P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

3. As regards the first contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the definition of the word "possession" as given in subsection (6) of section 2 of the Act, which reads as follows: "(6) "possession", except for the purposes of section 30, does not include possession obtained on or after the seventeenth day of February 1958, but includes possession so obtained in pur suance or as a result of an order passed before that date by the Rehabilitation Commissioner or by the Custodian Provided that a claimant dispossessed of any property on or after the first day of July 1957, shall be deemed‑to be in posses sion thereof." In the light of this definition the learned counsel has argued that as the petitioner has been in possession of the premises since before the 1st of July 1957, so he is not liable to be ejected and has the statutory right to retain possession of the property. In my opinion this contention is devoid of any force. By the mere definition of the word "possession" no legal right has been created in favour of the petitioner. By itself it does not give any protection against ejectment or dispossession. At best it means that a claimant who has been dispossessed of any property on or after the 1st day of July 1957 shall be deemed to be in possession thereof for the pur poses of the Act other than section

30. It is, therefore, necessary to look into the provisions of the Act to find out if any benefit can be derived by the petitioner. The word "possession" has been used only in two sections of the Act, viz., sections 29 and

30. It is clear that section 30 is excluded from the operation of the defini tion of "possession", and I am of the considered view that the word "possession" used in section 29 in the relevant context has only its' ordinary dictionary meaning and not the meaning which has been given to it by its definition in the Act. If this meaning were to be given to the word "possession" used in section 29, it will make no sense. The question, however, arises that in what context the definition of the word "possession" will be applicable to the pro visions of the Act. The answer to this question is not far to seek. Section 10 of the Act empowers the Settlement Commissioner to transfer or dispose of any property out of the compensation pool on evaluation basis or by sale by means of auction or otherwise in accordance with the First Schedule and in such other manner as may be prescribed. Similarly section 16 (1) of the Act authorises the preparation of one or more schemes for the transfer of immovable property on evaluation basis or otherwise to claimants, non claimants or locals in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule or for the making of deferred payments in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule by persons to whom property is transferred under this Act. The First Schedule of the Act provides for the manner of disposal of urban evacuee property to the claimants and others. In most of the clauses of this Schedule, the word "possession" has been used, and it is in this context that the word "possession" acquires its meaning as given to it by its definition in section 2 (6) of the Act. In the light of all that has been said above, it is evident that the case of the petitioner has not in any way improved by the definition of the word "possession" in the Act and he has not acquired any legal right to retain possession of the property on that account.

4. Another argument which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his first ground of attack is, that section 29 of the Act has given the petitioner complete protection from ejectment from the premises, even though he is in unauthorised possession of the same. This contention requires detailed consideration of the provisions of section 29 of the Act which runs as follows :‑ "

29. Ejectments.‑(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no order of eject ment passed on or after the seventeenth day of February, 1958 by any authority in respect of any house or shop shall be given effect to, and where, in pursuance of any such order, any person has been dispossessed of any such house or shop, he shall be deemed to be in possession thereof. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply to an order of eject ment passed under this Act, or to any person dispossessed in pursuance of any such order, or to any person (other than a claimant) dispossessed in pursuance or as a result of an order passed before the aforesaid date by the Rehabilitation Commis sioner or by the Custodian." It will be seen that under the first part of subsection (1) all orders of ejectment passed on or after the 1 i th of February 1958 by any authority in respect of any house or shop were rendered ineffective. The Act had come into force on the 28th of March 1958. So if by that date the order of ejectment passed on or after the 17th of February 1958 had not taken its effect, then after the 28th of March it could not have been given effect to. But if during the interval such an order had been carried out, then under the second part of this subsection the person who had been dispossessed of any such house or shop in pursuance of the aforesaid order, was to be deemed to be in possession thereof. This subsection was to be operative irrespective of the fact that the person concerned was a displaced person, or was a claimant or a local. The complete bar to the ejectment of any ' person from any house or shop was, therefore, in respect of orders which had been passed by any authority on or after the 17th of February 1958 and which had not taken their effect before the 28th of March 1958 or in; other words, if the person concerned had not been dispossessed in pursuance of such an order by the 28th of March. But if the person concerned had been dispossessed before the 28th of March 1958, in pursuance of such an order, then the question arises whether the legislature intended to restore possession to him of the house or shop as the case may be. The language of the section which is quite plain and un ambiguous does not warrant the inference that in such an eventua lity the legislature intended to restore possession to the dispossessed person. If this had been the intention of the legislature, nothing would have been easier than to have said so expressly. The very fact that such a dispossessed person was merely to be deemed to be in possession thereof strengthens my view that the legislature did not contemplate the restoration of possession at all. It might look somewhat harsh that if a person was not dispossessed before the 28th of March, then he could not be dispossessed at all thereafter, but if he had been dispossessed before that date, then he was merely to be deemed to be in possession thereof. The language of the subsection, however, is not only plain, but, in my opinion, it does not admit of any other meaning. It seems as unambiguous as language can be. Hence the question of its interpretation does not arise at all. "Absoluta sententia expositors non‑indiget." Whatever the consequences, the duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands. The Court sits to administer the law, not to manufacture it. That is the business of the legislature. After giving a careful consideration to this aspect of the question, I have arrived at the conclusion that such dispossessed person is not entitled to be put into possession or tire property from which he has been dispossessed. In my opinion the only benefit which accrues to such a dispossessed person is, that he shall be deemed to be in possession of the property when his case comes up for consideration for the purposes of transferring, the property from the compensation pool under the provisions of the First Schedule of the Act.

5. In subsection (2) of section 29, three exceptions to the general rule, which is embodied in the first subsection, are enumerated. They are as follows :‑ (1) The first exception is that if the order of ejectment is passed under the Act, then in spite of the fact that it will have been passed after the 17th of February 1958, yet it will be excluded from the operation of subsection (I), and shall have its effect. (2) The second exception is that if any person is dispossessed in pursuance of an order passed under the Act, it shall have its effect and despite the provisions of subsection (1), he shall not be deemed to be in possession of the premises from which he is dispossessed. (3) The third exception is that the provisions of subsection (1) will not apply to any person who is dispossessed in pursuance or as a result of an order passed before the aforesaid date by the Rehabilitation Commissioner or by the Custodian, meaning thereby that if a person is dispossessed after the 17th of Febru ary 1958 in pursuance or as a result of an order passed before the 17th of February by the Rehabilitation Commissioner or by the Custodian, then such a person shall not be deemed to be in possession of the premises from which he is dispossessed. The period during which such a person is dispossessed under such orders does not appear to be restricted to the period between the 17th of February and the 28th of March 1958, because no such limitation is indicated in this subsection. But this third excep tion is not applicable if the person concerned is a "claimant", that is to say, if a "claimant" is a dispossessed after the 17th of February 1958 in pursuance of an order passed before the 17th of February 1958 by any authority including the Rehabilitation Commissioner and the Custodian, then subsection (1) will operate to his benefit in so far that he shall be deemed to be in possession of the premises from which he is dispossessed. I have already held that a person dispossessed under the provisions of subsection (1) is not entitled to restoration of possession of the property from which he is dispossessed. It, therefore, follows that in case the benefit of subsection (1) accrues to a person whose case is excluded from the operation of exception three of subsection (2), he will not be in a better position than the person to whom subsection (1) itself applies. I must, however, say that in interpreting the third exception I felt some hesitation in arriving at the conclusions stated above, because the provisions of subsection (1) were otherwise inappli cable to orders of ejectment passed before the 17th of February 1958 or to persons dispossessed in pursuance of such orders either before or after the aforesaid date. But I believe that the legis lature in its wisdom assumed that subsection (1) will apply to the persons specified in the exception, and intended to bring them at par subject to the conditions stated therein, with those who were dispossessed in pursuance of orders passed on or after the 17th of February 1958. Thus the effect of section 29 seems to be that all orders of ejectment passed on or after the 17th of February 1958 by any authority including the Rehabilitation Commissioner and. the Custodian were rendered ineffective as soon as the Act came into operation, but if during the interval a person was dispossessed in pursuance of such an order, he was to be deemed to be in possession of the property from which he had been dispossessed. But if the order of ejectment had been passed by the Rehabili tation Commissioner or by the Custodian before the 17th of February 1958 then if the person concerned was not a claimant and was dispossessed after the 17th of February 1958, then he was not to be deemed to be in possession of the premises from which he was dispossessed. And if in respect of such a person the order of ejectment had been passed by any authority other than a Rehabilitation Commissioner or Custodian or in the case of a claimant by any authority before the 17th of February 1958 and such a person or claimant was dispossessed after the 17th of February 1958, then such a person or claimant was to be deemed to be in possession of such premises for the purposes of deciding the question of transferring the property from the compensation pool under the provisions of the First Schedule of the Act. In my opinion, section 29 applies irrespective of the fact whether the person concerned is a displaced person, claimant or a local or whether the possession of such a person is authorised or not. The intention of the legislature appears to give protection to all persons with a view to stabilise the conditions regarding rehabilitation. The object of the Act is to provide the payment of compensation to certain displaced persons and the rehabilitation of others. This view finds support from the provisions of the First Schedule of the Act, according to which even unauthorised possession has been recognised in certain cases. For example, sub‑clause 3 of clause 12 of the Schedule provides that an evacuee building site which has been in unauthorised possession of any person, and that person has constructed a permanent building on it, then that site shall be transferred to that person on payment of the prevailing market value plus twenty five per cent of such market value.

6. On this analysis of the provisions of section 29, I am of the opinion that its provisions are of no avail to the petitioner. The only protection afforded against ejectment is provided in the] Act by subsection (1) of section 29, which comes into operation only if the order of ejectment is passed by any authority on or after the 17th of February 1958, and the case is not covered by any of the exceptions embodied in subsection (2). Otherwise, there is nothing in the Act which renders ineffective the operation of ejectment orders passed before the 17th of February 1958.

7. In the present case the order of ejectment had been passed on the 22nd of October 1957. The petitioner had not appealed against this order but on the failure of the appeal of Muhammad Ibrahim Ali Khan he had gone up in revision, which was however dismissed on the 30th of May 1958. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order of ejectment passed on the 22nd of October 1957 had merged into the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner and therefore the order of ejectment should be deemed to have been passed on the 30th of May 1958, that is long after the Act had corm into operation, and consequently in view of the provisions of section 29, this order has been rendered ineffective. I am not impressed by this argument. With the re section of the revision petition by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, the order of ejectment passed on the 22nd of October 195 by the Additional District Rehabilitation Officer remained intact and operative and it will be in pursuance of that order that the petitioner will be ejected. It has neither merged into nor has been substituted by the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner. The petitioner is, therefore, liable to ejectment.

8. Now there remains to be considered the second ground of attack on the basis of the suitability of the petitioner to hold the property. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that he being a refugee with a big family cannot be held to be an unsuitable person to hold the property within the meaning of subsection (2) (b) of section 7 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act XVII of 1956. This contention is also without any substance in it. Admittedly the premises have not been allotted to the petitioner. He is undoubtedly in unauthorised possession of the 7 same. The provision of suitability or unsuitability referred to t above relates only to a person to whom land, building, business j or undertaking has been allotted and consequently this provision has no application to the case of the petitioner who is a rank trespasser.

9. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition and dismiss it with costs. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.