P L D 1969 Supreme Court 77 (PLP)

A. K. Brohi, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (M. Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Ghulam Ali Memon, Attorney for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th January 1969. SAJJAD AHMAD, J.‑This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against 3 decision of Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, whereby the petitioner's application under Article 123 of the Constitution read with section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act for con tempt proceedings against the five respondents, the first being the Collector of Customs, Karachi and the rest his subordinate officers, was dismissed. It is necessary to give a brief account of the events which led to this application. Between the 27th and 29th of March 1967, the officers of the Sea Cutsoms, Karachi, raided a large number of cloth shops in Karachi and seized large quantities of imported foreign cloth. The petitioner, S. M. Yousuf, like many of his fellow shop‑keepers challenged this action by a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution. A Full Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, by a majority judgment declared that the seizure of the cloth was without lawful authority, as it was done in disregard of the mandatory require ments of law, and ordered the return of the cloth to the petitioner subject to the following condition :‑ "The Collector of Customs or staff before releasing these goods to the petitioner shall make a complete inventory of the goods with proper description which should be signed by both the parties and each party shall retain one copy of this inventory. In addition it would be open to the Collector of Customs to have each of these pieces marked upon in one place by the Customs seal or otherwise so as to ensure the identity of goods. Such of those goods as may, be required by the Collector of Customs shall not be sold or disposed of within a period of three months." It was made clear in the order that these directions were for the benefit of the Customs Department and it was open to it waive any one of them. Thereafter, on the 10th of October 1967, a notice was received by the petitioner from the Collector of Customs intimating the release of his goods. He was asked come to the Customs House on the 28th of October 1967, at 10.00 a.m. and see Mr. S. H. Mirza, Senior Law Officer and/or' 1r, Z. A. K, Saifi, Assistant Law Officer for opening the locks and seal of the trunks, bales or cases for preparing and signing the inventory and for further compliance of the order of the High Court. It was directed that a duly constituted attorney should be sent to sign the inventory and take the delivery of the good, if the owner himself was unable to come. It seems that the inventory of the petitioner's goods was prepared on the 30th of October 1967, and they were released on the following day, viz, the 31st of October 1967. Soon after the goods were loaded on a truck the Customs officials upped the truck and seized the entire goods in question by a written order under section 178 of the Sea Customs Act. It was in these circumstances that the petitioner moved the high Court for an action in contempt basing it on the allegation that the Customs officials in reseizing the goods had violated the orders of the High Court by circumventing the erections given by the High Court in this behalf. It was submitted that the formal release of the goods was merely a technical compliance with the orders of the High Court without my intention to respect it in spirit as manifested by the subsequent action of the Customs Authorities in reseizing the goods the respondents in their answer submitted that the reseizure of s, good; was made by them in exercise of their power under section 178 of the Sea Customs Act and that no contempt of Court was committed or intended by them. The learned fudges held that the reseizure was made by the Customs officials on the purported exercise of their powers under the Sea Customs 1ct. It is stated in the judgment of the High Court that cases: re known where a person who had been released on the issues of writ of habeas corpus was immediately re‑arrested and no action for contempt was ever taken in such cases although lie re‑arrest was challenged as illegal or mala fide. The action of the Customs Authorities gives us the impres sion that the delivery of the seized goods to the petitioner by the Customs Department officials was made, more in their anxiety to comply with the orders of the High Court rather than to defy it. They have reseized the goods in their belief that the order of the High Court had not placed any restriction on them to do so. The High Court in disposing of the contempt application has said that no restriction was placed on the Customs Authorities against reseizing of the goods if the requirements of law were fulfilled. When the High Court itself A thinks that in reseizing the goods the Customs Authorities had purported to act in the exercise of their powers and no con tempt was committed by them, it becomes impossible to agree with Mr. Brohi, the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court should feel differently, in a supersensitive regard for the dignity of the superior Courts to see that their orders command absolute submission. As repeatedly held, the jurisdiction of the superior Courts to take action for contempt of its own authority which undoubtedly belongs to them should be jealously guarded but sparingly exercised. The dignity of the Courts rests on far more sure foundations of public trust and confidence. These foundations become stronger by the noble and serene conduct of judicial rectitude on the part of the Judges rather than by coercive actions taken in provocation or sensitiveness for vindicating their authority. In proceedings for contempt where the conduct of a person who has apparently defied the orders of the Court leaves room for doubt with regard to his intention and a belief is possible that he has acted either mistakenly or on wrong but honest notions of his rights, the benefit of doubt should ungrudgingly be given to him. We do not think that this is a case for our interference. We decline to grant leave and dismiss the petition. K. B. A. Leave refused.