2000 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

The case of the Company, in brief, is that it is a limited company and the relation between the petitioners and the Company is governed by law of employer and employee (Master and Servant), as such, these petitions are not maintainable. Also, it is urged that the petitioners were employed on "voidable contract for temporary service" and on that score also the petitions are not maintainable. It is claimed that to streamline smooth working of the Company the Board has framed Service Rules for the benefit of its employees. The Executive Staff Service Rules are applicable to carrier executive of the company and not to trainees or these appointed on temporary basis. It is alleged that the Prime Minster Secretariat and Minister for Natural Resources ordered the Company to appoint the petitioners and the Company had no option, but there was absolutely no justification whatsoever for such appointments. The company has claimed that it is suffering losses over Rs.2.50 crores, per month, on account of forced payments to petitioners. Also, is alleged that these appointments were made in deviation of rules and procedure of the Company and there was neither any requirement for such a large number of trainees nor proper advertisement was made. It is also alleged that even a large number of above petitioners were appointed without interview. The company has claimed that it is its legal right to dispense with the services of those, who are of no use for it. This Bench by judgment, dated 9 3‑1999 had disposed of 22 petitions C.Ps. Nos.D‑216, 217, 257 of 1999 and others), and the petitioners of those cases were the employees of the Company. It was held in those cases that the petitioners had not claimed any relief on the basis of terms and conditions of service nor they could do so as the Company has no statutory rules and in absence thereof the relation between the parties was that of master and servant. The plea of the petitioners of those cases, that the petitioners after insertion of section 2‑A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, have become civil servants, as such, they being in service of Pakistan their services shall be regulated in terms of Article 240 of the Constitution, was repelled. It was also turned down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with an observation that it was devoid of any force and the employees of various authorities/corporations, etc. mentioned in section 2‑A have been treated in service of Pakistan for "limited purpose" for providing them remedy by way of appeal to them and this by itself does not convert their status as that of civil servants within the definition of section 2‑B of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The judgment of this Court, dated 9‑3‑1999, was challenged before Supreme Court in C.P. No.201‑K of 1999, C.P. No.295‑K of 1999, and C.P. No.459‑K of 1999, through Mr. Muhammad Muzaffar‑ul‑Haq, Advocate, and above mentioned petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court. The petitioners of those cases were, however, permitted to take‑up the matter before the Service Tribunal. In Civil Petitions Nos.391‑K to 456‑K and 483‑K to 484‑K of 1998 on appeal from judgment, dated 18‑5‑1998 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, in which the Company was the respondent, having taken into consideration the cases reported as: (i) Lt.‑Col Shujauddin Ahmed v. Oil and Gas Development Corporation (1971 SCMR 566); (ii) Chairman of East Pakistan Development Corporation v. Rustom Ali (PLD 1966 SC 848); (iii) Lahore Central Cooperative Bank Limited v. Pir Saifullah Shah (PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 210); (iv) Zainul Abedin v. Multan Central Cooperative Bank Limited (PLD 1966 SC 455); (v) Shahid Khalil v. PIAC, Karachi (1971 SCMR 568); (vi) A George v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1971 Lahore 748); (vii) RTH Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation , (PLD 1974 SC 146)x; (viii)Muhammad Yousuf Shah v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1981 SC 224); (ix) Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 1984 SC 194); (x) Anwar Hussain v. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 1112); (xi) Raziuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 2 others (PLD 1992 SC 531); (xii) Chairman, WAPDA and 2 others v. Syed Tamil Ahmed (1993 SCMR 346); and (xiii) Muhammad Umar Malik v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. I through its President, Karachi and 2 others (1995 SCMR 453); The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:‑‑ "We may observe that this Court has consistently held that the relationship of corporation/employer and its employee is that of master and servant in the absence of any statutory provision or rules:" Also, the following was observed in the last para. of said judgment:‑‑ "We are inclined to hold that in the absence of violation of any provision of law or statutory rule, no exception can be taken to the view found favour with the Tribunal as the petitioners will be entitled to receive one month's salary in lieu of notice plus other dues, if any, payable under the terms of the appointment or internal rules of the company." Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada, learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that impugned actions of the respondents are violative of Articles 2‑A, 3, 4, 37 and 38 of the Constitution. Also, he argued that it is the inalienable right of every citizen of Pakistan to enjoy protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law. According to him, this has not been done to the petitioners and, ex facie, they have been discriminated. Learned counsel also argued that the petitioners have been denied economic and social justice, which is against the provisions of the Constitution. Also, it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that entire action of the respondents right from the very beginning has been violative of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Human Rights Case, reported as Abdul Jabbar and others, 1996 SCMR 1349. He also contends that impugned action of the respondents is also violative of the principles of legitimate expectation as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Al‑Jehad case (PLD 1996 SC 324). Mr. Syed Sami Ahmed, Advocate, argued that though the Company has no statutory rules, yet the functions entrusted to it are indeed functions of State, involving some exercise of soverign or public powers and the fact that the control of the Company is substantially in the hands of Government and also the fact that the bulk of the fund is provided and used by the State, therefore, it shall be deemed that it functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation. In support of the above contention, he relied upon Salahuddin and 2 others v. Federal Sugar Mill and Distillery Limited, PLD 1975 SC

244. Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Mangi, Advocate, has argued that the petitioner (C.P.No.98 of 1998) has been discriminated and that 61 officers, who were appointed after his appointment have been accommodated while steps are being taken for his removal. Mr. Rasool Bux Unar, Advocate, submits that due to political rivalry with previous Governments the petitioners are being threatened for termination of their services. He also argued that if quota of Sindh and Balochistan in the Federation is kept in view, all the petitioners are entitled to be retained in service and to be absorbed on regular basis. It is not denied that the petitioners were appointed on temporary basis and the initial period was six months only. It is also not denied that the petitioners were appointed for a temporary assignment. In fact, they were appointed for new projects, which the Company had started. According to the learned counsel for the Company, those projects either have been completed or abandoned. At the time of appointment of the petitioners, in the terms of the appointment letter itself, it was made clear to them that the assignment offered to them was without commitment to provide any employment at any stage. This was the main term of their assignment, which they had accepted and, in fact, never protested against it. The Company's status as that of "Public Limited Company" is not disputed. It is also not disputed that it is managed by the Board of Directors elected under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and its Articles of Association. Though the Company, like other companies, has framed Service Rules for the benefit of its employees, but they are not statutory rules and in absence of such rules the relation between the company and its employees is that of Master and Servant. It being so' it cannot be treated like statutory corporations. Where there is a relationship of Master and Servant the former commands the latter and possesses the absolute power of hire and fire. The principle, as it is, imports unfettered power in the employer. Articles 2A, 3, 4, 37 and 38 of the Constitution are not attracted to the circumstances of this case. Neither there is violation of any fundamental right nor the petitioners can insist for their employment. To keep or not to keep them in service is a sole discretion of the Company and it is not controlled by any provisions of any law or the Constitution. The petitioners want substantial change in terms and conditions of their service. Impliedly they have urged to be treated like civil servants or the employees of a statutory corporation. None of the aforesaid Articles of d the Constitution can be invoked for said purpose. They would be governed by the, terms and conditions of service which they had accepted. They cannot unilaterally innovate them. There is no violation of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Abdul Jabbar Memon for the simple reason that it refers to the Federal Government, Provincial Government, statutory bodies and public authorities. The "Company" does not fall under the scope of any of the aforesaid Authorities. It is true that every citizen has a right to enter upon any lawful profession, but it is always subject to the conditions attached with it. Article 18 of the Constitution, under the circumstances, is not attracted. The principle of legitimate exception enunciated by the Supreme Court in Al‑Jehad case is also not applicable. The said principle was laid down keeping in view the various provisions of the Constitution. Suffice it to say that there is no violation of any constitutional provisions. Ratio of the case Salahuddin and others, referred to above, is, in fact, against the petitioners. It has clearly been held in this case that public limited company not created by any statute and Governmental control limited only by certain regulations, such company is not a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of Federation, which is a condition precedent for invoking Article 199 of the Constitution, though the offices held by the Director and Chief Executive of such company may be regarded as public offices. Accordingly, we hold that these petitions are not maintainable and are dismissed in limine. Q.M.H./M.A.K./I‑1/K Petitions dismissed.