P L D 1963 (W (PLP)

MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.‑The facts necessary to be stated for the purposes of this order are that on the 24th of November 1954, Salamat Ali was appointed as Lambardar of Chak No. 705/G. B. Tehsil Toba Tek Singh. Allah Ditta respondent, who was also a candidate for the post, preferred an appeal to the Com missioner, Multan Division, Multan, who, by his order dated the 19th of October 1955, set aside the appointment of the petitioner. By then the West Pakistan Provincial Board of Revenue had been constituted before which the applicant preferred a revision petition, which was accepted by Mr. A. K. Malik, by his order dated the 23rd of October 1956. Allah Ditta respondent filed a further revision petition purporting to be under section 7 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Ordinance (XII of 1956), to the Full Board, while this revision petition was pending, on the 28th of February 1957, the afore-said Ordinance was replaced by the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act (XI of 1957) which was given retrospective effect from the 14th of October 1955. Section 7 of the Act, which is in point, reads as follows :‑ Revision of orders by Board.‑(1) Any order made or a decree passed by a Member either on appeal or in revision shall, subject to any order made or decree passed under the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of section 8, be final. (2) Any person considering himself aggrieved by an order made or a decree passed by a Member, in such class of cases as may be specified in the rules framed under section 9 of this Act, may apply to the Board for revision of such order or decree, and if the Full Board considers that there are sufficient reasons for doing so, it may revise that order or decree and pass such further order as it may think fit after hearing the applicant: Provided that no revision shall lie to the Full Board against an order made or a decree passed by a Member in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. Explanation.‑‑Full Board, shall mean two or three Members of the Board, as may be determined by the rules. "(3) Every application under subsection (2) for revision of an order or decree shall be made within a period of ninety days from the date of that order or decree." Section 9 of the Act conferred on the Board, subject to the prior approval of the Government, the powers to make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. On the 22nd of May 1959, the West Pakistan Board of Revenue (Conduct of Appeals and Revisions) Rules 1959, were published in an Extraordinary Gazette. The relevant rule 5 reads as under :‑ "Revision of orders or decrees by Full Board.‑(1) An application for revision under subsection (2) of section 7 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957, shall lie to the Full Board only in cases where the order made or decree passed by the Court, subordinate to the Board, is reversed or modified by a Member of the Board on appeal. (2) The Full Board shall consist of Members other than the Member who made the order or passed the decree sought to be revised."

2. The revision '' petition preferred by Allah Ditta came up for hearing before the Full Board on the 9th of June 1962, to which a preliminary objection was taken by the applicant that as no rules under subsection (2) of section 7 of the Act were in existence on the 23rd of October 1956, specifying the class of cases in which a further revision from the order of one Member of the Board could be preferred to the Full Board, when Mr. A. K. Malik accepted his revision petition and restored the order of his appointment as Lambardar, the revision by Allah Ditta was not competent. The scope of rule 5 was also claimed to be limited to orders and decrees passed by the Courts as distinct from the Revenue Officers subordinate to the Board. The objection was overruled and on merits the order of the Commissioner dated the 19th of October 1955, appointing Allah Ditta respondent as Lambardar in place of the applicant was upheld.

3. Dissatisfied with the above order, Salamat Ali moved the present writ petition, which was admitted to a hearing on the question of jurisdiction of the Full Board to entertain Allah Ditta's revision petition from the order of Mr. A. K. Malik before the Rules of 1959 were promulgated and to determine the scope of rule

5. In support of his contention, Mian Muhammad Shafi, learned counsel for the applicant, has referred to a number of authorities, including Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd., v. Income‑tax Commissioner Delhi and another (1927 P C 242), Ohene Moore v. Akesseh Tayee (1935 P C 5), Modi Food Products Limited v. Commissioner of Sales‑tax U. P., (A I R 1956 All. 35) and M. L. Bagga v. G. Murhar Rao (A I R 1956 Hyd. 35).

4. The reason which appealed to the learned Members of the Board in overruling the applicant's preliminary objection was that section 7 of the Act conferred a right of further revision from the order of one Member of the Board to the Full Board subject to the conditions laid down in it which could not remain dead or dormant until rules under section 9 were framed.

5. If we have understood the learned Members of the Board correctly, a right to bring a matter before the Full Board from an order of one of its Members was conferred on all aggrieved parties on the passing of Act XI of 1957. The specification of cases in which a further revision was to lie under sub section (2) of section 7 to the Full Board was thus a procedural provision which did not affect the substantive right of revision. The plain language of section 7 of the Act is however, not suscep tible to such an interpretation. Subsection (1) contains a general statement that any order made or a decree passed by a Member of the Board, either in appeal or revision, shall be final. To these two exceptions are provided ; (i) a further revision to the Full Board in the circumstances detailed in subsection (2) and (3), and (ii) the power to review the orders under section

8. No absolute right of preferring a revision from an order of a Member of the Board to the Full Board was conferred by sub -section (1). of section 7 of the Act. If that were so, every order made or decree passed by one Member could be brought before the Full Board and no rule‑making authority could take away that right. Normally, rules are framed to regulate the procedure for filing of appeals, revisions and review petitions etc., but in the present case the class of cases in which alone a further revision was to be preferred to the Full Board was to be specified by the rules. This indeed is a legislative function, which the statute conferred on the Board as delegated legislative power. It may, therefore, be said that rule 5 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue (Conduct of Appeals and Revisions) Rules, 1959, is supplementary to section 7 of the Act. Both of them have to be in existence to confer on an aggrieved party a right to prefer a further revision from the order of a Member of the Board to the Full Board. In the absence of either of them, such a right would not come into operation.

6. There is a point in the contention raised by Mian Muhammad Shafi, learned counsel for the applicant, that under rule 5 a revision petition to the Full Board lies only from an order and decree passed by a Court subordinate to the Board. On the revenue side, there are Revenue Courts and Revenue Officers as distinct entities. Though the same‑ Officers may be performing both the functions, the procedure applicable to actions in one or the other and their nature is wholly different. An order made by the Revenue Officer ordinarily does not adjudicate upon rights in property while a decree or an order by a Revenue Court is conclusive of rights of the parties. It is. therefore, understandable that a right of second revision has been conferred in case of orders and decrees made by the Revenue Courts alone and not in the case of orders made by the Revenue Officers which can be brought under challenge in appropriate, .action in a Civil or a Revenue Court.

7. The Privy Council judgment in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited. v. Income‑tax Commissioner, Delhi and another was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner to support the contention that the West Pakistan board of Revenue (Conduct of Appeals and Revisions) Rules, 1959, were not retrospective in their effect. There was hardly an occasion to rely on this authority as the rules themselves say that they came into force at once i.e., on the day of their publication in the Extraordinary Gazette on the 22nd of May 1959. In fact the title given to them is the "West Pakistan Board of Revenue (Conduct of Appeals and Revisions) Rules, 1959". In Ohene Moore v. Akesseh Tayee their Lordships laid down that all appeals exist merely by statute, and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled, no jurisdiction is given to any Court of justice to entertain them. The authority is in point that unless the rules specified the class of cases in which a further revision would lie, the statuory condition for entertaining such a petition was not fulfilled. The Allahabad and the Hyderabad authorities as in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Income‑tax Commissioner, Delhi and another were besides the point because the rules specifying class of cases in which a revision is to lie to the Full Board do not claim to be retrospective.

8. In the view expressed above, we set aside the order of the Full Board dated the 9th of June 1962, as without jurisdiction and restore the order of Mr. A. K. Malik, dated the .23rd of October 1956 upholding the appointment of the petitioner as Lambardar of Chak No. 705/G. B., Tehsil Toba Tek Singh. There will be no order as to costs. K. B. A. Petition accepted.