ordained by God. Her deposition was not shaken in the cross-examination. The respondent No. 1 accused the petitioner for having extra marital affairs with other women. Apart from that one element of fraud was that petitioner told her that petitioner has obtained permission of his first wife which according to respondent No. 1 was a false statement. Marriage has taken place in dubious circumstances i.e. at taxi driver's place for which even the elders of the family (as the parties are grand children of same grand father) did not know nor they participated and blessed the couple. Even if I was to ignore the vital age difference between the parties, circumstances which have come in evidence would reveal that the marriage had taken place in dubious circumstances to satisfy wordly lust and not for seeking heavenly blessings, therefore, the order passed by the Trial Court is just and proper. (vi) Writ jurisdiction can only be exercised once the Court comes to the conclusion that the lower Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, travelled beyond its jurisdiction, or acted without jurisdiction. If the Court possesses jurisdiction (which in this case it does possess) the findings of the fact recorded by the Tribunal may not be disturbed simply on the grounds that another view is possible on the same evidence. Unless this Court comes to the conclusion that the findings of the Tribunal are based on no evidence, or such findings are fanciful or arbitrary or based on fantasy, in such eventuality, such findings can be disturbed because they will be no findings in law, the Constitutional jurisdiction may not be available. Such is not the case here. The Family Court examined and assessed the evidence. The findings are based on evidence as such I decline to exercise the constitutional jurisdiction. (vii) There is yet another reason which compels me to hold that the order of dissolution of marriage was valid. Petitioner (husband) filed report with police. Police dragged the respondent No. I and her father humiliated and insulted them. Is it humanly possible for a wife to live with such husband? Human nature is vindicative. Humanly it may not be possible, but divinely yes as to forgive is device. (viii) The writ jurisdiction in matrimonial matter would be exercised in only rare circumstances. Such matrimonial matters involve delicate human relations. They are emotional issues as well. These relations should not be judged on legal factors alone. The Court should keep in mind the entire fabric of society while deciding the human issues involved in matrimonial matters, and the conclusions of the Courts should benefit the society as whole. In other words in such, matters the concept of social justice rather than legal justice be advanced. Such is also the obligation of State under the Principles of Policy of the Constitution which charges the executive to advance social justice and eradicate evil, and protect weaker section of the society. One such Article 35 provides as follows:- "

35. Protection of family, etc. The State shall protect the marriage, the family, the mother and the child. " The Courts may not enforce principles of policy but can lay broader contours for dispensation of justice.

7. After hearing the parties in Court, I dismissed this petition with costs by short order. These are the reasons for passing such order. N. B. T./S-164/K Petition dismissed.