P L D 1969 Dacca 954 (PLP)

The point raised is of general importance, and we requested Mr. Kamruddin Ahmed to appear as amicus curiae. We place one record our appreciation of his ready response to our request and the able assistance rendered by him. In order to appreciate the contention of Mr. Mofakher, I should read now the order dated 6‑4‑66, granting Leave to appeal to this Court: "The Second Party files a petition for leave to prefer an appeal against the award. Heard representative of the Send Party. He submits that leave may be given only in respect of the award under Demand No.

8. Leave is granted." Mr. Sharif's contention that the expression "leave is granted" is without limitation cannot be accepted, for, read with the previous sentence it is clear that the Court granted a leave to appeal in respect of what was asked for. Leave was asked for "only in respect of an award under Demand No. 8." Mr. Ahmed contends that the Labour Court may grant leave to appeal to the High Court or refuse it, but cannot grant a limited leave for, no such power is conferred on the Industrial Court by the statute. His further contention is that by grafting such a leave, a Court imposes limitation on the authority of a Court of Appeal. I Now read subsection (5) of section 13: "Any party aggrieved by any award given under clause (a) of subsection (t) or published under subsection (2) may, with the leave of the Court concerned, prefer an appeal to the High Court within thirty days of its delivery or of its publication as the case may be, and the decision of the High Court in such appeal shall be final" The expression used is "in an award given under clause (a), of subsection (1)". The expression "Any award" does not mean'conclusion reached in respect of an item of demand. The expression "Any award" means order as a whole. The intention of the Legislature, therefore, is not that the L3bou‑. Court should decide as to whether or not its award given only on a particular dispute should be agitated before the appellate Court. It s true the Labour Court may refuse to grant leave. But if it thinks that there are some points for which the aggrieved party may reasonably ask for leave to appeal, it should not be limited to any particular conclusion of law or fact. The Legislature could not have intended such a result for in doing so it would be impossible to limit the discussion of a superior Court to those points alone, for generally in a case of this nature points raised are found to be interconnected. It appears to us that the expression "Any award" means all the conclusions on law or fact reached by the Labour Court. In that view of the matter we are of opinion that the leave granted should be deemed to be an open leave inasmuch as imposition of limitation is not founded on any provision of law. We are, therefore, of opinion that there is no substance in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Mofakher and it is accordingly overruled. Mr. Sharif now raises an objection. His contention is that the dispute raised by Mr. Mofakher's client is not maintainable inasmuch as it was raised by seven workers and not by a recognised Union or not even a registered Union. This contention of Mr. Sharif is answered by Mr. Mofakher by repeating his first argument that Mr. Sharif should not be allowed to raise this point of jurisdiction inasmuch as leave granted is a limited one. About this contention we have already expressed our opinion. Mr. Mofaker also submits that this point was not raised before the Industrial Court itself and as such this question cannot be raised before this Appellate Court. We may at once say that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage, so long as that question is not dependent on determination of an issue of fact in this case it is patent on the face of record that the dispute was raised by seven workers and not by a recognised Union. It is therefore not necessary to remand this case for recording a finding of fact in this behalf by the Industrial Court. In the case of Chittagong Mercantile Employees'' Association v. The Chairman, Industrial Court of East Pakistan, Dacca (19 D L R 19 (SC)), it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following terms: "Mr. Asir drew our attention to clause (d) of section 15 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, which authorises a registered Trade Union to spend its general funds inter alia on the conduct of Industrial Dispute on behalf of the Trade Union or any member thereof. This only means that if a Trade Union has the capacity to raise a dispute, it may expend its funds on pursuing it, but cannot lead to the inference that the Trade Union, by the mere fact of its being registered as such, acquire a right to raise a dispute. Learned counsel was unable to point out any provision of law under which an unrecognised Trade Union could have power to raise an industrial dispute on behalf of workmen. The upshot of the whole discussion is that the appellant Union having ceased to occupy the character of a recognised Union, had no locus standi, either to raise an industrial dispute, on behalf of its members or to take it to the Industrial Court in the face of this finding, the other points raised in the appeal, do not call for decision." It will, therefore, be seen that their Lordships were of the view that even a registered Trade Union cannot raise the dispute on behalf of the Union or its members unless it was recognised on the ground that there was no such provision empowering such a Trade Union to raise a dispute. The case of Chittagong Mercantile Employees' Association referred to above was a case under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance. So, also is the case before us. In the present case seven workers have raised the disputes on behalf of the whole body of workers. In the absence of any provision enabling such a course to be adopted, we are of opinion that they had no locus standi to raise the dispute on behalf of the general body of workers. Such a power was given as was indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to the recognised Trade Union alone. That being so, the impugned order was without jurisdiction. In that view of the matter the appeal is allowed and try; .ward dated 28‑3‑66 is set aside. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. HABIBUR RAHMAN, J.‑I agree. A. B. Appeal allowed.'