2007 PLP 372 (PLC)

SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J.

The above and all other revision applications placed in Court today are directed against several orders passed by the Labour Courts under provisions other than sections 46, 33 or 44(4-c) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. When some of these matters came up before me on 7-8-2006. I was a little doubtful whether revision applications against orders which were not appealable were maintainable at the behest of an aggrieved party. It may be appropriate in this context to reproduce section 48(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. "

48. Appeal to the High Court.

(1) The High Court may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the award or decision given under section 46 or 33 a sentence passed under clause (c) of subsection (4) of section 44 and shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Ordinance on the Labour Court, save as otherwise provided. (2)

(3) The High Court may, on its own motion, at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order, and may pass such order, in relation thereto as it thinks fit." One may recall that section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, also conferred the same revisional powers upon the Labour Appellate Tribunals. Indeed, prima facie, upon a plain reading of the statutory provision, it seems that the revisional powers may only be exercised by the Court on its own motion as distinguished from the A application of an aggrieved party. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, however, brought to my attention a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. v. Muhammad Rived Iqbal PLD 1984 Kar. 519, where the position was dealt with by Ajmal Mian, J., in the following terms:-- "(6) We are inclined to agree with Mr. Syed Iqbal Ahmed that a party cannot file a revision under section 38(3-a) of the I.R.O. as a matter of right and therefore, if the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal would have dismissed the respondent No.1's above application under the above provision as misconceived, he would have no cause of action for agitating the above question through a constitutional petition. However, the question in issue is, whether the Tribunal having jurisdiction to exercise suo motu revisional power has exercised the said powers though upon an application filed by a party can be said to have acted without jurisdiction. We are also inclined to hold that the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal cannot' entertain a revision application under section 38(3-a) of the I.R.O. as a matter of course but at the same time we are of the view that if the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal on receipt of information even from a party through an application comes to the conclusion that a case for exercise of suo motu revisional power has been made out and that it would foster the cause of justice instead of resulting in miscarriage of justice, it can exercise the suo motu power

" An appeal against the judgment of this Court was preferred and the same arguments were dealt with in 1986 SCMR 1071 by Zafar Hussain Mirza, J. in the following words:-- "(8) So far as the first argument is concerned, no principle of law or any precedent was quoted to show that the suo motu statutory power cannot be invoked by the authority vested with it on the application of a party to proceedings before the subordinate forum or authorities. On a perusal of the provisions of subsections (3-a) of section 38, we find no warrant to hold that there would be any bar on the Tribunal to exercise this jurisdiction, if the requisite information comes before it from any source including an application made by any party." From the above precedents cited by learned counsel. I am quite clear in my mind that basically the revisional power of the Court is only exercisable suo motu or on the Court's own motion and no party can claim a right to file a revision application or demand its entertainment. Nevertheless, any party can lay appropriate information before the Court and only if the Court is satisfied that miscarriage of justice has taken place or proceeding in revision would foster the cause of justice it may exercise its suo motu powers upon receipt of such information issue notice to the other parties. Upon issuance of such notice the parties would be entitled to be heard. Most of the learned counsel did not appear to be prepared on the merits of the case and perhaps rightly so as they considered that only question of maintainability would be decided. Hearing is adjourned and office is directed to list these revision applications expeditiously. In future, an application presented may only be treated as information and placed before the learned Judge hearing labour cases who will after application of his mind decide whether revisional powers may or may not be exercised. H.B.T./P-5/K Order accordingly.