PLC 1999

1999 PLP 171 (PLC)

Messrs AMIN FABRICS LIMITED, KOTRI through Production Manager Versus MAZDOOR DOST LABOUR UNION, AMIN FABRICS LIMITED, KOTRI and another

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Decided Date
Revision Application No. HYD-272 of 1997, decided on 20th January, 1998.
Honorable Judges
Ahmed Yar Khan, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1999 PLP 171 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Bench Members Ahmed Yar Khan, Appellate Tribunal
Parties Messrs AMIN FABRICS LIMITED, KOTRI through Production Manager Versus MAZDOOR DOST LABOUR UNION, AMIN FABRICS LIMITED, KOTRI and another
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1999 PLP 171 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1999 PLP 171 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Ahmed Yar Khan, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1999 PLP 171 (PLC) (Messrs AMIN FABRICS LIMITED, KOTRI through Production Manager Versus MAZDOOR DOST LABOUR UNION, AMIN FABRICS LIMITED, KOTRI and another). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

Representation

  • Rana Mehmood Ali Khan, Representative for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 20th January, 1998

Headnotes / Summary

Ss. 35 & 38(3)(a)

West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.O. 11-A-- Admission of petition

Petition filed by employer under S.11-A of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was dismissed by Labour Court on ground that Presiding Officer of Labour Court who was holding additional charge of another Labour Court at relevant time, was not competent to pass order of admission of petition as no notification in that respect was issued under S.35 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969

Petition under S.O. 11-A of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was Presented before concerned officer who recorded his note thereon but as there was no Judge and additional charge of the Court was with Presiding Officer of another Labour Court, concerned officer presented that petition before Presiding Officer of the Court when was also holding additional charge of another Labour Court

Presiding Officer admitted petition for regular hearing by recording orders viz. "Admit and register. Issue notice to respondent"

Order passed by Labour Court was to be considered an administrative order which did not require any judicial consideration

Admission order passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court whereby main petition was admitted, being an administrative order, was not hit, by plea that it was without jurisdiction

Judgment of Labour Court according to which petition of employer was dismissed, was set aside and matter was remanded to Labour Court for proceeding further on merits. Muhammad Humayun for Applicant.

Judgment & Decree

Implies physical contact, something added to another. Structure physically attached to or connected with building itself, Mack v. Eyssell, 332 No. 671, 59 S.W. 2d 1049, Extention; increase; augmentation, Meyering v. Miller, 330 Mo. 885, 51 S.W. 2d 65,

66. That which has become united with or a part of; This term embraces the idea of joining or uniting one thing to another, so as thereby to form one aggregate. Ex parte Boddie, 200 S.C. 379, 21 S.E. 2d 4.8; Charge: v. To impose a burden, duty, obligation, or lien; to create a claim against property; to assess; to demand; to accuse; to instruct a jury on matters of law. To impose a tax, duty, or trust. In commercial transactions to bill or invoice; to purchase on credit. In criminal law, to indict formally accuse; Judicial Order: One which involves exercise of judicial discretion and affects final result of litigation. Happy Coal Co. v. Brashear, 263 Ky.257, 92 S.W. 2d 23,

27. See also Decision; Decree; Judgment; Order; Judicial Power: The authority exercised by that department of Government which is charged with declaration of what law is and its construction. The authority vested in Courts and judges, as distinguished from the executive and legislative power. Courts have general powers to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between two persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision; and also such specific powers as contempt powers, power to control admission and disbarment of attorneys, power to adopt rules of Court etc. A power involving exercise of judgment and discretion in determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting interests of person or property, as distinguished from ministerial power involving no discretion. Inherent authority not only to decide, but to make binding orders or judgments. Powel v. Femel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d, 592,

594. Power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before Court for decision. Power that adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of persons or property, and to that end declares, construes and applies the law; Jurisdiction: The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky., v. Crombie, 258 Ky, 383, 80 S.W. 2d 39,

40. It is the authority by which Courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of City of Marietta v. Brooks, 179 Okl, 600, 67 P.2d 4.6; State v. True, Me 330 A.2d

787. The legal right by which judges exercise their authority, Max Ams. Inc. v. Barker, 293 Ky. 698, 170 S.W. 2d 45,

48. It exists when Court has cognizance of class of cases involved, proper parties are present, and point to be decided is within powers of Court. United Cometeries Co. v. Strother, 342 Mo. 1155, 119 S.W. 2d 762, 765; Harder v. Johnson, 147 Kan, 440, 76 P.2d 763,

764. Power and authority of a Court to hear and determine a judicial proceeding. In re De Cambllis' Estate, 65 Misc. 2d 882, 322 N.Y.S. 2d 551,

556. The right and power of a Court to adjudicate concerning the subject‑matter in a given case. Biddinger v. Fletcher, 224 Ga. 501, 162 S.E. 2d 414,

416. Areas of authority; the geographic area in which a Court has power or types of cases it has power to hear. Jurisdictional limits The Constitutional or statutory parameters within which judicial power may be exercised such as limits based on the monetary value of the action. See jurisdictional amount;

4. I intend to examine the facts of the present litigation in perspective of the abovementioned definitions as given in the Black's Law Dictionary. The facts indicate that the relevant Application under Standing Order 11‑A of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 bearing No.7 of 1996 was presented before the concerned officer on 10‑12‑1996, who recorded his note thereon. There was no Judge and the Additional Charge was with the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. II at Karachi, hence the concerned Officer brought that Application to Karachi on 14‑12‑1996 and presented it before the learned Presiding Officer, Court No. II. at Karachi who was also holding the Additional Charge of Court No. VI at Hyderabad. The learned Presiding Officer, Court No. II admitted the aforesaid Application for regular hearing by recording the following words:‑‑

. "Admit and register. Issue notice to respondent."

5. In my view the Admission Orders are generally of two kinds. The one which are recorded by Lower Courts at the time of presentation of civil suits, applications etc; while the other kind is that which are passed by the Superior Courts at the time of Katcha Peshi. I am of the humble view that the Admission Orders passed by the Lower Courts are of Administrative nature and do not require judicial consideration while the Admission Orders at the stage of Katcha Peshi require judicial consideration by the Superior Courts. So far as the present order is concerned it appears to be an Administrative Order which did not require any judicial consideration. The matter was presented before the Labour Court No. VI as well. Since the Application was within time and had no other legal defect, hence the learned Presiding Officer Labour Court No. II passed the abovementioned Administrative Order. As such I am of the opinion that the Admission Order passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.11 whereby the main petition was admitted, was an administrative order and is not hit by the plea that it was without jurisdiction. The result is .that the present suo motu Revision Application is allowed and the impugned order dated 1‑11‑1997 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court NO.VI, Hyderabad is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Labour Court No.VI, Hyderabad for proceeding further on merits. H.B.T./240/Lb.S Revision application allowed