PLC 1993

1993 PLP 543 (PLC)

MANAGING COMMITTEE, THE PUNJAB CLUB, LAHORE Versus THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, LAHORE REGION, LAHORE

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore High Court
Decided Date
W.P. No. 4855 of 1992, decided on 17th February, 1993.
Honorable Judges
Malik Muhammad Qayyum, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1993 PLP 543 (PLC)
Forum / Court Lahore High Court
Bench Members Malik Muhammad Qayyum, J
Parties MANAGING COMMITTEE, THE PUNJAB CLUB, LAHORE Versus THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, LAHORE REGION, LAHORE
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1993 PLP 543 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1993 PLP 543 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court bench comprising: Malik Muhammad Qayyum, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1993 PLP 543 (PLC) (MANAGING COMMITTEE, THE PUNJAB CLUB, LAHORE Versus THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, LAHORE REGION, LAHORE). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑‑

Representation

  • Khalid Mahmood Pasha for Petitioner.
  • Rana Muhammad Arshad, Addl. A.‑G., Punjab for Respondent No. 1.
  • Nemo for Respondent No. 2.
  • Date of hearing: 22nd December, 1993.
  • 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Unfortunately, although at one stage the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 had appeared but thereafter he absented himself and no argument was addressed on behalf of the said respondent by any one. In view of the importance of the question involved, 1 had called upon Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik, Advocate‑General, Punjab, Mr. Asadullah Siddiqui, Mr. Aftab Ahmad Khan and Mr. M. Asghar Malik, to assist this Court in resolving this controversy. I am grateful for the valuable assistance rendered by them.
  • 10. All the learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae also took the same view, except Mr. M. Asghar Malik, Advocate.
  • 11. Mr. M. Asghar Malik, Advocate, has referred to the definitions of `Industry' as appearing in various enactments in Pakistan and abroad. The learned counsel emphasized that if material services are provided by an organisation even to its members, it would be an `industry'. He maintained that the word `service' in the context of an industry has wide connotation and has received judicial interpretation. The learned counsel placed heavy reliance on certain decisions from Indian jurisdiction.
  • 12. Mr. Aftab Ahmad Khan, Advocate, has correctly pointed out that the Indian cases are not of much relevance as the definition of `industry' under the Indian laws is different from that appearing in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In this context it may be pointed out that the definition of `industry' as originally enacted in section 2 (xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was differently worded and specifically included undertaking'. However, by Ordinance XIX of 1970, the definition of `industry' was substituted and apart from other change word `undertaking' was specifically deleted. The judgments of the Indian Supreme Court in The Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v. The Management of the Gymkhana Club AIR 1968 SC 554 and Cricket Club of India v. Bombay Labour Union and another AIR 1969 SC 276, proceeded to hold clubs as `industry' as being an `undertaking'. This reasoning is, however, not applicable in our country after the deletion of word `undertaking' by Amending Ordinance No. XIX of 1970 from the- definition of 'industry'
  • of those which are enjoyed by a person in his own house. No services are rendered by a club to the public in general or to the community at large or even a section thereof. It is, therefore, difficult to agree with Mr. M. Asghar Malik, Advocate, that merely because material services are being provided by a club it should be considered as an `industry'.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑‑Ss. 7(2); 22‑A(8) & 22‑B(c)‑‑‑Employees of a club‑‑‑Forming of trade unions‑‑‑Legality‑‑‑Entitlement to treat Club as an "industry" within meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so as to justify formation and registration of trade union formed by the employees of Club‑‑‑Club is generally understood not as a Commercial or Industrial Organisation but is in the nature of a second home to its members‑‑‑Income which the Club in question generated was from the contribution of its members and not an outcome of any business activity‑‑‑Services rendered by the Club were confined to its members and were in the nature of those which were enjoyed by a person in his house‑‑‑No services were rendered by the Club to the public in general or to the community at large or even a section thereof‑‑‑Facilities provided by the Club were restricted to its member membership of Club was regulated by the provisions contained in the Articles of Association, which would show that the Club was in the nature of a private Club rights of admission to which were reserved‑‑‑Club in question, could not be regarded as an "industry" within meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and as such, trade union formed by its employees did not qualify for registration in view of S.7(2), Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. K.G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others PLD 1976 Lah. 1097; Lahore Development Authority and others v. Abdul Shafiq and others 1992 PLC 1214; Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Gujranwala through its Chairman Registrar of Trade unions, Gujranwala and another 1993 PLC 475; The Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union v. The Management of the (3ymk'iana Club AIR 1968 SC 554 and Cricket Club of India v. Bombay Labour Union ant another AIR 1969 SC 276 ref. Rawalpindi Club, Rawalpindi v. Registrar of Trade Unions and 2 others 1989 PLC 760; Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edn., p. 232; Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edn., p. 211; United Gerebral Palsy Asso. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 382 Pa 67, 114 A2d 331, 52 ALR 2d 1093; American Jurisprudence, Vo1.6, p. 432; Halsbury's Laws o 'England, (Fourth Edn., Vol. 6, p. 56, para. 201; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 14, p. 1279; Beneficial Associations, Ss. 1‑86; Master and Servant, Ss. 167‑170; 39 CJ. p. 247, Note 65 p. 259 Note 26; Associations, Ss. 1‑39; Permanent Edition, Vol. 7‑A; Margin v. State 59 Ala. 34; Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary, Eleventh Edn., p. 261; Comportz v. Cold ingham 9 Mad. 31‑9; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edn., p. 488; Bennett v. Cooper 76 CLR 570 and Re: Hardy 48 NSWSR 133 rel. Maqbool Elahi Malik, A.‑G., Punjab, AF3dullah Siddiqui, Aftab Ahmad Khan and M. Asghar Malik: Amicus curiae.

Judgment & Decree

12. Mr. Aftab Ahmad Khan, Advocate, has correctly pointed out that the Indian cases are not of much relevance as the definition of `industry' under the Indian laws is different from that appearing in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In this context it may be pointed out that the definition of `industry' as originally enacted in section 2 (xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was differently worded and specifically included undertaking'. However, by Ordinance XIX of 1970, the definition of `industry' was substituted and apart from other change word `undertaking' was specifically deleted. The judgments of the Indian Supreme Court in The Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v. The Management of the Gymkhana Club AIR 1968 SC 554 and Cricket Club of India v. Bombay Labour Union and another AIR 1969 SC 276, proceeded to hold clubs as `industry' as being an `undertaking'. This reasoning is, however, not applicable in our country after the deletion of word `undertaking' by Amending Ordinance No. XIX of 1970 from the- definition of 'industry'

13. The question as to whether club is an industry was considered by this Court in Rawalpindi Club, Rawalpindi v. Registrar of Trade Unions and 2 others 1989 PLC 760, which was a case relating to Rawalpindi Gymkhana in which it was held to be not an industry as the facilities provided by it were limited to the members of the Club. I am not persuaded to take a different view.

14. In order to resolve the controversy involved in this petition, it is necessary to understand as to what exactly is a club. In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition at page 232, a club is defined as:-- "A voluntary, incorporated or incorporated association of persons for common purposes of a social, literary, investment, political nature, or the like. Association of persons for promotion of some common object, such as literature, science, politics, good fellowship, etc., especially one jointly supported and meeting periodically, and membership is usually conferred by ballot and carries privilege of exclusive use of club quarters, and word also applies to a building, apartment or room occupied by a club." Similarly, in Ballentine's Law Dictionary Third Edition at page 211, following definition of club appears:-- "An association or organisation of persons who meet together for the purpose of social intercourse or some common object such as the pursuit of literature, science, politics, art, and athletic pursuits or sports, such as swimming, tennis, and golf. United Cerebral Palsy Asso. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 382 Pa 67, 114 A2d 331, 52 ALR 2d 1093:"

15. Vol. 6 American Jurisprudence at page 432, defines club as:-- "The word `club' has no precise meaning. It derives from the Anglo-Saxon "cleofan", meaning uniting to divide, and usually indicates a division of reckoning. As commonly understood, a "club" is merely an organisation or association of persons who meet or live together for the purpose of social intercourse or some other common object such as the pursuit of literature, science, politics, or good fellowship. Clubs are formed for all sorts of purposes, and there is no uniformity in their constitutions and rules. It is well-known that clubs exist which limit the number of their members and select them with great care, own considerable property, furnish food and drink to the members for money, and afford sleeping quarters and recreational activities as ordinary adjuncts. Clubs may be either incorporated or unincorporated, and in this article both kinds are discussed. Social clubs are sometimes organised as corporations, but even when they are created under the statute, their functions, which are intended to be purely social, remain unchanged. They are generally regarded, in morals and in law, as free from condemnation, and even censure, when organised in good faith and conducted in accordance with what was intended by the law making power of the State in authorizing their incorporation. But where the charter of such an organisation is fraudulently obtained for the purpose of evading some law of the State, it will be revoked."

16. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition), Vol. 6, para. 201 at page 56, it is stated that:‑‑ "A club, except a proprietary club or an investment club, may be defined as a society of persons associated together, not for the purposes of trade, but for social reasons, the promotion of politics, sports, art, science or literature, or for any other lawful purpose; but trading activities will not destroy the nature of a club if they are merely incidental to the club's purposes. The association must be private and have some element of permanence. The purposes for which a club exists may be altered or modified, and there is no rule of law which requires a club to fulfil each and every separate purpose for which it was originally f6rmed. Once the mutual assent of the members has been secured; the doctrine of ultra vires has no place with respect to the activities of such an association."

17. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 14 at page 1279, club is defined as under:‑‑ "A club is a voluntary association of persons for purposes of a social, literary, or political nature, or the like. While the word `club' has no very definite meaning, it may be . defined generally as a voluntary association of persons for purposes of a social, literary, or political nature, or the like. A club is a definite association organised for an indefinite existence; not an ephemeral meeting for a particular occasion, to be lost in a crowd at its dissolution. There are various kinds of clubs. An unincorporated members' club is a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. An unincorporated proprietary club is one whose property and funds belong to proprietor who usually conducts it with a view to profit; the members, in consideration of the payment by them to the proprietor of entrance fees and subscriptions, are entitled to make such use of the premises and property, and to exercise such other rights and privileges, as the contract between them and the proprietor justifies. Beneficial associations generally are considered in the title Beneficial Associations, Ss. 1‑

86. Employee's relief and benefit associations are discussed in the C.J.S. title Master and Servant, Ss. 167‑170, also 39 C.J. p. 247 Note 65, p. 259 Note

26. Unincorporated associations generally are considered in the title Associations, Ss. 1‑

39. According to Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 7‑A club inter alia means:‑‑ "a club is an association of individuals for pleasure or profit. Margin v. State 59 Ala. 34."

18. In the Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary (Eleventh Edition) at page 261, club is defined as:‑‑ "Club, Clubhouse, Association to which individuals subscribe for purpose of mutual entertainment and convenience. It is not a Company, a partnership or even a collection of co‑owners. The affairs of a club are generally conducted by a steward or secretary, who acts under the immediate superintendence of a committee. The members of a club, merely as such, arc not liable for debts incurred by the Committee for work done or goods supplied to the club. The Courts will not ordinarily interfere with the decision of the club expelling a member, if such a decision had been arrived at bona fide and in accordance with the ‑rules of the club. (Comportz v. Cold‑ingham‑9 Mad. 31‑9):"

19. In the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition at page 488, following definition of club appears:‑‑ "In Australia the following definition has been given: A club is "a voluntary association of a number of persons meeting together for purposes mainly social, each contributing a certain sum either to a common fund for the benefit of the members or to a particular individual for his own benefit". (Per Latham, C.J. in Bennett v. Cooper 76 C.L.R. 570). A club is not a justice entity: See Re Hardy 48 N.S.W.S.R. 133." On an analysis of the above definitions, it will appear that a `club' is generally understood not as commercial or industrial organisation but is in the nature of a second home to its members. It is especially so in the case of a private club. The income which the club generates is from contributions of its members and is not an outcome of any business activity. The services being rendered by the club are confined to its members and are more in the nature of those which are enjoyed by a person in his own house. No services are rendered by a club to the public in general or to the community at large or even a section thereof. It is, therefore, difficult to agree with Mr. M. Asghar Malik, Advocate, that merely because material services are being provided by a club it should be considered as an `industry'.

20. It stands admitted in the written statement and is evident from the documents filed by the parties that Punjab Club is an association limited by guarantee and was originally registered under section 36 of Act, 1887. According to Memorandum and Articles of Association, the facilities provided by the club are restricted to its members. The membership is regulated by the provisions contained in the Articles of Association, which would show that the club is in the nature of a private club and the rights of admission to which are reserved.

21. It emerges from the foregoing discussion that Punjab Club cannot be regarded. to be an `industry' within the meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and as such trade union formed by its employees did not qualify for registration, in view of section 7(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. For the reasons aforesaid, this petition is allowed and the registration of respondent No. 2 as a trade union is declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect. There shall be no orders as to costs. A.A./M‑948/L Petition accepted.