P L D 1964 (W (PLP)

The learned counsel contended that the view taken in the other appeal could be justified on the above‑mentioned subsection. But since this provision of law does not find place in the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, the same reasoning should not be applied to a case arising under it. In our view no such distinction can be made. Both section 10 (6) of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act and section 13 (6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restric tion Ordinance, are of a penal nature and merely on the ground that no direction in the Karachi enactment is given about the pay ment of the amount deposited in Court, it cannot be construed in a different manner. In fact in the absence of any specific direction to this effect it would be presumed that the Rent Controller had an implied power for passing an order of this nature. Therefore, the view taken by us in the other appeal fully applies to the facts of this appeal. The first contention of the appellant has no force and must be repelled.

3. It was next urged by the learned counsel for the appel lant that the Additional District Judge, Karachi was not com petent to hear the appeal because under section 15 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act an aggrieved party is only entitled to prefer an appeal to the District Judge, Karachi or such other officer as may be empowered by the Provincial Government to hear such appeal. The learned counsel contended that the Additional Dis trict Judge, Karachi was not empowered by the Provincial Govern ment and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The decision of this point depends on the construction put to section 15 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act which is in the following terms :‑ "15 (1) Any party, aggrieved by an order passed by a Con troller may, within thirty days from the date of‑ such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge, Karachi, or such other judicial officer as may be empowered by the Provin cial Government to hear such appeals. (2) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), shall apply to an appeal from an order under this Act as they apply to an appeal from a decree of a Civil Court. (3) The provisions of section 115 of the aforesaid Code shall apply to a proceeding or appeal decided under this Act as if such appeal or proceeding were a case which has been decided by a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of that section." This provision of law was for the first time introduced in Karachi Rent Restriction Act by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1962 passed under the authority of the President of Pakistan and became effective from 7th June 1962. It, however, appears that since Karachi was integrated with the West Pakistan Province the Provin cial Government repealed the entire Karachi Rent Restriction Act by the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance XXXVIII of 1962, which came into force on 1st July 1963 under Notifica tion dated 28th June 1963. In the present case the Rent Controller Karachi, passed the impugned order on 6th June 1963 for the eviction of the respondent from the premises in dispute. In the Court of District Judge, Karachi the appeal was filed on 14th June 1963. Thus the appeal was filed much before the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 came into force in Karachi.

4. Had this case been covered by section 3 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Amendment Ordinance, 1962 only those appeals would have been saved which were pending before the Central Government or other authorised officers and the appeal filed by the respondent being not pending before such authorities could not have been saved. But fortunately their being no contrary intention appearing in the repealing legislation ; section 4 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act applied to the appeal filed before the District Judge. Under this provision of law any legal proceedings instituted before any competent autho rity is to be continued under the repealed statute unless a different intention appears in the repealing legislation.

5. Thus it is perfectly clear that the appeal filed before the District Judge, Karachi was proper and no exception can be taken to it. In the present case the difficulty arises because the learned District Judge, Karachi assigned the appeal for disposal to one of the Additional District Judges, Karachi namely Mr. Mehdi Ali Siddiqui. Appellant counsel contended that no such power was conferred on the District Judge Karachi, who was only a persona designata. According to the learned counsel under section 15 (1) the only authority to confer power on any other judicial officer was the Provincial Government and not the District Judge, Karachi. In our view, the contention of the learned counsel has no force. The power conferred on the District Judge, Karachi under section 15 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act to hear appeal was not conferred on him by name but in his capacity as t District Judge or in other words on the person holding that impor tant judicial office. It cannot be doubted that in this way one more function was added to the powers ordinarily exercised by him. It is, therefore, one of those cases in which the appellate power of a judicial officer was enlarged. The appellant's counsel referred us to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mst. Aziz Begum v. Sheikh Nur Muhammad (P L D 1962 Lah. 887) ; which is distinguishable. It was a case under West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordi nance, 1959 under which the choice to confer appellate power rests with the Provincial Government and no direct authority had been conferred on the District Judge in West Pakistan to hear appeals. Besides while hearing appeals the District Judges on whom power to hear appeal is conferred are designated as First Appellate Authority and not District Judges. A power to hear appeal conferred in this manner might create some doubt and in such circumstances an Appellate Authority may be considered to be persona designata. In the present case the position is different. Here the power is directly conferred on the District Judge and in section 15 (3) it is further stated that any decision made by him will be considered to be by a Court subordinate to the High Court. It, therefore, appears to us that when the learned District Judge, Karachi assigned the appeal pending before him to the Additional District Judge, Karachi, he was only delegating one of his appellate functions under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act. In our view this is permissible under the West Pakistan Civil Court Ordinance, 1962. In Behari Lai Bulaki Ram v. Kundan Lai (AIR 1922 P C 361) the Judicial Committee while considering a similar ques tion observed as under :‑ "It is not disputed that under the Act the District Court has jurisdiction, the only question is whether that jurisdiction is confined to the District Judge or can be exercised also by an Additional District Judge. This matter appears to be settled by the Punjab Courts Act, 1888, which by section 6 provides as follows :

When the business pending before any Divisional Court con sisting of one Judge or before the Court of any District Judge, requires the aid of an Additional District Judge for its speedy disposal, the Local Government may appoint to the Court an Additional Divisional Judge, or an Additional District Judge as the case may be. An Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a Divisional Judge or District Judge, as the case may be, which the Divisional Judge or District Judge may assign to him and shall, as regards the discharge of those functions and subject to the provisions of the next following subsection, be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be a Divisional Judge or District Judge. There is no doubt that the District Judge had assigned to the Additional District Judge all the functions of supervising this liquidation. He discharged these functions apparently without any objection for a considerable time and made many orders and no point was taken till this appeal was made at an advance stage of the liquidation. He had jurisdiction, and the question which remains to be decided is the property of the order which he made." It is, therefore, quite obvious that if any such provision of law exists it is open to the District Judge to assign his function to an Additional District Judge. It is in this context that the validity of the act of the District Judge in delegating his functions is to be considered.

6. It is unnecessary to mention that the Court of the District Judge, Karachi at the material time was functioning under the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. Under section 5 of this Ordinance the Government, in consultation with the High Court, can appoint as many persons as it thinks necessary to be District Judges and post a District Judge to each District. Simi larly under section 6, the Government, in consultation with the High Court, appoint as many Additional District Judges as may be necessary. Section 6 (2) has material bearing on the contention raised by the appellant's counsel. It is in the following terms:‑-- "An Additional District Judge shall discharge such functions of a District Judge as the District Judge may assign to him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge." Therefore, on the above provision of law, it is absolutely clear that it is competent for an Additional District Judge to discharge such functions of a District Judge as the District Judge may assign to him and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. In the present case under section 15 (1) the District Judge, Karachi has been entrusted with) the power to hear appeal under section 15 (1) of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act. Undoubtedly under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act he has to perform this functions as the District Judge, Karachi. It was, therefore, open to him to assign any f of the functions to be performed by him to one of his Additional District Judges. In the present case, the appeal disposed of by Mr. Mehdi Ali Siddiqui was assigned to him by the District Judge in his administrative capacity, and it cannot be doubted that the appeal was transferred to his Court in the ordinary course and In pursuance of a valid provision of law. In these circumstances we find no force in the second point, which is repelled.

7. No other point was urged. We would, therefore, sum marily dismiss the appeal. S. Q. Appeal dismissed.