P L D 1963 (W (PLP)

(7) There is nothing definite in the statement of Khan Bahadur before the Revenue Authorities to show that he intended to disinherit the ladies. The report of the Mukhtiarkar, Johi, shows that the ladies did receive something out of the produce from defendant No. 4, so they had no reason to suspect that the possession of the defendant No. 4 was adverse. It is customary with the Balooches to let the name of the eldest male member of the family stand in the Record‑of‑Rights insteady of the names of the female co‑sharers also." The following five issues were struck on the pleadings of the parties by the learned District Judge, Dadu. "(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled' to declaration and injunction as prayed by them in para. 16 of the plaint, if so, what is the effect ? (2) Whether the declaration given by the defendant No. 4 is binding on the plaintiffs ? (3) Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain this suit? (4) Whether the court‑fee paid Is Insufficient ? (5) What should the decree be ?" All the above issues were decided in favour of the petitioners, who were the plaintiffs and the suit was decreed "as prayed". Issue No. 3 was discussed and disposed of as follows :‑ "The learned Government Pleader concedes that this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. According to section 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, a suit for declaration and injunction can be filed in any of the Districts within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, any portion of the property is situated."

3. The absence of objection to the jurisdiction of the Court by the Government Pleader and of any reference to the provisions of Martial Law Regulation 64 should be noted. The true legal situation is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by paragraph 27 of the Regulation which is as follows :‑ "

27. Bar of jurisdiction.‑(I) No provision of this Regu?lation or of any rules or orders made thereunder shall be called in question in any Court including the High Court and the Supreme Court, or before any authority other than an authority appointed under this Regulation, and no such Court or authority shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Commission or an Officer acting under the authority of the Commission is empowered to determine. (2) No such Court or authority as aforesaid shall be com?petent to grant any injunction or other order in relation to any proceeding before the Commission or before any officer exercising any power or discharging any function under this Regulation or the rules or orders made thereunder or in relation to anything done or intended to be done by or at the instance of the Commis?sion or such officer." Moreover in virtue of paragraph 3 of the Regulation the Land Commission is not bound by the orders and decrees of any Court excepting as pointed out in Zafar‑ul‑Ahsan's case to which further reference will be made later. The paragraph is as follows :‑ "

3. Regulation to override other laws, etc.‑The provisions of this Regulation, and any rule or order made thereunder, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, or in any order or decree of Court or other authority, or in any rule of custom or usage, or in any contract, instrument, deed or other document." A reference to the above provisions would have informed the learned Judge and the Advocates who appeared in the suit, of the futility of the concession which the Government Pleader made in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court. We invite attention to two judgments of this Court in Pahlomal Motiram v. The Chief Land Commissioner (P L D 1961 Kar. 384) and Pir Bux Khan v. Moosa Khan (P L D 1962 Kar. 859). No great legal acumen is needed for appreciating that the Court could not issue an order of injunction against the Chief Lang Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore, Deputy Land Commissioner, Dadu and Deputy Land Commissioner, Nawabshah restraining them from resuming the land. But the learned Judge was apparently taken in by the so‑called permission granted by the Land Commission to institute the civil suit and the helpful ?attitude which the defendants, who were impleaded in their ‑official capacity, took by waiving their objection under section 80, C. P. C. and by including their views in their written statement to support the petitioners.

4. The effect of the decree was no more than what it was expected to be. The decree was presented to the Land Com?mission which decided to ignore it. We may point out here that Civil Courts are not expected to act in oblivion of the limits of their jurisdiction, however pleasantly helpful the parties may be to each other.

5. The decision of the Land Commission conveyed by the letter dated the 1st of May 1961 (Annexure H) to disregard the decree of Mr. Azizullah Memon, District Judge, Dadu is questioned in these proceedings by the petitioners as without jurisdiction, mala fide and amounting to a cloak used for the purpose of misusing the law.

6. We pointed out to the learned Advocate who supported the petition that the bar to the jurisdiction of all Courts against interference with the work of the Land Commission was so complete that it was not possible for him to criticise the Commission's working unless he was in a position to bring. his criticism within the narrow scope that is indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their judgment of Zafar ul Ahsan's case, as follows :? "If a statute provides that an order made by an authority acting under it shall not be called in question in any Court, all that is necessary to oust the jurisdiction of the Courts is that the authority should have been constituted as required by the statute, the person proceeded against should be subject to the jurisdiction of the authority, the ground on which action is taken should be within the grounds stated by the statute, and the orders made should be such as could have been made under the statute. These conditions being satisfied, the ouster is complete even though in following the statutory procedure some omission or irregularity might have been committed by the authority. If an Appellate Authority is provided by the statute the omission or irregularity alleged will be a matter for that authority, and not, as rightly observed by the High Court, or a Court of law. . Of course where the .proceedings are taken mala fide and the statute is used merely as a cloak to cover an act which in fact is not taken though it purports to have been taken under the statute, the order will not, in accordance with a long line of decisions in England and in this sub?continent, be treated as an order under the statute." The learned Advocate nevertheless tried to argue that the Land Commission was bound by the decree of the Civil Court because some of its highest authorities who are respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in this writ petition have admitted the petitioners' claim in the written statement which they submitted jointly in the District Court, Dadu and because the Land Commission bad itself permitted the petitioners to institute the suit. These facts un?doubtedly create an impression that there was a division of opinion inside the Land Commission and that a section of it had not only had the feeling to be helpful to the petitioners but had actually helped them. The admissions which were made by the autho?rities in the Civil Court do morally harm the stand which the Commission has taken in declining to give effect to the decree of the Civil Court. They expose the Land Commission to the criticism that it is not prepared to do what is right but is adamant merely because it is the highest authority in its own field of action. Counsel for the petitioners struggled to describe this aspect in respectful words as "a fraud on the law." We pointed out this moral weakness of the case to the Additional Advocate?-General who supported it before us. He explained that Pir Muhammad Khan is a big Zamindar and an influential man who could induce the lower officers to support him because the written statement which was submitted in the District Court, Dadu was not scrutinized by the highest officers of the Land Commission.

7. In spite of the moral weakness of the stand that is taken in these proceedings by respondents Nos. 1 to 4, we find ourselves in law bound to entertain the view that the Land Commission is the exclusive authority to decide, while scrutinizing declarations which are submitted to it under paragraph 15 of the Martial Law Regulation No. 64, as to who is the owner of the land and what part of it may be resumed for the purpose that it may vest in the Government. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the arguments in support of this view as they have been set out in detail by a Full Bench of this Court in Pahlomal‑Motiram's case and explained according to the facts of the case in Pir Khan's case. The view taken by the Commission in declining to give effect to the decree of the Civil Court is neither mala fide nor a cloak for exercising unlawful authority, because it is in strict conformity with the spirit and the provisions of law.

8. We may add that counsel for the petitioners tried again and again to impress on us that the declaration made by Pir Muhammad Khan was neither factually correct nor binding on the petitioners, that the admissions made by the authorities in the Civil Court disclosed that the Land Commission knew this, that the Land Commission was not expected to disregard the admitted situation and to deprive the petitioners of their shares of land irrespective of whether the decree of the Civil Court was legally enforceable or not. We have tried to explain to the learned Advocate that we are neither the judges of the facts which were to be assessed by the Land Commission nor are we B in these proceedings the Appellate Court to review the judgment of the Civil Court. It was, therefore, futile to impress on us a to what the conclusions might have been if we were to examine the facts and to draw our own inferences from them. We still hold the same view, but as the situation is being exploited on behalf of the petitioners to create the impression that the last stand taken by the Commission is devoid of honesty, we may add in fairness that we have not been impressed by the pro?testations of Pir Muhammad Khan and of the petitioners that the declaration which he had submitted was the consequence of his simplicity or that he now believes that he was not holding the entire land as its sole owner. We mention this for the further reason that we may not be misunderstood as suggesting that the final conclusion of the Land Commission is wrong, for what we have tried to point out to the Additional Advocate‑General is simply that the conflict of views that apparently existed in the Commis?sion has given occasion to the petitioners to criticise its moral side.

9. With the above views as to the position in law and the situation taken as a whole, we dismiss the writ petition with no order as to costs. This conclusion was announced by us in Court at the close of the arguments on the 20th of March 1963. A. H.??? Petition dismissed.