P L D 1966 Supreme Court 758 (PLP)

Moinul Huq, Advocate Supreme Court, instructed by S. S. Hoda, Attorney for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 19th May 1966. CORNELIUS, C. J.‑Leave is sought by the petitioner Mazharul Huq Bhuiyan, to appeal against the refusal by the High Court to quash an order requisitioning a certain building in the center of Barisal town, in the ground floor of which he carries on business as distributing agent for a number of companies manufacturing consumer goods in general demand. The list of these companies indicates that the petitioner's business is run on a considerable scale. The building is owned by Hindus, and the petitioner states that he has been doing business there for the past 20 years. The upper floor of the building, the whole of which has been requisitioned, is occupied by the petitioner's brother, Serajul Huq Bhuiyan, who has not objected to the requisition. Nor have the owners objected. The petitioner himself owns a house in Barisal, but pleaded that as it is in a residential area, it is not suitable for his business. He claims to pay about a lakh of rupees a year as income‑tax. Mala fides were alleged, not on the basis that the allegation of public purpose made in the order of requisition, viz., "accommodation of Government officials" was colourable, not on the basis that the real purpose was for private benefit of some person or persons, or to victimize the petitioner for some ulterior reason, but on the basis (a) that full account had not been taken of the availability to the Government of other accom?modation, requisitioned as well as Government owned, and (b) there had been derequisitioning of a number of properties in favour of private owners, while this property was being taken away from a person who could not do without it for his livelihood. The petitioner gave details of other available properties which in his opinion, should suffice for the requirements of Government, as well as of properties which had in the recent past been derequisitioned. It should be mentioned that before moving the High Court, he had appealed to the Commissioner, and had also applied to the Provincial Government, for revision of the order, without success. These details, viz., of other avail?able properties and of derequisitions were brought to the notice of these authorities. It was urged by him that they paid no heed to his pleas, but he admitted at the same time that the Secretary to Government, who dealt with his revision petition, gave his Advocate a full hearing, and thereafter reserved judgment. From this it may be concluded that the executive authorities, before they finalised the order of requisition, were in possession of all the relevant facts to enable them to form a judgment that, taking into account their own requirements and also all the available accommodation, both Government‑owned as well as that which was under requisition or could be requisitioned, this particular building was one which they could not do without. As it is situated in the center of the town, it is particularly well‑fitted for Government offices. It is said that the Education Department offices are located there. The same matters were raised before the High Court, where in reply, detailed explanations, were offered, and allegations refuted, in affidavits filed by the officer responsible for providing accommodation in Barisal, for the increasing number of offices and officials to be located there, in accordance with development plans. On a consideration of the facts so disclosed and of the circumstances otherwise appearing in the case, the High Court was unable to find anything in the nature of perversion of public power) which would appear to be a more correct description than mala fides in a case of this kind). Mr. Moinul Huq has attempted i to press the same matters in detail before us, evidently under a misconception as to the function of a Court acting under Article 98 in a matter of this kind. It is not for the Court to decide what accommodation is necessary, nor how it is to be provided, for the necessities of the administration. Placing of details before the Court as to what was available, or how in detail, the administrative official responsible for provision of accommodation performed his task, was purposeless, for to revise his performance is entirely beyond the scope of the Court's powers. The revision lay with his own superiors, who on being approached, as provided by statute, received information regarding the whole position from the petitioner, besides that available to them through Government agencies, and approved the action of the officer on the spot. No fault can be found with the procedure followed by the authorities. The result was one which it was within their lawful authority to reach. Mr. Moinul Huq complained that the High Court had not given sufficient attention to the plea that the Additional Deputy Commissioner who made the order of requisition was not duly empowered to do so. The order declared that the Additional Deputy Commissioner was exercising powers under section 3 read with section 9 of the relevant Act of 1948 "which powers have been delegated to me by the Provincial Government." It is argued that since the amendment of the Act in 1961, the power to requisition is no longer vested in the Provincial Government, but is now possessed by the "Deputy Commissioner," which term has been defined in section 2 (i) of the Act, as follows:‑ " `Deputy Commissioner' includes an Additional Deputy Commissioner and a Joint Deputy Commissioner and also an Assistant Commissioner or an Extra‑Assistant Commissioner authorised by the Deputy Commissioner to exercise any power conferred, or perform any duty imposed, on the Deputy Commissioner by or under this Act;" Mr. Moinul Huq seemed to argue that an Additional Deputy Commissioner has no power in himself to make a requisition, and needs to be authorised by the Deputy Commissioner of the District for the purpose. The words of the definition do not bear out this interpretation. The wording shows clearly that authorisation is necessary only in the case of Assistant Commis?sioners and Extra‑Assistant Commissioners, their case being differentiated from those who are, by designation, included in the term "Deputy Commissioner" by the use of the preceding words "and also". As for the mention of delegation of powers by the Provincial Government in the requisition orde4 that was clearly otiose, for no delegation of power by any authority is necessary to enable an Additional Deputy Commissioner to make an order of requisition. It appears likely that the words of delegation are continuing to be used as a carry‑over from past practice, although they have no meaning since the 1961 amendment. These words are mere surplusage, and are without effect upon the validity of the order. We accordingly dismiss this petition. A. H. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Petition dismissed.