1992 PLP 593 (CLC)

Brief facts of the case are that Abdur Rasheed Lambardar of Chak No.61/ML, Tehsil Bhakkar resigned and applications were invited to fill in the resultant vacancy. The Collector vide his order dated 26‑3‑1987 appointed Abbas Ali Shah as new Lambardar of the Chak. Muhammad Din, Muhammad Yousaf, Hassan Muhammad, Muhammad Khan and Haji Abdul Majeed filed separate appeals before the Commissioner who vide his order dated 24‑5‑1987 appointed Haji Abdul Majeed as Lambardar in place of Abbas Ali Shah. That order was challenged by Muhammad Yousaf, Muhammad Din, Abbas Ali Shah and Hassan Muhammad before the Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab who vide impugned order accepted the revision petition of Muhammaad Yousuf and appointed him the new Lambardar dismissing the other three petitions. Hence these review petitions under section 8 of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957.

2. This single order shall dispose of the titled two review petitions as the matter is interconnected.

3. The learned counsel for Haji Abdul Majeed petitioner argued that he had been ousted vide para. 12 of the impugned order wrongly. All his family is resident of Chak No.61/ML, Tehsil and District Bhakkar. His driving license dated 9‑8‑1966 also records his address and residence in the same Chak which was also corroborated by his Army discharge certificate. The Commissioner had verified all the record which was in his favour and no rebuttal thereof had been placed anywhere on the record and so in the impugned order which consisted of conjectures and presumptions. Muhammad Yousaf respondent was the owner of 60 Kanals of land only whereas the petitioner was a much larger owner. Respondent Muhammad Yousaf had left school in Class IV on 5‑10‑1969 and had not been educated to the Middle as wrongly held in the impugned order. His land was also not sufficient for `Zar‑e‑Bhurt'. As recorded in review petition No.168 of 1989, Muhammad Din (petitioner) had never been considered by any Revenue Officer for appointment as Lambardar and he had been ignored all along and hence he was not entitled to be appointed as Lambardar. It was prayed that the review petition may be accepted.

4. The learned counsel for Muhammad Din petitioner contended that his case had not been considered at all by the learned Member (Revenue) in the impugned order. Haji Abdul Majeed respondent (petitioner in Review Petition No.161 of 1989) had been correctly removed but Muhammad Yousaf respondent had been wrongly appointed. The petitioner was a much better candidate than Muhammad Yousuf owning 120 Kanals and was educated up to 10th Class. The petitioner was a dedicated social worker and the age and the experience were on his side. It was prayed that his review petition may be accepted.

5. The learned counsel for Muhammad Yousuf respondent in both the review petitions, maintained that review under section 8 of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957, had a very limited scope and all grounds had been adjudicated upon in the impugned order. The review was therefore not competent. `Naqsha Lambardari' shows that Abdul Majeed was an absentee landlord. He owned a workshop in Multan and his vote was also registered in electoral rolls at Multan where he sells agricultural implements. There was an inquiry of embezzlement of local rates against Haji Abdul Majeed who had also filed a suit against the Government and hence he was not eligible for the post of Lambardar. Muhammad Din had also filed a suit against the Government and he was penalized for illicit cultivation. The respondent's land was valued at Rs.1,20,000 whereas `Zar‑i‑Bhurt' was Rs.40,000 and his land was sufficient security for the `Zar‑i‑Bhurt'.

6. I have considered the arguments and perused the case record. Section 8 of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957, contemplates review of an order made by the Board of Revenue on any of the following three grounds: (i) from the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after due diligence, was not within the applicants' knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time of making the decree or the order; (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record; or (iii) for other sufficient reason. Conditions No.(i) is not applicable in so far no new and important material has been placed on record. Similarly no sufficient reason has been given for reviewing the case. Sufficient reason does not mean subjective dissatisfaction of an applicant; it has to be related to objective and verifiable factors. This leaves us with condition No.(ii) above, i.e. that any error or mistake apparent on the face of the record.

7. Although the petitioners have tried to make out their respective cases that the record had not been correctly considered by my learned predecessor, yet I fail to see any apparent error or mistake in the impugned order. According to the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (1975 Edition) `apparent' is defined as `that may be seen: obvious: conspicuous: seeming: obtained by observation without correction, distinguished from true or from mean. Taking a very simple example 2 + 2=4 is no error but 2 + 2=3 or 5 is an apparent error. For purposes of apparent argument need not be stretched; it should be obvious. Appreciation of evidence or record does not amount to any obvious or conspicuous error and it has to be so established. This effort 6 would take it out of the purview of `apparent error or mistake on the face ‑ the record'. Further that the review under section 8 ibid does not amount to an appeal or revision and the Court reviewing the order cannot sit in judgment on its own order or that of its predecessor in so far as the appreciation of evidence is concerned. All the grounds taken before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners stand already adjudicated upon in the impugned order and it is not open to me to give findings on these grounds afresh without first establishing whether there was any apparent mistake or error in the impugned order. No new important matter of evidence has been produced and no sufficient cause has either been shown which would justify my interference in the impugned order. The review petitions are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed. A.A./397/R Review petitions dismissed.