1978 PLP 319 (PLC)

He shall be paid his dues, if any, under the Rules in full and final settlement subject to his producing Clearance Certificate to our Accounts Section." The above letter was sent by the Personnel Officer.

3. The respondent challenged the order of his retirement by way of a petition under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before Punjab Labour Court, No. 2, Lahore on 28‑10‑1976. At that time the said Labour Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Its jurisdiction was on the other side of‑the road, from where the Establishment was situated. The said Labour Court referred the case to the Tribunal realising that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The Tribunal, vide order dated 23‑12‑1976, transferred the case to Punjab Labour Court, No. 1, Lahore, which had jurisdiction to entertain it. The said order was passed in the presence of the representatives of the parties. On behalf of Pakistan Cycle Industrial Cc‑operative Society Limited, Personnel Manager had appeared. The said file was received by Punjab Labour Court,. No. I on 6‑1‑1977. Written statement was filed there on 1‑2‑1977. In the said statement in paragraph 2 preliminary objection was taken to the effect that the petition was barred by time because the cause of action, if any, arose from 23‑8‑1976. In paragraph 3 of the said statement it was mentioned that no valid institution of the petition was made and that the Tribunal was not competent to transfer the case. Thereafter, the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Courts was changed and the case again stood transferred to Punjab Labour Court, No. 2, Lahore. On 9‑7‑1977 an application for condonation of delay was filed. Punjab Labour Court. No. 2, vide interim decision dated 19‑7:1977, overruled the preliminary objection as to limitation and directed the parties to produce their evidence.

4. Aggrieved by the above interim decision, the appellants have preferred this appeal.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the petition was not legally Instituted before the Labour Court and, therefore, no petition was pending and as such nothing was transferred by the Tribunal. The net result is that the petition was deemed to be instituted on 6‑1‑1977 when it was received by Punjab Labour Court No. I and as such was barred by time.

6. The point for determination is not that the petition was within limo but whether the Punjab Labour Court No. 2 could competently condone the delay. According to section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to any special or local law. Since the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is a special law the said section will be applicable. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads under: "Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide In Court without jurisdiction. (1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or In a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court, which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of alike nature, is unable to entertain it."

7. In the instant case the respondent had been diligently prosecuting the case and that if on 28‑1t?‑1976, when he filed the petition, the petition had been returned to him, he would have been able to file the petition in time in the proper Court. Thus it is clear that it was the fault of Punjab Labour Court No. 2 to hive entertained the petition in the first instance. It is against the principles of natural justice to make a party suffer due to mistake of a Court. In any case if there was mistake by the respondent in filing the petition in the first instance before Punjab Labour Court, No. 2. the mistake was unintentional and as such would be taken as having been made In good faith. In the case, Azam Jung v. Mohammad Abdul Razzack (A I R 1957 Hyd 4) it was observed‑ "It would appear from the wording of section 14 that the Court is not given any discretion but the litigant is entitled as of right; to exclude the period spent in infructuous proceedings where he satisfies the Court that he was prosecuting the suit bona fide with due diligence." 1t was also observed: "A mistake made unintentionally would be taken as having been made in good faith. Where therefore from a bona fide mistake of fact the litigant has been misled into litigation in a wrong Court such party could avail himself of section 14, Limitation Act." It was further observed; "The ingredient necessary for relief under section 14, Limitation Act is that the suit should have been prosecuted in good faith. A person cannot be said to be acting without good faith where be relies upon the advice of a person whose status entitled him to give advice to litigants. The matter as to which Court would have jurisdiction, must be presumed to be within the knowledge of the lawyer. If the legal adviser erred in advising the client, and the client acting upon such advice files the suit in a wrong Court, the period during which suit was pending in the wrong Court or Courts could be deducted in computing the period of limitation. Mistaken advice of a lawyer in any particular case could be regarded as a bona fide mistake,"

8. In the instant case the petition under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was filed by the respondent through a counsel, therefore, it would be deemed to have been filed at the mistaken advice of miss counsel and as such can be regarded of a bona fide mistake.

9. In the case, Brij Indar Singh v. Lala Kanshi Ram and others (AIR 1917 P C 156) it was held that the circumstances contemplated in section 14 of the Limitation Act should ordinarily constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 9‑A. In the case, Sunderbal and another v. Collector of Begaum and others (AIR 1918 P C 135) an appeal was presented in a wrong Court owing to mistaken legal advice but later on it was presented in right Court and it was by that time barred by time. It was hold that the time it was pending in the wrong Court may be excused.

10. In view of the above, I am satisfied that the delay in filing the petition was rightly condoned by the Labour Court. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.