1983 PLP 9 (CLC)

This appeal has called in question the order dated 11th October, 1980 of the learned Additional District Judge, Shikarpur, whereby the temporary injunction granted in favour of the appellant has been vacated. The temporary injunction was issued in the suit filed by the. appellant seeking to restrain the respondent Town Committee Chak from recovering the arrears of the lease money alleged to be outstanding against him on account of collecting octroi. As disclosed in the memo. of appeal, the appellant had taken a lease for one year for collecting octroi on the goods imported within the limits of the Town Committee. The lease money agreed to be paid by the appellant was Rs. 90,000 out of which he had paid Rs. 60,000 before filing of the suit. As for the balance, his plea was that he was not liable to pay the same because he could not collect the octroi after breaking out of the war between India and Pakistan in 1971. According to his version almost all those Hindus who dominated the business of the town came to standstill. He further alleged that even Town Committee did not co‑operate with him inasmuch as that the octroi collecting staff were not made available to him for collecting the tax. In spite of these developments which prevented the appellant from collecting the octroi, the Town Committee issued notice calling upon him to clear the outstanding arrears whereupon he filed the suit now pending in the Court of Additional District Judge; Shikarpur, with the prayer mentioned above.

2. The impugned order is obviously based on the amendment introduced in Order XXXIX of the Civil Procedure Code by inserting a new rule 4‑A after rule 4 thereof. The new rule 4‑A reads as follows :‑ "4‑A. Injunction to cease to be in force after certain period.‑An injunc tion granted by a Court in a suit which seeks to question the validity or legal effect of any order made, proceedings taken or act done by any authority or person, which has been made, taken or done, or purports to have been made, taken or done, under any law which is specified in Part I of the First Schedule to the Constitution or relates to, or is concerned with, assessment or collection of public revenues shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period (six months) following the day on which it is made, unless the case is finally decided, or the injunction is discharged or set aside by the Court earlier. Explanation.‑In this rule 'public revenues' includes the dues of any bank owned by the Federal Government or of any Corporation or under taking owned o: controlled by the Federal Government or a Provincial Government."

3. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the amendment made by rule 4‑A was inapplicable in the instant case. His argument was that the money in the hands of the appellant not being octroi dues could not be treated as public revenues within the meaning of the amendment. According to the learned counsel it was a contract money and, therefore, its recovery was governed by the terms and conditions of the contract. Since the amount sought to be recovered was disputed it could not be recovered until it was determined by due process of law. In support of this argument he relied upon The Province of West Pakistan 'v. Muhammad Ayub Khuro (P L D 1967 Kar. 673) and Construction Ltd. v. XEN, I. B. Division, Thatta (P L D 1975 Kar. 1059).

4. In the first mentioned case the word 'dues' was held to mean "that which law or justice requires to be paid or done." On the basis of this defini tion it was further held, "therefore, before claim ‑can ripen into 'dues', a determination has to be reached in accordance with law or justice."

5. In the second case it was held : "There is therefore, hardly any doubt with regard to this issue that the amount of damages claimed by the P. W. D. had firstly been determined and assessed by a competent authority, only then could such 'established dues' be recovered as arrears of land revenue, in case there was a proper notification authorising such recovery."

6. The proposition spelt out in the above authorities is unexceptionable. But the point involved to the instant case relates to vacation of temporary injunction after efflux of time. By this order it is not to be decided that the Town Committee can go ahead with recovery of the amount notwithstanding that it has not been determined by due process of law. Of course if the temporary injunction ceases to have operation, at the expiry of six months, the Town Committee would, no doubt, be free to start proceedings for the recovery and in that eventuality the very purpose of the suit would be frustrated. Notwithstanding the difficulty that the appellant would have to face by such recovery proceedings, the action would, however, not be final. It would be subject to the final judgment delivered in the suit. If the appellant happens to succeed in the suit, the money recovered from him would be refunded to him. The question arises as to why should the appellant or for that matter any other litigant placed under similar situation, be put to such inconvenience during the intervening period. It seems the intention of the amendment is not to allow the public money to be locked up until disposal of the suit which invariably takes years to be disposed.

7. The moot point to be determined in this case is whether the money due to be paid to the Town Committee is 'public revenue' within the meaning of the amendment. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that until amount was not finally assessed by due process of law it could not be said to be due to be paid to the Town Committee and as such it could not be treated as 'public revenues'. I am unable to go alongwith this view. May be the amount is disputed yet its status of being the money belonging to the Committee and hence being public money cannot be doubted. If this argu ment is accepted, then the amendment would become redundant and in no case it would be applicable. The words 'public revenues' are defined in the Explanation following the rule 4‑A. They include dues of any bank owned by Federal Government or any Corporation or undertaking owned or con trolled by the Federal Government or Provincial Government. In the opinion of learned counsel for the appellant the Town Committee does not fall within any of the categories mentioned in the explanation. His view does not appear to be correct. The word 'corporation' has been used in the explana tion. Of course it has not been defined in the Civil Procedure Code. It is to .be understood in its ordinary grammatical sense. The dictionary meaning of the corporation is : united body of persons, specially one authorised to act as an individual ; artificial person created by charter, prescription or act of the Legislature, comprising many persons". The Town Committee has all these attributes and therefore can be properly termed as corporation within the meaning of the Explanation. In various laws the word corporation is recognized as a corporate body having independent status with its own seal and power to acquire movable or immovable property. It is body who can sue and be sued. The Town Committee satisfies these requisites and as such can be treated as corporation. In view of the position explained above the money payable to the Town Committee is held to be public revenue and as such the amendment referred to above is applicable in the instant case.

9. For the above reasons, the impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge based on the aforesaid amendment is correct. There is no justification to reverse the same. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with cost. S. Q. Appeal dismissed.